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EDITORIAL
Robert D. Leighninger, Jr.
This is the second Special Issue since I've been Editor to
grow spontaneously from regular JSSW submissions. No Call
for Papers was issued. No Special Editor beat the bushes for
good quality work. It flowed in over the transom. We did have
to delay the publication of some papers and rush others through
revisions, but otherwise all we had to do was organize the material. This is testimony to the enduring problems of our welfare
system and the devotion of good scholars in a variety of disciplines to finding ways to solve them.
It is worth emphasizing the multidisciplinary character of
this issue. Its contributors represent Economics, Political Science, History, Sociology, and Social Work. This is, I hope, a sign
of increasing recognition of JSSW as a place where important
work will be read and cited.
The authors began their reconsideration of welfare for different reasons. Ron Dear's "What's Right With Welfare" was written because of a recurrent classroom experience. When asked to
list advantages and disadvantages of the current welfare system,
his students had no problems with criticism but could come up
with nothing positive to say. Feeling that any reform should
maximize strengths as well as correct weaknesses, he set out to
assess the positive aspects of the existing system. Students were
not the only skeptics. One member of our Editorial Board, when
informed of the title of the paper, asked: "Is it more than a half
page long?" In fact, it is one of the longest papers we've ever
published. We hope it will provide a solid basis for evaluating
recent reform efforts.
Len Goodwin did some of the original studies on the relationship of work to income support. Since this theme persists
in current reform efforts, his review of workfare research is
essential to evaluating those efforts. To remind us that these
problems have a history in our society that extends well beyond
the time we think of as the dawn of the Welfare State, Cynthia
Hamilton's article describes the attempts at reform in the Progressive Era.

4

Editorial

Following the Background Section, we have three articles
that cover several ideological perspectives on Welfare Reform.
Nancy Rose gives us the view of Political Economy, David
Congdon offers a new look at Keynesianism, and David Stoesz
argues for a new formulation entirely. He combines ideas from
the NeoConservatives with some traditional Liberal notions. We
hope these pieces will stimulate reexamination of our basic assumptions about how society works and how it might work.
Finally, we have collected case studies of special problems
and specific attempts at reform. They cover a wide range and
show in detail the dilemmas we face and the cost in human
frustration and misery of our failure to resolve them effectively.
We hope this Special Issue will contribute something to those
resolutions.

What's Right with Welfare?
The Other Face of AFDC'
RONALD B. DEAR
University of Washington
School of Social Work

Eleven million people, mostly mothers and children, depend on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, America's largest child welfare program. Much is wrong with AFDC welfare, and serious efforts are being
made, again, to reform it. So far, no major attempts at reform have
been successful. If reform is to succeed, we must understand what
needs to be corrected and what does not.
What's right with welfare? This study, not an apology or excuse
for AFDC, answers that rarely asked question. Part I surveys background. Part II cites myths and criticisms of AFDC and portrays poverty as it afflicts children and female-headed households. The focus of
the analysisis on the depiction of 12 positive features of AFDC. Hidden
in this unpopular form of aid are income transfer policy principles
important to any consideration of welfare reform. To overlook these
principles and to continue to ignore what is right with welfare may
doom all efforts at reform.
Our blindness to what is good about AFDC extends to most public
social programs and all become vulnerable to attack and budget reductions. Americans need to be made aware of the desirable aspects of
their social programs. By scrutinizing AFDC, the most maligned of
programs, this analysis is a step in that direction.

Everyone knows what's wrong with the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. It is generous, expensive,
and ineffectual; it is "welfare" 2 for mothers with children. Conservatives claim it squanders public taxes and fosters dependency, and liberals maintain it is primitive and stingy. The press
headlines its fraud and its waste. Politicans suggest that solving
the "welfare problem" would resolve our fiscal predicament, get
state and federal budgets back in balance, and make government
fiscally responsible. AFDC administrators, line workers, and
clients themselves derogate the program; staff is demoralized,
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clients detest its complicated application procedure and stigmatized support. Nobody likes AFDC.
Purpose
How much of the negative feeling surrounding AFDC is
based on fact? This article takes a "stop and think" approach to
show that AFDC, with its flaws, serves many critical functions
in American social welfare. Indeed, to reduce AFDC further or
to eliminate it entirely, as is occasionally suggested, would prove
disastrous.
Let's face it: most public social programs in America, and
especially those designed for poor people, have a bad name.
"This is the land of plenty; work hard and cash in"-is our ethic.
Since virtually all of us receive aid from social programs sometime during our lifetime-frequently for long periods of timethis inability to see good in social provision programs in general
and in AFDC in particular is national blindness.
What was the origin of this unpopular program? Part I, "The
Background of AFDC," briefly examines the context of AFDC
and its predecessor, mothers' pensions, defines social assistance
and shows how the grant level was set. Major changes across a
53-year history chart the course of welfare reform.
Part II lists two dozen myths about AFDC and also cites five
common criticisms. This is the "first face" of welfare and the
face with which we are all familiar. Part II also presents 12 positive features of AFDC. What would happen if AFDC ceased to
be funded? Who would be hurt? What are the income alternatives for those who depend on it? In other words, what is right
with welfare? Not an apology or whitewash, the intent of this
critique is to document that AFDC does indeed have another
side, a second face that is positive and beneficial.
Part I. The Background of AFDC
Mothers' Pensions
Prior to passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 and the
commencement of a national Aid to Dependent Children program, nearly all states had enacted legislation that would provide
public aid to children in their own homes. Mothers' pensions
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("mothers' aid," "mothers' assistance," "widows' pensions") were
public grants in cash or in kind given to selected homes where
the male breadwinner was absent. These pensions had much in
common with relief under the poor law, but they introduced
several new relief concepts and were a prelude to the Aid to
Dependent Children program.
Mothers' pensions were evidence of public recognition of
the long-term nature of childrearing and of the contribution a
mother could make in a fatherless home (Social Security in
America, 1937, pp. 233-234). Following the recommendations of
the 1909 White House Conference on the Care of Dependent
Children, mothers' pensions were designed to prevent the
3
breakup or disruption of families solely because of povery.
Such aid enabled mothers to stay at home, thereby preventing institutionalization of the children. Not only could the child
be cared for best in his/her own home, but also "the mothers'
contribution to the home ... was [usually] greater than her
earnings outside the home" (Social Security in America, 1937,
p. 234). Grace Abbott (1934, p. 191) contended that mothers' aid
ushered in a new principle in public assistance, that of adequacy. The first mothers' pension law was enacted in Missouri
in 1911 and applied only to Jackson County. The first statewide
law as enacted in Illinois in the same year. Within ten years,
laws had been passed in 41 states and by 1935, all but two
(Georgia and South Carolina) of the 48 states had such legislation (Lundberg, 1930, pp. 273-274).
States were quick to pass mothers' pension laws but slow to
implement them. In 1928, for example, when 44 states had such
legislation, fewer than 50% used them (Lundberg, 1928, p. 446).
Moreover, when the laws were in use, implementation varied
widely; many areas gave out small amounts of money that were
hardly more than tokens of aid.
In any case, mothers' aid was largely an urban program. In
1934, just prior to passage of the Social Security Act, 51% of all
recipients lived in only nine cities (Social Security in America,
1937, p. 238), and these cities accounted for more than twothirds of total expenditures in the country. Six states had fewer
than 200 families receiving aid (Abbott, 1934, p. 207).
Moral overtones strongly affected state policies. Aid was re-
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served largely for a group Bell called the "gilt-edged widows"
(1965, p. 9). One study showed that in 1932, 82% of those in
receipt of aid were widows, of whom 96% were white (cited in
Bell, p. 9). Not surprisingly, only a tiny minority of those in
need received assistance. In 1930, there were 3.8 million femaleheaded families in the United States, and, of these, slightly over
one million were headed by widows. Less than 3% of families
at risk received aid and "less than 0.7 of 1% of all children under
18 years of age.., were covered by the program" (Bell, p. 14).
By 1934, it was becoming clear that the success or failure of
an income maintenance program (as measured by grant level,
degree of implementation, and proportion of the at-risk population covered) frequently depended upon whether local participation was obligatory or optional and also upon which unit of
government instituted, supervised, and helped to finance the
program. In retrospect, the history of mothers' aid underscores
the notion that in social programs, larger units of government
achieve wider implementation, greater uniformity, and tend to
provide higher benefits than do smaller units of government.
The Social Security Act and ADC
Current public assistance programs (also called "welfare,"
public aid, or social assistance) were established in the mid-1930s
as part of the omnibus Social Security Act (P.L. 271, 1935). They
were public programs designed to help or "assist" a few selected
categories of needy people (children, elderly, blind), and, as a
consequence, are also referred to as "categorical aid" or as "categorical programs." For those who fit the defined category, the
major determinant for eligibility has always been income and
level of need. In contrast to social insurance criteria, eligibility
is rarely linked to prior employment of the applicant or a member of the applicant's family. (In some states, AFDC-E may be
linked to prior employment.) Social assistance is given to individuals and families in several forms, most frequently cash,
medical care (Medicaid), food stamps, and social services.
All aid is financed out of public funds, derived from a varying and complex combination of federal, state, and, in some
instances, local revenues. Federal revenues are derived mainly
from individual and corporate income taxes (90 percent) excise,
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customs, duties, and a variety of other minor revenue sources.
State and local revenues are derived from income, property, sales,
excise and other sources such as gas tax, user fee, etc. With the
exception of the sales tax, most of the federal and state revenue
sources are comparatively progressive. Unlike financial support
for social security and unemployment insurance, no specially
earmarked taxes or payroll taxes paid by employers and/or employees are used to finance public assistance.
Complex funding, varying eligibility conditions, and limiting aid to selected categories of people may not seem the most
effective way to organize large social programs. Why would policy makers develop such an uncoordinated medley of programs?
These patchwork programs only make sense when viewed in
the historical context of the period of national crisis in which the
legislation was passed, the framework of the Social Security Act,
and the predecessor programs of mothers' pensions, old-age
pensions, and pensions for the blind. Aid to Dependent Children (ADC, title IV), Old-Age Assistance (OAA, title I), and
Aid to the Blind (AB, title X) were the three social assistance
titles of the five income transfer sections in the original Social
Security Act, signed into law August 14, 1935. In theory, this
form of aid was supposed to "wither away" and to be superseded
increasingly by old-age insurance ("social security," title II) and,
to a lesser degree, by unemployment insurance (title III). In short,
the three public assistance titles of the Social Security Act were
viewed as emergency measures, designed to take effect immediately in a time of high unemployment, widespread hunger,
destitution and homelessness. The nation was in a prolonged
economic depression and national crisis. Most private charities
had run out of money, and some state and local governments
were close to bankruptcy.
Thus, it is not surprising that President Franklin Roosevelt
called ADC "a safeguard gainst misfortune which cannot be
wholly eliminated in this man-made world of ours." In creating
ADC, for the first time the federal government accepted the responsibility to help states underwrite the support of children
who had been deprived of a parent because of death, disability,
or desertion. Most important, the program provided a meansspearheaded and partly financed from the federal treasury-to
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care for those children in their own homes, rather than in institutions, as had been the common practice before (Ross, 1985,
pp. 5-6).
In ADC, federal and state governments shared fiscal and
program responsibility. Annual appropriations from general
revenues provided for the federal share of program costs. To
receive money, each state had to adopt a plan subject to federal
approval: among other things, the plan had to be effective in all
political subdivisions of the state, provide a single administering
agency, institute a process for appeal of denied claims, require
regular reports to the Social Security Board, and put a limitation
on residency requirements. States were free to establish their
own eligibility requirements and benefit levels, and to be as
restrictive and as discretionary as they chose.
Setting the ADC Grant Level
The original bill did not limit the federal share of the ADC
grant, except to say that it should be no more than one-third of
the amounts expended by state and local governments. The onethird figure, suggested by the Children's Bureau, was based on
the belief "that state and local governments should each bear
one-third of the cost of this aid" (Witte, 1963, pp. 164-165).
In the old-age assistance program, however, Congress had
already decided to pay for one-half the total OAA benefit, up to
a federal maximum of $15 a month for each recipient. Thus, if
a state chose to pay an elderly person $15 per month, the total
federal/state benefit was $30 a month. Theoretically, a two-person elderly couple household could receive as much as $60 a
month. Of course, states were free to pay less (or more) than
$15 a month to an elderly person. If they paid more, the federal
limit of $15 would remain.
Several members of the House Ways and Means Committee
thought there should also be a limit on the ADC grant. What
would be an appropriate maximum? It was suggested
... that the limitation should be the same amount as the maximum pension payable to children of servicemen who lost their
lives in World War I, namely, $18 per month for the first child and
$12 for the second and additional children in the family. In making
this suggestion, the congressman completely overlooked the fact
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that under the Veterans Pension Act [an additional] grant of $30
per month is made to the widow ....

(Witte, p. 163)

In ADC no money was to be provided to the mother or caretaker.
Witte, in his chronicle of the Act, tells us that "no one pointed
out this fact at the time, and ...

[the] motion was adopted with-

out dissent" (pp. 163-164). As a result, when the ADC program
began payments on February 1, 1936, the federal government
agreed to pay one-third of the state's ADC expenditure with a
federal ceiling of $6 per month for the first child (one-third of
$18) and $4 for each additional child (one-third of $12).
In establishing the ADC program, Congress commmited
three major blunders: (a) It fixed the maximum matchable aid
for children at the unreasonably low levels of $18 and $12 per
month. (b) It agreed to pay only one-third of these small maximums. (c) It failed to provide any money to the adult caretaker.
These oversights had an immediate impact. Under the adult
program of OAA, a two-person family (an elderly couple) could
receive as much as $60 a month. In the children's program a
three-person family (mother with two children) could receive a
maximum of $30 per month. Two people on OAA could receive
twice as much as three people on ADC. Witte states:
...I called the attention of. . . members of the House committee
to the fact that this limitation would operate to keep the federal
grants below one-third of the states' expenditures in many cases;
further, that it was utterly illogical to expect a mother with a child
under sixteen to live on $18 per month when old age assistance
grants of $30 per month per person were contemplated in the same
act. This was acknowledged to be a justified criticism, but there
was so little interest on the part of any of the members in the aid
to dependent children that no one thereafter made a motion to
strike out the restriction.
He adds,
There was little interest in Congress in the aid to dependent
children. It is my belief that nothing would have been done on
this subject if it had not been included in the report of the Committee on Economic Security. That the grants to states for this purpose are limited to one-third of their expenditures, while the grants
for old age assistance and blind pensions are for one-half of the
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expenditures, reflects this complete lack of interest in the aid for
dependent children. (Witte, p. 164)
One half century later this Congressional disinterest in dependent children continues; the errors that resulted in large grant
disparities still await correction. Those in the adult categoriesthe aged, blind, and disabled-now covered under Supplemental Security Income (SSI) continue to receive two to three times
more money than children and their families. For example, in
August 1988, the average federally administered SSI payment
was $260 per person per month. Twenty-eight states gave an
additional $113 a month. Under SSI a single person might receive
$373 per month and a couple $746 (Social Security Bulletin, Nov.
1988, p. 51). By contrast, in March 1988, the average AFDC payment was $127 per recipient per month or $371 for a three-person
family. The range was $38 a month for a recipient in Mississippi
to $198 in California (Monthly Benefit Statistics, Oct. 1988, p. 12).
Major Changes in ADC and AFDC, 1939-1988
In spite of a negative view of welfare, Congress and the
courts have expanded entitlement and increased benefits over
the past half century. The fact that conservative Republicans once
urged higher welfare benefits (note 4) now appears a strange
anomaly, a curious historical footnote. However, they joined the
Democrats in 1939 to extend eligibility to children 16 and 17
years of age if attending school. Later, 18 to 20 year olds were
also made eligible if attending school. (Recently this age was
reduced so that a child must be under 18 and in school.)
A change in 1950 made a needy relative living with an eligible child a recipient. For the first time, a state would receive
federal matching funds if it gave aid to an ADC adult (Social
Security Act Amendments of 1950). In 1961, the Unemployed
Parent program (ADC-UP) made a child eligible for ADC when
one parent in a two-parent household became unemployed (Social Security Act Amendments of 1961). In 1962, a major program change included a second adult as a recipient for federal
matching purposes. At this time the program changed its name
from ADC to AFDC, "F" implying a program for families-not
just for dependent children (Public Welfare Amendments of 1962).

What's Right with Welfare?

Numerous alterations have been made in the complex federal
matching formula, nearly all designed to give states a more generous match and to encourage higher benefits to recipients.
Aside from the name change, all these changes were optional
to the states: they were free to extend eligibility if they chose to
do so. For instance, only 28 of the 54 states and jurisdictions
give aid to families with an unemployed parent, and in those
states it is a tiny program.
The Continuous Search for Welfare Reform
The last three decades have seen numerous efforts at welfare
reform. Most attempts have focused on reducing the size of the
welfare rolls by helping recipients become self-sufficient. The
Social Security Amendments of 1967 established the Work Incentive Program (WIN). Mothers with children over 6 were required to register for work. Employment Security and the state
welfare department were to assist dients in counseling, training,
and job referral. Never considered cost effective, WIN underwent many changes and has been superseded by the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program of 1988. No separate
funding has been requested for fiscal 1990.
During the early 1970s, Nixon pursued his Family Assistance
Program (FAP). Perhaps the most daring effort at reform, Nixon's
plan would have provided a national income guarantee for all
needy families with children. It was defeated because one contingent thought the plan and its benefits too liberal and far
reaching. Oppositon also came from those who believed the
proposed guarantee too low. The Carter administration recommended a Better Jobs and Income bill. This proved no more
successful than the Nixon plan, but it did reflect the growing
conviction that any welfare reform should incorporate work requirements. The various Negative Income Tax experiments of
the 1960s and 1970s also reflected the intense interest Congress
and the public had in the effect of income and tax rates on work
efforts.
The 1980s have seen increasing attention and innovation
shifting to the states. Massachusetts, California, New Jersey,
Ohio, New York City, and Washington State have started their
own reform efforts, usually with the blessing (and necessary

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
waivers) from the federal government. A number of states have
introduced work programs. Yet another tack to reform welfare
has been to increase administrative efficiency (Brodkin, 1986).
The most recent federal effort at welfare reform saw a somewhat grudging agreement between Democrats and Republicans
and resulted in the Federal Support Act signed by President
Reagan October 13, 1988. It provides a Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills (JOBS) program, offers transitional child care and
medical assistance, requires all states to provide welfare to twoparent families, and, not surprisingly, emphasizes moving the
welfare parent, usually the mother, out of the home and into the
work force. Far from perfect, the act does provide limited new
funds for education, support services, and child support enforcement. Over the next five years, federal reform will cost
about four percent above current costs, not counting inflation
or program expansion.
Whatever may be said regarding welfare reform, work is
only part of the answer. AFDC mothers are the only employable
people on welfare, and of these mothers, perhaps one-third are
employable. The rest are already working, in training, incapacitated, or needed at home. These employable mothers constitute
a tiny 6.7% of all 17 million welfare recipients; the rest are children, or blind or disabled or aged persons. Roughly 11% of all
AFDC families indude a male, and they constitute but 2% of all
those on welfare. Many of these men are unable to work because
of disability.
The American welfare system does need to be improved.
"Real" welfare reform, where employable persons are aided in
becoming self-sufficient, has remained an elusive goal. Critics
and reformers alike fail to acknowledge that helping people become self-supporting is extremely expensive. It is likely that the
aim of reforming welfare and the aim of saving tax dollars are
mutually exdusive goals. Reform will cost more than the amount
we now pay for welfare, at least in the short run.
The True Cost of AFDC
The constant criticism, debate, analysis, and attempt to reform welfare are remarkable in light of the financial commitment
actually made to AFDC. In Reagan's proposed budget of $1.1
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trillion for fiscal 1990 (10/1/89-9/30/90), total federal outlays for
AFDC cash payments are estimated to be $8.5 billion (Appendix
to U.S. Budget, 1990, p. 1-K 38). AFDC constitutes 0.7 of 1% of
the budget. Tracing federal expenditures back 30 years shows
little variation: AFDC has never exceeded 1.2% of the federal
budget. Recipients of income for all means-tested cash programs 5 rose from 5.8 million in 1960 to approximately 17 million
today, a period that encompassed the War on Poverty and the
greatest beneficiary increase in 50 years. Surprisingly, and in
spite of this threefold increase, public assistance cash grants as
a proportion of all federal expenditures remained fairly constant,
reaching a high of 3.2% for one year (but usually much less)
(Dear, 1982, pp. 26-30).
By comparison, in fiscal 1990, $22 billion, about 2% of the
federal budget, has been allocated to all means-tested cash assistance. In addition to AFDC, this induded SSI, earned income
tax credit, refugee assistance, and low income energy assistance.
Outlays for food stamps were an additional $12.8 billion (U.S.
Budget, 1990).
Why all the fuss? From the standpoint of cost (political rhetoric notwithstanding), welfare, particularly AFDC, is not a bigticket item. Why the outpouring of energy and time aimed at
reducing it further? Apparently, negative and distorted views of
welfare are rooted in societal beliefs about poverty, low income,
and illegitimacy. Further, there is evidence that this form of
assistance is unpopular in other countries as well as in the USA.
Part II: The Two Faces of AFDC
A. The First Face of AFDC: What's Wrong with Welfare?
Myths and Criticisms
Myths about AFDC welfare abound and some contain a grain
of truth. However, few apply to a large percentage of recipients
and none apply to a majority. Of the following generalizations,
not a single one applies to all recipients, and most are simply
untrue:
1. Once on welfare, always on welfare.
2. The welfare population consists of a permanent, dependent
class of recipients.
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3. The federal government faces a large budget deficit because so
much is spent on programs like AFDC.
4. Half of the money in the federal budget is spent on programs
for poor people.
5. Women on AFDC/welfare have more children to get more
money.
6. Poor people migrate to states with high AFDC benefits to get
on welfare.
7. Welfare families tend to be larger than families not on welfare
and have more children than nonwelfare families.
8. All children on welfare are born out of wedlock.
9. Most mothers receiving AFDC are in their teens.
10. To get more money, AFDC applicants try to cheat the system
by deliberately misrepresenting the facts. As a result, the system is rife with fraud.
11. Most people on welfare simply cannot handle money.
12. If you give more money to people on welfare, they will probably spend it on drink or in other nonworthwhile ways.
13. Almost no welfare mothers have finished high school.
14. Most welfare families are black.
15. Benefits are purposely low in some areas because it costs less
to live there.
16. In some states benefits are so high that recipients have little
motivation to get off of the rolls.
17. The majority of AFDC families live in private housing and a
good number own their own homes.
18. Benefit levels have been rising fast or faster than inflation.
19. Families on welfare living in states with more generous grant
levels are brought well above the poverty line.
20. A large number of AFDC families have two able-bodied adult
recipients.
21. Most AFDC families consist of able-bodied adults too lazy to
work or seek employment.
22. Almost no AFDC parents work, are in training, or are looking
for a job.
23. People can receive a sizeable amount from employment and
still remain on welfare.
24. Those on welfare have little incentive to work. 6
The above generalizations are faulty, but there is much that
can be legitimately criticized about AFDC. First, grant levels are
pitifully low. Not a single state provides enough cash income to
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bring a mother with one or two children up to the admittedly
low official poverty line. (Food stamps do help, but even with
food stamps few families are brought up to the poverty level.)
The larger the family, the lower the per capita grants. In March
1988, the average monthly payment per person in all states was
$127 per month and for a family of three the average grant was
$371 per month or $4,452 per year, one-half of the poverty level
of $9,690 for a family of three (Monthly Benefit Statistics; Social
Security Bulletin, April 1988, p. 2). Furthermore, the average obscures a wide variation in payments: Mississippi pays $38 a
month; California, $198. Finally, while they are required to define a standard of need for AFDC families, the states are not
required to meet it. Few make the attempt.
A second legitimate criticism of AFDC concerns its difficult,
demeaning, and painful application procedures. Those seeking
AFDC assistance must complete long, complex forms and provide numerous personal documents. Clients often wait many
hours with their small children in an overcrowded room to see
a harried, underpaid, overworked, eligibility worker who has
but a few minutes to review the complex forms and to answer
questions. If there is a mistake or an omission on the application,
or if additional supporting documents are required (e.g., rent
receipts, electric bills, birth certificates, records of prior employment, etc.), the weary applicant is told to return another
day to repeat the long procedure. Getting an answer to a simple
question ("Is this where I apply for Medicaid?") may require an
entire day sitting in the waiting room. At times, aid is denied
based on the judgment or discretion of the eligiblity worker. In
short, one applies for welfare-one does not claim it.
A third legitimate criticism of welfare is that many of the
rules, regulations, forms, and procedures differ in each of the
54 states and jurisdications. A needy person may receive benefits in one state and be denied benefits in another. Equally
needy families will receive unequal amounts of aid. In only onehalf of the 54 states and jurisdictions two-parent families are
eligible to apply for aid.
AFDC policies may be criticized because they are sometimes
contradictory. To cite only one example, considerable emphasis
is placed on getting AFDC parents into the workforce to become
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self-sufficient. However, when people do receive income from
work under AFDC, they face an unusually high tax rate. The
1981 Social Security amendments changed the tax rate to 67%
for the first four months and 100% thereafter. After four months,
for each dollar earned, one dollar of benefits is lost. In addition,
the fully employed former recipient also loses access to medical
care, child care, and other in-kind benefits.
The fifth criticism relates to the quality of life and the daily
struggle of the typical AFDC mother. The life of the AFDC family
is perhaps indescribable by middle-class standards. Certainly,
conditions are worse than stated here or described in most literature or realized by those who wage their untiring criticism
of the "welfare mess" and of "all those bums on welfare."
AFDC grants and food stamp allotments are insufficient, and
families routinely run out of money before the end of the month.
How do people survive on so little income? Some welfare mothers ransack supermarket garbage bins (called "garbaging)-really
a modem update of Biblical gleaning-to get enough food for
their children. Others sell their blood plasma twice a week for
about $10 a pint to gain desperately needed additional income.
Still others pilfer Good Will drop-off bins to get clothing for
themselves and their children. To spare themselves the embarrassment of going barefoot, recipients may borrow footware to
go to the doctor, to school, or for other appointments. (In one
ironic instance, a family borrowed shoes to go to a welfare eligibility review, where they had to assure the worker they were
still in need.) Some mothers, in absolute desperation, resort to
prostitution to get money.
Such actions, most illegal, and others, were related by AFDC
mothers to the writer, and these women live in a state noted for
the generosity of its welfare benefits. One wonders how mothers
in less generous states manage. (Twenty-four jurisdictions provide average payments of less than $100 a month per recipient)
(Monthly Benefit Statistics, Oct. 1988, p. 12).
The myths about welfare and its legitimate criticisms constitute the first face of AFDC, the one that is visible and best
known. There are, of course, other myths and additional criticisms. Such a summary underscores program difficulties in a
broad political and academic sense. Unfortunately, it understates
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the personal decisions that face every AFDC family, especially
the mother each day of her life. What is good and desirable in
a program so easily discredited? The following section discusses
12 positive characteristics of AFDC.
B. The Second Face of AFDC Unmasked: What's Right
with Welfare?
1. AFDC directs benefits to families with the highest risk of
poverty and for whom there is no viable income alternative.
"The dilemma must be faced: the chief cause of poverty in
modem society is children." So claimed the late Alva Myrdal in
1941 in Nation and Family (p. 66). Aside from the USA, virtually
every advanced nation has faced the dilemma by adopting family allowance programs. Most plans in these 63 nations provide
monthly grants of money to mothers for each child in every
family, regardless of income (Social Security Program Throughout
the World, 1987, 1988). Here, the public social policy closest to
universal allowances is the federal income tax exemption for dependents, a once-a-year provision of little value to those with
low income (and low tax rates) and of no value to those with no
income. There is also AFDC, specifically designed to direct assistance to high-risk families with children and for whom no
other aid is available. Can AFDC be justified? Are there other
income alternatives to this form of public aid?
Recent data show 32.5 million Americans (13.5% of the population) living in poverty in 1987. Of the 32.5 million poor, 66%
were white, 3 0% black, and the remainder of other races. (Persons of Spanish origin may be classified as black or white). Of
65.1 million families, 7.0 million or 10.8% were poor (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report [CPS], P-60,
No. 161, Aug. 1988, pp. 7, 38).
Unhappily, these statistical dice are loaded: In spite of the
fact that two-thirds of all poor people are white, a white person
in America has only 11 chances in 100 of being poor. For black
Americans, the chances of being poor jump to 33% or 1 in 3.
Of course, additional characteristics boost the probability of
poverty, such as sex of family head and the number of children
in the family.
Forty percent of all poor persons are children under 18 years
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of age. Both the number and percent of children in poverty have
risen; 12.4 million boys and girls under 18 live in families with
incomes below the poverty level. The Census Bureau concludes,
The poverty rate for children continues, as it has since 1975, to be
higher than that for other age groups, averaging 20.6% for those
under 18 years, while that for persons 65 years and over was 12.2%
in 1987, and the poverty rate for persons 18 to 64 was 10.8% (CPS,
P-60, No. 161, p. 8).
As Table 1 dearly illustrates, husband/wife or married-couple households are the norm, representing more than eight in
ten of all families. Female-headed households (no husband present) are still the exception, and households headed by men are
a tiny minority: of the 65 million families in 1987, 10.6 million
or 16% were headed by women and less than a million were
headed by men. However, husband-wife households have dedined from 90% in 1959 to 84% in 1987, whereas female-headed
households better than doubled in number, growing from 4.5
million to 10.6 million.
Between 1959 and 1987 total families increased by 44% (from
45.1 to 65.1 million), and female-headed families increased by
Table 1
Number and Percent of all Families by Head of Household:
Selected Years 1959-1987 (in millions)

Husband/Wife
Female (no male)
Male (no female)a
Totals

1959
%
No.

No.

%

1987
%
No.

90
10

49.0
8.2

86
14

54.5
10.6

40.6
4.5

NA
45.1 100%

1977

NA
57.2 100%

84
16

NA
65.1 100%

aTotal number of male households with no wife present is included in
husband/wife households. They represent a tiny percentage of all households
(approximately 1 to 2%). Data not available separately for each year.
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 (1988, August), Money Income and Poverty Status

in the United States: 1987 (Advance Data From the March 1988 Current Population
Survey), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 20, pp. 3839; 1959 & 1977 data are from Current Population Reports for prior years.
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a stunning 136% (from 4.5 to 10.6 million). Most AFDC cases
are drawn from the women and children in these low income
households. Table 2 demonstrates that although the number and
the percentage of all families classified as poor declined from
1959 to 1977, recent years have seen an upswing in family poverty. The critical difference lies in the composition of this group
of poor families. In 1959, one-fifth of all poor families were
headed by women. In 1987, over one-half of all poor families
were headed by women. Indeed, the single most striking trend
in poverty statistics over the last quarter century has been this
dramatic increase in poverty in female-headed households.
Evidently, the two-parent, often two wage-earner, household
has greatly reduced the risk of poverty. Bearing in mind that
10.8% of all families were in poverty in 1987, and that the risk
of poverty in a family was about one in eight, what is the risk
of poverty for a child raised in a two parent family versus that
of a child raised in a single parent household? Table 3 shows
that a child's risk of poverty is only 6% or about 1 in 17 in a
husband/wife household. In a female-headed household, the risk
is 34% or about 1 in 3.

Table 2
Number and Percent of Poor Families Classified by Head of Household:
Selected Years 1959 -1987 (in millions)
1959

1977

1987

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Married Couple

6.1

76

2.7

49

3.1

43.7

Female Head

1.9

20

2.6

48

3.6

51.5

Male Head
Total Poor Families
% of all families
classified as poor

.3
8.3

4
100%

.3
5.3

3
100%

.3
7.0

4.8
100%

Family Type

18.3%

9.3%

10.8%

Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Report, Series P-60 (various years), Characteristicsof the PopulationBelow the
Poverty Level, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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In any event, regardless of who heads the household, the
more children, the greater the chance of poverty, as Table 4 amply demonstrates. More children increases the risk of poverty
for all families, two parent, one parent, white, and black. While
the number of families in the United States with five or more
related children was comparatively small in 1987, there was a
50% chance that a child in a family of that size would be in
poverty. If the parents were black, there was a 71% chance that
the child would live in poverty.
The link between family size and poverty, and that between
family size/race and poverty, is clear and has existed for years.
But the link between family size/race/female-headed households
and poverty is so striking that it is the most compelling of all
poverty data.
Table 5 shows that a white mother with one child has a 30%
chance of poverty. Her black counterpart has a 42% chance.
Again, the close correlation between number of children and
probability of poverty is evident: the more children, the more
poverty. A white mother with four children and no husband
Table 4
Poverty Rate by Number of Related Children Under 18 in All
Families, 1987

No. of Children

All Families
(Poor & Nonpoor)
Millions
Percent
of Total
No.

31.1
None under 18
14.4
1 child
12.5
2 children
4.9
3 children
1.5
4 children
5 children or more 0.7
65.1 million
Total

47.9
22.0
19.2
7.5
2.3
1.1
100%

Percent of
Households Below
Poverty Level
All
Races White Black
4.9
12.0
13.8
24.4
35.3
49.0

4.0
9.7
10.7
18.3
26.5
39.4

14.4
25.6
35.2
52.7
57.5
71.0

Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 (1988, August), Money Income and Poverty Status

in the United States: 1987 (Advance Data From the March 1986 CurrentPopulation
Survey), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 19, p. 36.
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present has a 73% chance of poverty; a black mother similarly
situated has an astonishing 87% chance-and these poverty
rates exist after all income transfers.
Clearly, there are people in the United States who are poor
and who cannot support themselves. We even know something
about the incidence of poverty and about its population. We
know that a child born into a family where there are other siblings and where the mother is a single head of household and
black-that child is likely to live in poverty at some time in his
or her life. (Other factors, not discussed here, further increase
the risk of poverty for such a child, such as having a mother
who lives in the South, who is unemployed and who lacks education.) Myrdal's observations are as accurate now as when she
made them:
The more children there are in a family the more decidedly will
poverty be their atmosphere. It will change the very volume of the
air they breath, reduce the food they eat, and narrow the margin
of culture available to them ....
When a disproportionate number
Table 5
Poverty Rate of Female-Headed Households Classified by Race with
Number of Related Children Under 18, 1987

No. of Children
None under 18
1 child
2 children
3 children
4 children
5 children' or more
Total

Total No.
Female-Headed
Households
3.5
3.3
2.3
1.0
0.3
0.2
10.6 million

Percent Below
Poverty Level
All Races White
Black
9.8
33.6
45.7
69.2
77.8
86.7

6.8
29.5
39.1
60.5
72.9
-

22.4
42.3
60.3
80.1
81.1
86.9

aFemale heads of household with more than five children are too few (less
than 75,000) to permit reliable calculations.
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 (1988, August), Money Income and Poverty Status
in the United States: 1987 (Advance Data From the March 1988 Current Population
Survey), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 19, p. 37.
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of the nation's children are born of the poor, this becomes a cause
of national worry ... (Myrdal, 1941, p. 99)

Without AFDC, many children would suffer from even more
severe poverty. Thus, AFDC decreases the suffering of the "deserving poor," especially children. And at times it may be the
difference between bare survival and death.
Are there other ways to achieve this end? As discussed below, few alternatives to AFDC are acceptable on political or practical grounds. Neither social insurance, private charity, increased
assistance from state or local government, a guaranteed minimum income, a universal demogrant, full employment, nor work
programs are viable options. Why not?
First, eligibility in all social insurance programs is based on
prior employment. Social security, unemployment insurance,
railroad retirement, workers' compensation, and temporary disability insurance-all are insurance programs designed for
workers, retired, injured, disabled, and their dependents; and,
for deceased workers, their survivors. These programs do aid
low-income families-far more than does social assistance. Unfortunately, millions of needy people have not worked and are
not covered by social insurance.
What about private charity and state and local governments?
In part, AFDC and its predecessor programs of Mothers' Aid
were established because private agencies could not meet the
financial needs of millions of needy people. Private charities do
not have the resources nor are they equipped to aid even a
fraction of the millions in financial need. State and local governments are not inclined to establish additional programs to help
their poor. They are even reluctant to adopt existing social programs that have generous federal support and to which they
need pay only part of the cost.
Certainly, there are public social program alternatives to
AFDC such as a universal demogrant, a generous children's allowance, or a guaranteed minimum income. Establishing a national health service would be a giant step ahead, as would a
national incomes policy and greater availability of subsidized,
quality daycare. However, these alternatives to AFDC do not
appear politically feasible at this time. Federalizing the costs of
AFDC, as was done for the adult categories in SSI, might be the
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most reasonable advance, although current federal and state policies appear headed in the opposite direction.
For more than one-half century AFDC has been the major,
direct, and relatively inexpensive way to assist poor children
and their parents. It helps children whose parents are deceased
or unemployed; it helps children whose parents are separated,
divorced, or unmarried. Regardless of the cause of the need,
children require basic necessities, and AFDC helps to provide
these children and their caretakers with food, shelter, and medical care.
2. AFDC provides money to millions of needy people.
AFDC assists the population it was intended to assist; it aids
those with the highest risk of poverty-families with children.
Approximately 3.8 million families received income from AFDC
in March 1988. Thus, in any single month, AFDC increases the
well-being of over 11 million low-income people, including more
than 7.3 million children and 3.7 million adults. A high rate of
client turnover makes it likely that AFDC benefits 16 to 17 million individuals in approximately 6 million different households
over a year's time. Data for total individuals and households
aided each year are unavailable because an unduplicated count
7
is not maintained of those on welfare over the course of a year.
Perhaps as much as 7% of the United States' population and
about 15% of all 34 million families with children receive AFDC
over the course of a year. AFDC tends to be used as a temporary
source of income until other, more permanent means of support
can be found. Median length of time on AFDC is just over two
years, but many families receive aid for shorter periods, frequently two to four months. Most women who use AFDC do
not get trapped by it. In light of program criticisms, this is not
surprising. On the other hand, the minority that stay on AFDC
a long time accumulate, and the majority of costs of AFDC are
for those who stay on for a long spell (Duvall, 1982; 1986 AFDC
Characteristics Study; Ellwood & Summers, 1986, pp. 71-72).
3. Each year AFDC transfers billions of dollars to low-income
-familiesand reduces or eliminates poverty in those it assists.
Cash social assistance expenditures are relatively small, especially when compared to the gigantic cash transfers made
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through social insurance. 8 Approximately 4%-$16.5 billionof all cash income transfers was for AFDC in 1988.
Nevertheless, AFDC remains America's largest cash social
assistance program. Each year it transfers billions of dollars to
poor families to help them pay for housing, food, utilities, clothing, transporation, and other necessities. Grants are based on
need and the number of persons in the family. Without AFDC,
many families would lose their housing and go without food.
More than $17 billion will go to eligible low-income families in
fiscal 1990, a figure which includes a federal contribution, on
average, of 5 5 %. Table 6 summarizes the money transferred to
low-income families through AFDC from 1960 to 1989. Within
the last 19 years AFDC provided approximately $232 billion
(unadjusted dollars) to America's less fortunate families.
Receipt of AFDC cash benefits removes about 5 % of its recipient families from poverty. If the market value of noncash
transfers are included, then AFDC removes about 50% of its
families from poverty. For those not removed from poverty, the
mean poverty deficit for a typical three person AFDC family is
reduced from $7,807 to $3,242, after receipt of cash and noncash
benefits (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Paper 58, 1988,
pp. 16-17). At the very least, AFDC relieves some of the agonies
of poverty.
4. AFDC recipients have ready access to a number of noncash
benefits.
One of the primary advantages of being an AFDC recipient
is a simultaneous and almost automatic right to in-kind benefits.
Defined as any "noncash benefit in a form other than money
which serves to enhance or improve the economic well-being of
the recipient," examples include medical care, surplus food, food
stamps, housing, and social services (CPR, P-60, No. 141, p. 21).
In 1987 the market value of means tested noncash benefits was
almost double that of all means tested cash assistance., The largest component of means tested noncash aid is Medicaid, which
comprises 72% of such assistance (Technical Paper 58, 1988, p. 2).
In-kind benefits make a major contribution to the well-being of
low-income people.
Members of a family receiving AFDC are eligible for com-
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Table 6
Summary of AFDC Cash Transfer Payments, 1960-1989 (in billions)'
Year
1960-69
1970-79
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
b
1989
Total Payments 1960 to 1989

Total
$18,535,766
84,845,786
12,475,245
12,981,515
12,862,016
13,839,471
14,504,710
15,195,835
14,986,518
16,238,000
16,540,000
17,107,000
$250,111,863

aln unadjusted dollars. Totals do not include costs of administration. The
federal share of administration is now 50%. The federal share of cash payments averages 55% but ranges from 50 to 65%. States and localities pay the
remaining average of 45%.
bEstimate.
Note. Derived from data in Social Security Bulletin Annual StatisticalSupplement
1987, p. 294; personal communication with Social Security Administration
for 1987 and 1988. The 1989 estimate is from Appendix to U.S. Budget, 1990,
p. 1-K, 38.

prehensive medical care under Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, passed into law in 1965. 9 To many low-income
people, access to health care for all family members is the single
most important benefit of welfare. Maybe they can get along
without much money, some think, but they cannot raise their
children without access to medical and dental care. As Table 7
shows, the largest number of recipients in the Medicaid program
are children and adults in AFDC households; they comprise
69% of all Medicaid recipients. However, even though they constituted over two-thirds of Medicaid recipients, AFDC households account for only 24% of all expenditures (right half of
Table 7).
The left side of Table 8 lists an unduplicated count of medical
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Table 7
Recipients and Vendor Payments by
Unduplicated Number of Medicaid
a
Eligibility Category, Fiscal 1986

Category

Recipientsa
(in thousands)
No.
%

Age 65 and over
Blindness
APTD
Children under 2 1b
AFDC adultsb
Other
Total

3,140
81
3,091
9,954
5,618
1,138
22,405

14
.4
14
44
25
6

Payments
(in millions)
Amount
%
$15,080
277
14,587
5,096
4,848
992
$40,878

37
1
36
12
12
2
100.0%

aRecipient categories do not add to unduplicated total because of the small
number of recipients that are in more than one category during the year.
bThe total unduplicated number of AFDC Medicaid recipients exceeds 11
million AFDC recipients for 1986. The AFDC client count is usually given for
December and does not reflect the total AFDC recipients for that year.
Note. Derived from data in Social Security Bulletin Annual StatisticalSupplement
1987, Tables 169 & 171, pp. 253, 255.
services to Medicaid recipients. It shows 68.8 million units of
service, or an average of three units per recipient (68.8 million
units of service divided by 22 million recipients). However, the
cost of each unit or type of service varies considerably. A stay
in a nursing home or a mental hospital is more costly than a
visit to a doctor or a laboratory test.
The right side of Table 8 shows the actual cost of Medicaid
vendor payments by type of service. Fully 71% goes to inpatient
services in general hospitals, mental hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, and intermediate care facilities, all services more likely
to be used by adults (and especially the elderly) than by young
people. Young people in AFDC families are likely to use physician and dental services and visit outpatient clinics.
The average annual value of Medicaid in 1982 for the four
major dasses of recipients appears in Table 9. Note the effect of
including the costs of institutional care for each recipient group:
For the nondisabled group under 21, institutional costs increase
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Table 8
Medicaid Benefits: Unduplicated Number of Recipients by Type of
Medical Service and the Amount and Percentage of Payment for Each
Type of Service, Fiscal 1986
Medicaid Vendor
Payments by Type of
Medical Service
Type of Servicea
Inpatient
Intermediate Care
Nursing Homes
Physician Services
Dental Services
Other Services
& Family Planning
Outpatient Hospital
Clinic Services
Laboratory Services
Home Health
Prescribed Drugs
Other Care
Total recipient
units of service
Total recipients

No. of Recipients
for each service
(in thousands)

Amount
(in millions)

Percent

3,570
1,034
570
14,808
5,143

$11,406
11,798
5,651
2,545
529

28
29
14
6
1

5,184
10,711
2,033
7,122
593
14,704
3,316

478
1,983
810
424
1,352
2,692
1,098

1
5
2
1
3
7
3

68,788
22,405

$40,878

100%

aRecipients may receive more than one type of service.
Note. Derived from data in Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement 1987, Tables 168 & 171, pp. 252, 254.
expenditures by 2%; for those 65 and over, institutional care
increases expenditures by over 300%.
Other major noncash assistance for which AFDC families
may be eligible include food stamps, public housing, school
lunches, free or reduced-price school breakfasts, the Womens'
and Infants' Care program, and several child nutrition programs. In addition, a wide range of social services (costing some
$3 billion a year) is available. There are no separate data assessing the value of most of these programs to an AFDC family.
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Table 9
Average Annual Market Value of Medicaid by Major Recipient
Groups in 1982 a

Recipient Group
Age 65 and over
Blind and disabled
Ages 21-64, nondisabled
Less than 21, nondisabled

Including
Institutional

Excluding
Institutional

Expenditures

Expenditures

$3,349
3,720
817
381

$ 813
1,787
812
373

aEach state has its own value. Data are average for all 50 states and District
of Columbia.
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984), Technical Paper 51, Estimates of Poverty, Including the Value of Noncash Benefits: 1979 to
1982. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Tables B7 & B9.
However, excepting social services, the value of all other noncash
programs is less than 10% of the Medicaid, food stamps, and
public housing.
What percent of AFDC families receive major noncash benefits? Almost all AFDC families receive (or are at least eligible
to receive) medical benefits under Medicaid, and four-fifths receive food stamps. Two-fifths of AFDC children benefit from
school lunches and about one-fifth of AFDC families are in public housing or receive HUD or other rent subsidies (Characteristics of AFDC Recipients 1986).
What is the actual value of noncash benefits for a typical
AFDC family of three? Table 10 estimates the market value (not
the cost or the value to the recipient) of major noncash benefits
to such a family. The mean annual market value of food stamps
received by an AFDC family of three was $1,125 in 1987. Free
school lunches show an estimated annual value of $580 for two
children in 1987. The average annual market value of Medicaid
for an AFDC family of three was $2,166 in 1987, but the range
extended from less than $1,000 in some states to over $3,000 in
others (Technical Paper 58, 1988). It is difficult to count the value
of medical care as income. One family with a run of poor health
may far exceed the national or their state average. Another family
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Table 10
Value of Noncash Benefits for an AFDC Family of
Estimated Market
a
Three in 1987
Program
Medicaid
Housing
Food Stamps
School Lunches

Market Value
$2,166b
1,615c
1,125 d
580 e

aThe market value of an in-kind transfer is equal to the private market purchasing power of benefits received by individuals. The market value of medical care is based on an insurance value approach, not on the amount of
medical care actually received.
'Average for entire United States. Amounts vary greatly among states. Calculation is based on family of one adult, two children under 21. None are
disabled or institutionalized (see Technical Paper 58, Table B-6, p. 25).
'Based on assumption of three person household with income between $5,000
and $7,495 per year.
dThe market value assigned for food stamps was the annual face value or
purchasing power of food stamps in the market place (Technical Paper 58,
pp. 4, 21).
eFree school lunches (as opposed to reduced price) for two children for 167
days a year (Technical Paper 58, p. 21).
Note. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Paper 58 (1988, August), Estimates
of poverty including the value of noncash benefits: 1987. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
may be eligible to receive Medicaid but not use or require any
medical care in a given year.
The market value of housing subsidies for public or subsidized housing vary by type of household, size of family, and
total household income. Therefore, generalizations about the
value of subsidized housing are difficult to make. However, for
a typical AFDC family with a housing subsidy, the value approximates $1,615. Very few families receive all four of the major
in-kind benefits. Thus, it is inappropriate to add all of these
benefits in Table 10 and apply this total to any individual household or use it as an average for all AFDC families. Nearly all
AFDC families have direct access to one or more noncash benefits of food, medical care, and housing. Undoubtedly, these
benefits greatly increase familial well-being.
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5. AFDC is a public program.
AFDC is publicly sponsored and financed. Federal, state,
and local governments recognize the need and have taken responsibility for this category of needy people. The private sector
does not finance the construction of roads and airports, pay for
reconstruction required by national emergencies or disasters,
nor fund the welfare program. Private charities had a total outlay
of $87 billion in 1986. Forty-six percent went to religion, 14 to
health, 15 to education, 11 for human services, 7 to the arts, and
7% for other things. Perhaps some of the money directed to
religion and human service was given to poor people to spend,
but typically the private sector cannot be expected to provide
cash to low income people, at least in the long haul (Giving USA,
1987). Mass destitution is not something for which United Way,
private charity, foundations, or business can assume even partial
on-going responsibility. It is, in fact, not their job. Poverty is a
public problem and requires a public response. Public welfare,
by definition, is the responsbility of the public sector.
6. AFDC is a national program with federal leadership and
support.
With the impetus of generous federal match funding (varying from 50% in high income states to 65% in low income states)
and federal assumption of 50% of administrative costs, all 54
states and jurisdictions have assumed responsibility for the support of female-headed households. In addition, 28 states provide
AFDC benefits to husband/wife households.
State fiscal priorities do not tend to be poverty-oriented.
Without national leadership and the impetus of federal matching
grants, it is likely that some states would provide little aid to
needy families with children. Even with generous federal support (up to 65% in one-fourth of all states) only one-half of the
states and jurisdictions assist two-parent families. As illustrated
earlier, the history of federal assistance to the states has been
characterized by an unrelenting effort by the national government to motivate state governments to raise grants to AFDC
families. Clearly, poverty is a national problem and requires
national remedies. Unfortunately, the United States has been
slow to adopt this view.
Further evidence of the importance of the federal spur to
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states to aid their low-income residents appears in the efforts
states make to aid low-income citizens when there is no federal
grant-in-aid program. For example, what do states do for needy
people who are not elderly, blind, disabled, or in single-mother
households? What support do states give families without children? To nondisabled adults? To poverty-stricken persons between 18 and 65? To long-term unemployed adults whose
unemployment benefits have expired? To "marginal" persons
not dassified as medically disabled but not able to work? For
persons without health insurance for themselves or their families? To the teen-age unemployed? Finally, what help goes to
people who do receive federal aid from SSI or AFDC and who
still remain poor?
"General assistance" is the nonfederal response, and it is
meager. A remnant of the Elizabethan Poor Law, general assistance is an entirely state/local program designed to aid low income people who do not fit federal categories of assistance. Twothirds of all states and jurisdictions provide general assistance,
aiding 1.3 million people per month at an annual cost of $1.4
billion. 10
Of the 40 states with general assistance programs, 10 states
had caseloads of fewer than 1,000 people, whereas six states saw
nearly 80% of those on general assistance. Benefits were low,
averaging $127 per month per recipient in 1980. Furthermore,
general assistance benefits are usually available for limited periods (60 to 90 days). Without AFDC, millions of poor people,
especially children, would be utterly without income support.
7. AFDC has high target efficiency.
AFDC gets money and in-kind benefits to low income people
who need it and not to people who do not need it. The program
is targeted to the poor; it provides aid to many families in poverty who are most in need, mainly female-headed families with
children. In contrast to old-age, survivors, disability insurance
(OASDI or "Social Security"), AFDC provides little money to
those above the poverty line. Social security lifts many people
from poverty, but at a very high cost. For example, OASDI's
yearly outlays to its more than 38 million beneficiaries are estimated at $220 billion in fiscal 1989-26 times the federal cost
of AFDC payments. When social security payments are in-
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creased, benefits for all 38 million recipients, poor and nonpoor,
are increased. Since benefits are raised by the same percentage
for all recipients, those with the highest benefits are enriched
the most. Each dollar increase in AFDC goes only to the poor.
8. AFDC results in two types of vertical income redistribution.
Eligibility for public assistance, Medicaid, food stamps, and
subsidized housing is determined, in part, by an applicant's
resources (value of home, car, investments, life insurance, etc.)
and by her level of income. Both federal and state laws are specific on this issue. For example, applicants who have too many
resources or too much income must "spend down" (sell the car,
divest the life insurance, etc.) to a level that demonstrates destitution. Thus, recently unemployed persons who wish to apply
for Medicaid must prove to the eligibility worker that they do
not have the means to survive without AFDC or Medicaid;
("means test"). In addition, they must justify need by passing
a "needs test." Careful and continuous use of the means and
needs tests insure that public aid programs retain high target
efficiency by providing aid solely to individuals near or below
the poverty line.
AFDC cash benefits are derived 55% from federal general
revenues. Federal general revenues (excluding earmarked Social
Security) are derived amost entirely-89% in fiscal 1990-from
individual and corporate income taxes, the most progressive
form of income generation (Budget of U.S. Government, 1990,
p. 4-3). The federal income tax, replete as it is with shelters and
loopholes, is still our most progressive system of taxation. 1
States, on the other hand, differ considerably in the progressivity or regressivity of their methods of revenue generation.
Some jurisdictions, such as California, Colorado, and the District of Columbia, depend heavily on graduated income taxes.
Others, such as Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania,
levy flat rate income taxes. Still others (Washington, Nevada,
and Texas) rely on sales tax systems that are dearly regressive.
This last system affects all income levels, but falls most heavily
on those with low income since a larger proportion of the expenditures of low income people are subject to the sales tax.
In general, most of the federal money used to finance AFDC,
SSI, and in-kind benefits comes from a progressive tax system.
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In other words, the federal money that finances AFDC tends to
come from those who earn the most and is redistributed to those
who have the least. This important form of vertical redistribution takes from those who have money and gives to those who
do not. Furthermore, since the amount of the federal contribution
to individual states varies from 50 to 65% in AFDC and 50 to
78% in Medicaid, depending on the wealth of the state, redistribution also occurs from the more affluent to the less affluent
states (Social Security Bulletin, Annual Supp. 1987, p. 60).
Is progressive taxation and income redistribution from upper
to lower income people and from richer to poorer states a desirable social goal? Most advanced nations favor this or similar
forms of redistribution. Certainly, the United States grants modest vertical income redistribution through its public aid
programs.
9. AFDC allows children to remain in their own homes.
The United States supports the idea that parents are the best
qualified to raise their own children, and AFDC was specifically
designed to keep children in their homes. Because of this aid,
a low income mother may remain with her children to provide
the attention and care necessary to raise them. An increasing
number of single parents have come to depend on AFDC at
some time in their child-raising years.
Prior to 1935, the common practice was to put a destitute
child in the home of a relative or neighbor, or in a foster home
or institution (Social Security Board, Social Security in America,
1937, p. 233). AFDC allows millions of poor children to remain
in their own homes, usually with their mothers. Without AFDC,
many children might be deprived of their homes and their
parents.
10. The AFDC benefit level can be adjusted to the needs of the
family and to its size.
In theory, AFDC benefits are related to the needs of the client
and to the size of the family: the greater the need, the higher the
benefit. This theory is illustrated by the wide variation in family
benefits within the same state, since each additional family
member increases the grant level. Again, in theory, social assistance programs such as AFDC and SSI are far more flexible
than the major social insurance programs such as social security
and unemployment insurance.
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In these latter programs the exact benefit level is established
by law and is entirely unrelated to actual client need. In fact,
those with the greatest need often have had the most tenuous
attachment to the workforce and thus have, in absolute dollars,
the lowest social insurance benefits. The greater the need, the
lower the benefit.
Due to fiscal limitations faced by many states and because
of the unpopularity of "welfare," poor people, and of AFDC,
states are reluctant to exercise the great potential flexibility of
AFDC. Benefits remain pitifully low. In practice, most states do
not provide cash benefits up to their own defined level of need.
Nevertheless, AFDC has the potential flexibility of tailoring the
benefit level to meet the special financial needs of each recipient
family, whatever that level of need might be.
11. AFDC permits recipients to spend cash benefits as they
choose.
As opposed to vouchers, food stamps, Medicaid, and other
in-kind benefits, AFDC distributes cash to clients and permits
them to spend it as they wish. Using cash is less stigmatizing
and less demoralizing to recipients than using vouchers, food
stamps and other in-kind benefits. In other words, cash benefits
enhance individual freedom and independence.
Is it wise to give cash to low income people? After all, they
may spend it irresponsibly or on items which do not benefit the
family. Money given to low-income families is used for the benefit of the family to meet such needs as rent, utilities, food,
clothing and transportation. Most parents are genuinely concerned wtih the well-being of their children, and spend their
money, whatever the source, for basic family needs. In any event,
AFDC benefits tend to be so low that families must pay first for
necessities or risk shut-off of utilities, loss of housing, or hunger.
12. AFDC eligibility is based solely on family compositon and
on need and is rarely linked to employment.
Except in the AFDC-E program, receiving AFDC benefits is
not labor related and is not contingent on prior attachment to
the workforce. Indeed, a woman may be entitled to AFDC social
assistance benefits who has never worked a day in her life. Presence of a child or children in the household, inadequate assets
and low income are the basic considerations in determining AFDC
elibility. In contrast, unemployment compensation, social se-
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curity, and other social insurance programs always base eligibility on prior attachment to the workforce. Without a proven
history of working in covered employment, and sometimes a
substantial proven history, a person is not eligible for social
12
insurance.
Additional data could be summoned to further illustrate positive aspects of AFDC/welfare. For example, it enables women
to leave abusive relationships; ". . many women choose to remain with an abusive husband because the alternative is bringing up children in poverty" (Straus, 1983, p. 1632; Strube, 1987,
p. 791). Moreover, high teenage pregnancy is related to low welfare payments and low pregnancy to high payments (Stein, 1986,
p. 69).
Conclusion
AFDC is decidedly unpopular and much is wrong with it.
As welfare reform is again attempted, what lessons might be
learned from this analysis? The major point has been to illustrate
that it is absolutely crucial to acknowledge, understand, and
appreciate what is right with welfare. Are there other lessons?
Mothers' aid, the predecessor of AFDC, dearly illustrated
two fundamental income transfer policy principles. First, programs required in all political jurisdictions are far more successful than those left to the option of localities. Second, the
higher the level of government that administers the transfer program, the more successful the program as measured by degree
of implementation, uniformity among administrative jurisdictions, and adequacy of benefit. These are significant principles
to remember when considering decentralization of AFDC.
In terms of AFDC program operation, several points are important. ADC was one of the three original assistance titles of
the Social Security Act of 1935. However, children were not the
focus of attention, Congress had little interest in the ADC program, and grant levels for children were far lower than those
offered to the aged and the blind. Over one-half century later,
these disparities have yet to be rectified.
As a portion of the federal budget, of all public cash transfers, or as a part of the gross national product, AFDC has never
been a large program. Some positive changes have occurred.

What's Right with Welfare?

Aid was first offered to the adult caregiver in 1950, to an unemployed parent in 1961, and to two parents in 1962; social
services were added in 1967.
Most on AFDC are part of society's "underclass," at least
temporarily, and life at the bottom can be quite unpleasant.
Poverty disproportionately afflicts children, especially those in
large, minority, female-headed households; there it is a virtual
certainty. Benefit levels are low and have fallen drastically in
recent years; eligibility requirements and benefits vary from
state to state. Application procedures are difficult, tedious, and
demeaning. As bad as it is, much can be said in support of
AFDC.
In the first place, AFDC provides money to single-parent
families for whom the risk of poverty is greatest and for whom
little or no other income is available. About 3.8 million families,
constituting 11 million needy people, receive benefits each
month. AFDC has "undoubtedly contributed more than any other
social program to the goal of enabling children at risk of placement to remain with their own families" (McGowan & Meezan,
1983, p. 69). It transfers billions of dollars in cash to those families most in need; it reduces poverty, and in some instances it
eliminates poverty in those it assists; and recipients have a ready
access to noncash benefits, most important, to medical care and
food stamps. AFDC is a public program, and it is a national
program; it has high target efficiency and results in vertical income redistribution; benefits can be adjusted to the needs of
the recipient family, people can spend money as they choose;
and eligibility is based on family composition and never linked
to prior employment.
Blindness to these 12 charateristics greatly complicates efforts
to reform or replace AFDC. For to be successful, any new income
support program will have to include some of the income transfer policies and principles that are part of our existing system.
Moreover, the inability to see what is good and what works in
American social programs makes them constantly subject to attack and vulnerable to budget cutbacks. Policy makers and the
public must learn to view all of their social institutions with
some impartiality and balance, regardless of whether they favor
the beneficiaries. Only then will we have the vision to transform
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existing policies and programs into ones in which we will take
pride.
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Notes
1. I wish to express my gratitude to the following people. The late Wilbur J.
Cohen helped me to unravel the intent of early ADC legislation. Professors William C. Berleman and Robert D. Plotnick of the University of
Washington and to Mr. Richard Wright of the Department of Social and
Health Services provided valuable commentary. Ms. Lynn Clevell of
Woodinville, WA, offered many helpful suggestions.
2. "Welfare" as used in this article means AFDC (and on occasion other
means-tested programs); "AFDC" and "welfare" are terms inextricably
linked in the public mind. This is a narrow usage of "welfare." For a
comparison of the broad and narrow uses of the term, see Dear, 1982,
pp. 25-26.
3. The 1909 white House Conference declared, "Children should not be
deprived of ['home life'] ... except for urgent and compelling reasons ...
No child should be deprived of his family by reason of poverty alone"
(Proceedingsof the Conference, 1909, p. 9).
4. One of the paradoxes of welfare history and a point almost forgotten is
that there was bipartisan support of the public assistance titlers and even
agreement that old-age assistance grants were too low. Of ADC, one
member said, "Eighteen dollars a month for a mother with a young child
is utterly insufficient to supply even the barest necessities of life"
(CongressionalRecord, 79, 5553).
In fact, the Republican minority members of the Ways and Means
Committee, who never ceased fighting the insurance titles of the Social
Security Act, were unanimous in their support of the public assistance
titles, agreeing that the benefits were too low. The minority report stated:
We favor such legislation as will encouage States already paying old-age
pensions [assistance] to provide for more adequate benefits, and will encourage all other states to adopt old-age pension systems. However, we
believe the amount provided in the bill to be inadequate and favor a substantial increase in the Federal Contribution. (H. Report 615, April 5, 1935,
p. 42)
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5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

The Republican minority said essentially the same thing in regard to
Title IV, ADC, Title V, Maternal and Child Welfare, and Title VI, Public
health: "We would favor a stronger and more vigorous program than that
provided in this proposed legislation ..."(H. Report 615)
In addition to AFDC this includes Old-Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to
the Blind (AB), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).
The latter three programs were combined in 1974 into the Supplemental
Security Income program. It does not include state general assistance
programs.
For a good refutation of these myths, see Barbara Leyser et al. (1985) and
US DHHS 1986 AFDC Recipient CharacteristicsStudy.
These figures are for March 1988, but the total number of people aided
varies from month to month and is related to such factors as the state of
the economy and level of unemployment. See Quarterly Public Assistance
Statistics, January-March1988, p. 12.
Social assistance includes AFDC, SSI, general assistance, and emergency
assistance. Social insurance includes OASDI, railroad retirement, federal
civil service, V.A. pensions, unemployment insurance, temporary disability benefits, and workers' compensation.
With the exception of Arizona, all states and jurisdictions participate in
Medicaid (Social Security Bulletin, April 1987, p. 58).
Data are partly estimated and vary for each month. In September 1986,
there were 1.3 million recipients of general assistance. Prior to 1983,
recipients numbered less than one million. (See Social Security Bulletin,
Annual Statistical Supplement 1987, p. 301; Social Security Bulletin, December 1988, p.49.)
A progressive tax is one that levies an increasingly higher tax rate as
income increases.
There are a few exceptions. Beneficiaries who receive fixed-rate "special
age 72" payments (authorized in 1966) may receive small social security
payments ($139 in December 1985) without having been in covered employment if age 72 before 1968. Their numbers are small (32,000), and
they constitute less than one-tenth of the one percent of all social security
recipients. Others may receive benefits with very slight coverage. Of
course, survivors and dependents with no work history receive benefits,
but their eligibility is still contingent on that of a covered employee,
Social Security Bulletin,A1 March 1986, pp. 35-36.

The Work Incentive Years in Current Perspective:
What Have We Learned? Where Do We
Go From Here?*
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A review of the rationale, results, and research findings from worktrainingefforts for welfare recipientsis presented. Focus is on the Work
Incentive (WIN) Programfrom its inception in 1968 to its heydays in
the 1970s and its decline during the Reagan era. The review provides
a basisfor examining the recent welfare legislation and recongizing the
elements needed for real welfare reform.

While the War on Poverty and The Great Society efforts captured headlines during the 1960s, there were other efforts afoot
to help the poor. One of these was the Work Incentive (WIN)
Program. It was charged with helping welfare recipients achieve
economic independence through work. This paper examines the
assumptions, activities, and results of the WIN Program. The
task proves extremely useful because extensive, if unpublicized,
efforts were made to achieve program goals and extensive research was carried out on these efforts. Reviewing the heydays
of WIN from today's perspective permits a cogent analysis of the
new welfare legislation.
The paper begins by placing the assumptions and operations
of WIN within a pre-WIN context. There follows a review of
WIN and related efforts from 1967 until the beginning of the
Reagan Administration in 1981. The next section examines in
more detail what was learned from the WIN experience, drawing
upon research and evaluation studies. Brief examination of worktraining for welfare recipients from 1981 to the present comes
*Initial draft presented in Jackson, Mississippi, March 4, 1988 at a conference: The Impact of Federal Policy on the Development of Public Welfare in
the South: Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond.
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next, leading to a discussion of what is now known about training welfare recipients. The next section comments on current
welfare reform, and the last section summarizes the general
findings and conclusions of the paper.
WIN And Its Precursors
The first federally sponsored effort to help welfare recipients
came in 1935 in the Social Security Act. The provisions for public
welfare, unlike the major provisions of the Act, were aimed at
supporting widowed mothers with small children, irrespective
of their work history. The other provisions for Unemployment
Insurance and Social Security were aimed at helping persons
who had worked but had lost their jobs or had retired.
Over the years the work-related programs were readily accepted and expanded. The welfare program has been less favored. Its first serious review came after the Kennedy election
of 1960. This review revealed that welfare recipients were no
longer primarily mothers who had become widowed, but mothers who had never been married. Welfare was being given to
mothers who had not had a relatively stable life in a traditional
two-parent family, but seemed in some way to have created
their own difficulties by having children out of wedlock.
The 1962 Public Welfare Amendments sanctioned efforts to
provide counselling to welfare families in order that they might
improve their social/psychological stability and lead out of the
welfare syndrome. Also sanctioned were $2 million in demonstration funds for Community Work and Training projects (CWT)
to help recipients achieve training and work that would lead to
economic independence.
In 1963 $50 million were allocated to CWT projects. In 1964,
President Johnson proposed and Sargent Shriver incorporated
into Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act $150 million for
work-training programs that had much more liberal requirements as to residence and who was qualified to participate than
the CWT projects. All these programs were based in the federal
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). They did
not receive a great deal of attention in or out of Congress because
they could not compare in glamor to the major "war on poverty"
programs, e.g., Job Corps, VISTA, Community Action.

WIN

The important point is that the programs for welfare recipients were designed to get the recipients off the welfare rolls.
While there was an intent to help people, the underlying reason
for the programs was to lower welfare costs. The other programs
in the Social Security Act of 1935 had a rather different rationale.
Unemployment Insurance and Social Security were paid to persons who had "earned" their right to the payments. These were
programs not designed to support people who had not paid
their own way, but to provide more security for those who had
paid their way in the past.
This difference in rationale helps account for the different
attitudes and actions of policymakers regarding the two sets of
programs. As evidence mounted on the ineffectiveness of CWT
and Title V programs in lowering welfare rolls, members of
Congress became dissatisfied. A paper summarizing the
achievement of Title V showed that from 1964 to 1969 about
228,000 people had been in the program for an average of 7
months. About 35% of those found immediate employment upon
leaving the program. But only 24% of all entrants to the program
were known to be working 35 hours or more per week after 3
months. The average pay for the full-time workers was about
$1.80 per hour. These results were disappointing given that the
number of welfare families had risen from one million to 1.7
million during that period.
Part of the blame for the lackluster results of Title V was
attributed to the location of the program's administration in HEW
and welfare departments around the country rather than in the
Department of Labor (DOL) and employment services that were
more familiar with job training and placement. Upon amending
the Social Socurity Act in 1967 Congress established an even
more elaborate work-training program called the Work Incentive
(WIN) Program (Conference Report on Social Security Amendments of 1967). Major authority for developing guidelines was
shifted from HEW to DOL. The delivery of services was now to
be provided by local employment service agencies. The local
welfare agencies were still to screen welfare recipients for eligibility for WIN and to provide child care.
Special counsellors and manpower specialists were to be
provided by the local employment services to help WIN partic-
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ipants obtain better training and make a better adaptation to
the job market than occurred in earlier programs. Money was
provided for some participants to go into on-the-job training or
into public service employment. Day care funds also were available. Hence WIN brought together all the facilities offered in
previous efforts, ranging from personal counselling to training
for jobs. WIN went into operation toward the end of 1968.
Between August 1968 and April 1970 about 1.6 million welfare cases eligible for WIN participation were reviewed by local
welfare departments across the country. These cases included
father in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U) program as well as out-of-school teenagers receiving AFDC. However, the vast majority were AFDC
mothers.
Only about 10% of the 1.6 million eligibles were considered
suitable for enrollment in WIN. Of those terminated from WIN
in 1970 only about 20% had held jobs for at least 3 months.
Hence, during a period of 20 months when the welfare rolls rose
about 40% to almost 8 million persons, WIN was successful in
obtaining stable jobs for only 2% (20% of 10%) of the total
eligible welfare population. The median wage for employed WIN
mothers was approximately $2 per hour, hardly sufficient to support adequately a family of four.
Out in the field, many WIN participants were being held in
remedial education longer than anticipated. That is, the educational level of many applicants was so low as to require more
educational time in order to bring them to a level where they
might be trained for higher level jobs. This longer-term education and training markedly depressed the rate of job placement
and failed to lower the welfare rolls.
The lack of success, in terms of lowering welfare rolls, was
not lost upon Russell Long, powerful chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee responsible for WIN legislation. He severely
criticized DOL for failure to administer the program properly,
failing to enforce the rules of removing from the welfare rolls
those who refused to participate in WIN. Behind this concern
of Senator Long's was the belief that welfare people might be
lazy, not want to work, and so had to be strongly prodded into
the training programs and jobs (Goodwin, 1975, pp. 83-90).
In December 1971, Senator Talmadge, also on the Finance
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Committee, amended the WIN legislation to insure greater work
force participation of welfare recipients (Public Law 92-223).
Training of recipients was to be lowered in favor of immediate
job placement in whatever jobs were available. There were to
be more stringent penalties against welfare recipients who refused for no good cause to participate in the program. The
amendments went into effect in July 1972.
Subsequent years showed a marked increase in WIN job
placements. During fiscal year 1975 approximately 839,000 welfare recipients were deemed eligible for WIN. About 113,000 of
these people obtained unsubsidized jobs for at least 90 days.
Thus, a little more than 13% of the eligible group were placed.
This was a substantial jump over the 2 % of earlier years, but
was not very significant compared to the 3.5 million adults who
were on welfare at that time (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976,
p. 3).
Additional modifications were made to WIN in 1975. The
WIN sponsor, usually the state employment service, became responsible for WIN registration (rather than the welfare office).
This was a further step to convert WIN almost wholly to a placement rather than a training program. On the other hand, training objectives were to be attained by having this agency
coordinate WIN activities with such programs as those offered
through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA).
Effectiveness of WIN in lowering welfare rolls did not increase markedly. During 1981, for example, 1,156,000 persons
were new registrants in WIN, and 310,000, or almost 27%, obtained employment for 30 days or more. However, there were
a total of 3,800,000 welfare families at that time. Thus, jobs were
found for less than 10% of heads of welfare households. Moreover, the average earnings of the welfare mothers was only $3.70
per hour and for the fathers only $5.01 per hour (U.S. Department of Labor, 1982, pp. 43, 45). That level of income is hardly
suited to supporting a family of three or four at the poverty
level. (If there were a two parent family and both parents worked,
then there would be some possibility of leaving poverty and
welfare.) These data underline the small impact of the WIN effort
on the welfare rolls.
This thumbnail historical review of the WIN program, may
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leave the impression that WIN has been just another bureaucratic effort of limited success. What makes WIN of special interest is that a proportion of its budget was legislated for research
and evaluation, and that the federal WIN Office (in the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor)
was directed by Merwin Hans. He had a strong commitment to
discover through social science research how WIN efforts could
be improved. What follows is an outline of certain research efforts which illuminate the issue of training welfare recipients
for work.
What Has Been Learned From WIN 1968-1981
In order to adequately understand the performance of WIN
or any program, it is necessary to recognize the social systems
that affect it and which it affects. Figure 1 shows the systems
involved in the national effort. At the top is the Donor System,
the Congress and Executive Office which mandate the operation
of a national program, set the broad boundaries and purposes
of operation. The legislation is handed to the Federal Administrative System, for example, the Department of Labor in order
to establish specific guidelines for the operation of the program.
These federal guidelines go to the State Administrative Systems where the guidelines are related to state conditions and
then are passed down to local Delivery Systems that actually
deliver the services intended. The Recipient System consists of
persons who use the services. There are three further systems
of great importance. One of these is the Job Market, which determines what kinds of jobs are available for what wages. A
second one is the Family/Community System which consists of
the family members, friends and other social networks of Recipient System persons. The third system is the Constituencies
of the Donor System, the voters and special interest groups that
affect the continuation in office of donor system members.
What this Figure helps emphasize is the complex interplay
of people and social systems that goes into the operation of any
national program. The effectiveness of any program can be
doomed from the beginning by failure of donor system members to recognize the realities in other important systems (which
is a reason for holding public hearings on legislative proposals).
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Figure 1. Systems affecting the WIN Program
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In the case of WIN, there was strong suspicion on the part
of certain powerful members of the donor system that members
of the recipient system did not wish to work and get off welfare.
Hence, one useful area of research could be determination of the
attitudes of welfare recipients: did these recipients have the
work ethic, did they prefer welfare to work? A related area could
be determination of the employability characteristics of recipients, e.g., level of education, job experience, relative to job market demands.
A series of studies were commissioned by the WIN office to
examine the characteristics of members of the recipient system
and determine how these affected the goal of getting recipients
into jobs and off welfare (Goodwin, 1977, pp. 5-11). Two of the
studies involved large scale surveys of the attitudes and characteristics of welfare recipients in general, WIN participants in
particular, and various middle class comparison groups (Goodwin, 1972, 1983).
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Among the conclusions drawn from these several studies
was that welfare recipients along with other Americans tended
to have a strong work ethic, wanted to work, and when feasible
did work. No study revealed a significant segment of the American population that preferred indolence to work. And no study
was able to identify a group of persons with the same characteristics as welfare recipients but managing to get by without
welfare. Substantial barriers were found in the way of welfare
recipients' participating in the job market. These included lack
of skills, poor health, need for child care, and lack of jobs at
which they could earn enough to support their families above
the poverty level (Goodwin, 1977, p. 2).
Several large scale studies were funded in order to determine
which aspects of the WIN program, e.g., the orientation, educational component, work-training component, led to success in
terms of job placement. These studies gathered data over time
across many sites. There seemed to be higher rates of success
among recipients who received some form of WIN service, rather
than just placed directly in jobs (as encouraged by the Talmadge
Amendments and the administrative changes of 1975).
Identification of just which services contributed to success
was not clear, probably because of difficulties in taking account
of differences in programs and job markets across diverse sites.
These studies were precursors to a subsequent major, sophisticated effort at identifying factors that made some programs
more successful than others.
Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale (1980) gathered data
from 43 WIN sites in 10 states. Through interviews with officials
and reading documents they arrived at four basic aims or criteria
of success for the WIN program. Their task, then, was to measure these criteria at the different sites and find the other variables
that would explain them. The basic criteria (the dependent variables in their study) were: number of job entries per staff, average job entry wage, retention rate, average monthly welfare
grant reduction.
The predictors of these outcome criteria were far ranging,
and therein lies the importance of the study. The authors considered issues in the State Administrative System, the Delivery
System, the Job Market, as well as certain background charac-
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teristics of Recipients. They found for example, that the extent
of local employment growth and presence of low wage industries
in the Job Market System was significantly related to average
entry level wage of WIN persons.
They found that bureaucratic-political activities at the state
level did not affect performance at the local level. However, the
more the State Administrative System emphasized training for
staff, the greater the success of local programs. The more that
local WIN offices (the Delivery System) dealt directly and openly
with conflict within the unit, and the more flexibility within the
unit combined with more accountability the greater the success
of the offices.
At the level of the Recipient System, they found that institutional training was more effective with certain clients than
others. Richer mixes of supportive services and more client-oriented job development went with greater success. By casting
their research net broadly, these researches were able to illuminate the ways in which different social systems contributing
to the WIN operation could improve their operation and achieve
the stated goals. As useful as the study and the suggestions
were, they were not able to revolutionize the effectiveness of
WIN. There was no simple way to affect the job market system
relative to recipient characteristics in order to move massive
numbers of recipients into the work force.
The Washington WIN office under Merwin Hans not only
supported research projects, but encouraged forms of action research involving members of the Delivery System in novel activities. Thus in 1972 Hans encouraged a proposal to test the
giving of vouchers to WIN participants so that they could choose
their own training programs. The idea was that welfare recipients would have greater commitment to and get more from a
training program when they themselves could choose and pay
for that program themselves (using the voucher).
The use of vouchers was tested by having the WIN office in
Portland, Oregon administer them. Fears that the use of vouchers would result in totally impractical training purchases proved
unfounded. However, the impact of vouchers on subsequent employment had mixed effects. The vouchers increased the employability of some WIN participants, relative to a comparison
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group. For other participants, the voucher seemed to decrease
their employability relative to a comparison group. The study
highlighted the fact of individual differences among WIN participants (Goodwin & Milius, 1978, p. 21). It also highlighted
the extreme difficulty of trying to develop research efforts with
participation of the Delivery System members. Staff turnover in
the local offices, changes in regulations, and differences in perception between staff members and researchers make any such
effort difficult at best (Richardson & Sharp, 1974). Further use
of vouchers on any kind of large scale was not pursued.
At the same time, Hans recognized that if a local WIN office
became involved in research on a procedure it thought important, that procedure had a good chance of being adopted by the
office and perhaps other offices across the country. With that in
mind, and with a proposed research agenda which he had commissioned (Goodwin, 1976), Hans proceeded with establishing
four local WIN offices as laboratories for testing the usefulness
of new procedures suggested by the offices. The Manpower
Development Research Corporation (MDRC) was designated as
the agent to carry out the action research efforts, which began
in 1977.
The site in Louisville tested the effectiveness of job search
in increasing employment. The site in Denver tested the impact
of working more closely with welfare recipients who volunteered to enter WIN. The St. Louis site worked at trying to establish a connection between WIN trainees and small business
efforts. The combined sites at Madison and Racine, Wisconsin
were to test the use of a monetarily enriched on-the-job training
effort (Leiman, 1982).
The usual difficulties in attempting action research in a complex system were also encountered here, including the problem
of WIN staff turnover (which made agreements about goals and
procedures problematical when new staff arrived) and differences in viewpoints and interests between staff and researchers.
Also, the imaginativeness of the projects presented by the operating offices was very limited.
Only the Louisville effort showed any positive gain in employment for WIN participants. That is, greater effort put into

WIN

job search increased employment. The idea of continuing the
laboratory effort was not met with enthusiasm by any of the
parties, and so it was not continued after 1981.
The importance of these lab efforts is not in the usability of
the research results, but in the illumination of how research can
or cannot be integrated into operating programs. Further illumination along this line was generated from a series of three
ethnographic studies of WIN sites.
The idea of combining ethnographic, qualitative, research
with quantitative research was in Goodwin's research program
proposal (1976) that Hans commissioned. Unfortunately, personality conflicts developed between the leader of the ethnographic effort and the administrator of MDRC who was
responsible for the effort (Vivelo, 1980). Nevertheless, this kind
of effort again pioneered an important approach, and provided
invaluable information for those concerned with understanding
what actually happens in a service organization.
It was observed, for example, how a WIN team leader placed
an illiterate mother in Unassigned Recipient status because the
team's active caseload was high and unemployment was high.
Later on, when caseloads decreased and jobs were plentiful the
mother was sent to evening literacy classes and subsequently
got a job as a presser in a manufacturing firm (Levy, 1981, 107108). The decisions and actions of WIN staff seem reasonable,
and highlight the real situational constraints under which WIN
staff and welfare recipients operate in specific locales.
A different demonstration project, that was successful, introduced the "job dub". WIN staff at experimental sites, in 1976,
were trained to have WIN participants form support groups
around job search activities. It was found that members of these
"dubs" obtained more jobs than participants trying to get jobs
on their own (Azrin, 1978). Use of the Job Club spread to other
sites.
Many other efforts were made by the WIN Office in Washington to improve the training and job placement of welfare
recipients. Giving tax credits to employers hiring welfare recipients was tried. Little success was observed (Goodwin, 1977).
The Total Registration Involvement Project (TRIP) was initiated
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in 1979. It emerged from the fact that WIN was funded at a
relatively low level, $385,000,000 at its peak in 1979 which allocated an average of $259 to each person registered in WIN.
The TRIP project allocated more money to certain sites in
order to see if this increased job placements (Hans, 1979). The
General Accounting Office (GAO) in an overall evaluation of
WIN noted that TRIP increased employment of WIN participants but that the cost of service also markedly increased
(Comptroller General, 1982, p. 13). WIN's budget was on the
downturn at the time of that report and nothing happened to
extend project efforts after the demonstration was completed.
The GAO report presents results from a statistical analysis,
using WIN data, which sought to determine the factors affecting
WIN participants working their way off welfare. Their findings
indicate that economic independence goes up as there are fewer
children in the family, the WIN participant has more education,
is married, has been on welfare fewer years, and is younger
(Comptroller General, 1982, p. 54). These findings are reasonable in that a mother with several children who has little education, has no husband (who can help support the family or look
after the family), has been dependent on welfare a while and
out of the labor market, and is getting on in years will have
severe difficulty in working her way off welfare.
These GAO findings are sharply limited by the fact that the
investigators were using already collected data and could not
ask questions of recipients about attitudes. When this was done
in Goodwin's 1983 study of WIN participants, certain GAO findings were substantiated and new findings added. Goodwin found
that length of time on welfare militated against economic independence, and that the greater the number of children in the
family the longer the time on welfare. This is consistent with the
GAO model.
Goodwin also found that previous job status, which is
strongly related to level of education, positively predicts economic independence, as does having others in the family who
are earning money, which is another way of indicating the presence of a marital partner who is working (Goodwin, 1983,
pp. 50-51).
The further contribution of Goodwin's study was to show
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that certain psychological orientations predict economic independence and others do not. More specificially, he found that
recipients' attitudes toward work or welfare did not predict
achievement of economic independence. The major psychological predictor was expectation of achieving such independence.
This expectation in turn was influenced by whether one obtained employment or not-going up if one got a job and down
if one failed to get a job.
Goodwin's findings in combination with the GAO's findings, and in the absence of contrary findings, suggest that people
are on welfare because of inability to earn enough money in the
job market to support their families at the poverty level. Moreover, they are not on welfare because they reject the work ethic
or prefer welfare to work. Combining these findings and condusions with the evidence reported above that extensive WIN
efforts over the years have failed to make a dent in the national
welfare rolls, suggests that there are structural, hard-to-change
patterns in our society which lead millions of families on to the
welfare rolls.
If the above analysis is valid, then, further efforts at worktraining along the models already seen should be futile. If the
above analysis is invalid, then, innovative work-training efforts
should produce a dramatic dedine in welfare rolls. The Reagan
Administration proposed to demonstrate this dramatic dedine
by phasing out WIN and allocating money to the states to develop their own imaginative work-training efforts (Comptroller
General, 1982, p. 61). These aims were included in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. At issue is what has
been the results of training welfare recipients during the period
from 1981-1987.
Work-Training Up To Date
The 1981 legislation made it possible for states to require
welfare recipients to work for their welfare grants in a Community Work Experience Program (CWEP). States also could
fund on-the-job-training by using the welfare grant as a wage
subsidy with a private employer, or they could mount their own
WIN Demonstration Program. Numbers of states took advantage of these opportunities. What happened?
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The first fact to note is that the welfare rolls have not dramatically declined. In 1987, there were 3,788,000 families on
public welfare as compared with 3,841,000 in 1981 (WIN Office,
1987). The further question is whether particular kinds of efforts
made by certain states have shown remarkable results or reveal
the possibility of achieving dramatic state or national changes
in the welfare rolls?
This question can be answered by the work of MDRC which
contracted with 11 states to evaluate their efforts. One of the
more successful efforts was in San Diego. It involved mandatory
participation of welfare recipients in a job-search workshop followed by individual job search, as well as up to 12 weeks work
experience in public or private nonprofit agencies. After a period
of 15 months persons who received these services were compared with persons who had been assigned to a control group
without those services. One might expect some positive impact
here since emphasis on job search had been shown to improve
employability in the Louisville WIN Lab study in the "job dub"
study.
Results showed a significant difference between members
of the control group and those who received services. The latter
had statistically significant higher levels of employment and
earnings, along with lower welfare payments. However, the absolute magnitude of these differences was small. Thus average
total earnings over a period of 15 months was $700 more for the
group receiving services. Increased earnings of less than $50 per
month are unlikely to have a dramatic effect on the welfare rolls.
The total average reduction in welfare payments over a period
of 18 months was $288. This level of decline does not indicate
dramatic welfare savings (Gueron, 1987, pp. 16, 24).
Efforts in some other states showed no difference at all between those receiving services and those in the control group.
This was true in West Virginia where the unemployment rate
was so high that the possibility of welfare recipients obtaining
a job was extremely low. One conclusion drawn from the study
is that "although programs produced changes, the magnitude of
those changes was relatively modest ...Thus, while it is worthwhile to operate these programs, they will not move substantial
numbers of people out of poverty" (Gueron, 1987, p. 29).
Those conclusions are remarkably similar to those reached
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in an earlier MDRC experiment that involved supported work
for welfare mothers. In that case, the mothers were placed in
subsidized employment for a period of time with their subsequent earnings compared to earning of welfare mothers in a
control group. While there was a significant difference in earnings, it only amounted to $77 per month (Masters & Maynard,
1981, p. 108).
All the findings presented suggest that the WIN experience
from 1968-1981 has been reproduced during 1981-1987. Some
efforts are better able than others to help welfare recipients
achieve economic independence, but these efforts are not able
to make any significant impact on the welfare rolls.
Improvement in job markets can have a positive impact on
welfare rolls. This is not a panacea, however. The State of Massachusetts is a case in point. In 1974 there were 330,000 persons
on public welfare when the unemployment rate was 7.2% (Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 1976, p. 362). In 1987,
with the unemployment rate around 3%, there were still 233,000
persons on public welfare. The overall national number of welfare recipients was about 11,000,000 at both times (WIN Office,
1987). The Massachusetts welfare rolls have been substantially
depleted but are by no means negligible. This in spite of the
fact that Massachusetts has heavily invested in training for welfare recipients (Nightingale, 1987, p. 112).
An unexpected problem arises when the economy is good
and unemployment is low. The cost of housing rises. In the city
of Worcester, for example, where this author resides, the cost of
housing has doubled and tripled in the past few years. Welfare
grants have not nearly kept pace (O'Hare, 1987, p. 30). Those
on welfare today are less able to find adequate housing, or any
housing, than they were earlier.
The welfare phenomenon does not stem from one cause that
can be remedied in a quick and simple way. Welfare rolls will
not totally disappear when services are put in place or when the
unemployment rate dips. Low level of skills, chronic illness, negative experiences in the educational and job market systems as
well as in housing and living situations that promote family
disruption and psychological discouragement cannot be easily
overcome.
Effectiveness of any welfare reform depends in large part
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upon the amount of resources allocated to the efforts prescribed
and the understanding of powerful members of the Donor and
Constituency Systems about the goals of a welfare program. If
these goals center around a cost-benefit lowering of welfare
spending in the next year or two, the legislation will tend to be
punitive and seriously underfunded as was the WIN Program.
If goals center around the long-term development of human
resources the program will be adequately funded and aimed at
helping disadvantaged people make use of opportunities for
achieving economic independence. It is necessary for the federal
government to provide substantial resources here, since, as
Nightingale (1987, p. 113) has indicated, many of the States are
not able to support extensive work-training efforts. How does
the 1988 welfare reform measure up to these issues?
Welfare Reform 1988
In December, 1987 the House of Representatives passed a
surprisingly farsighted Family Welfare Reform Act, H.R. 1720.
It included virtually all the services that have been tried in the
past: remedial education and education for the high school
equivalency certificate; job search; skill training and on-the-job
training; community work experience training; counselling for
personal and family problems; job development; supportive services such as child care and Medicaid even after leaving welfare
(Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, pp. 41-43).
The efforts were to be funded for a period of five years at a
total of more than $7 billion. The bill also gave strong emphasis
to systematic evaluation of program efforts through an interagency panel, an outside advisory board, and $20 million in
funding (Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, pp. 125-126).
A very shortsighted welfare reform bill, S.1511 was introduced in the Senate. The two versions went to a joint HouseSenate Conference Committee in the Spring, 1988. At the end
of September, 1988 the Conference Report emerged and then
became law (PL 100-998). The imaginative portions of the House
bill, including the adequate funding, had been scuttled. About
$3.34 billion was to be provided over a period of five years. As
Rep. Major Owens (NY) pointed out in the House debate, "According to CBO (Congressional Budget Office) in real dollars,
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this bill will provide about half of what we spent on the WIN
Job Training Program for welfare recipients during the 1970s"
(1988). If WIN was unsuccessful in lowering the welfare rolls,
spending less on training cannot reasonably be expected to provide better results.
The negative attitude of the compromise bill toward developing the human potential of welfare recipients is illustrated in
Rep. Augustus Hawkins' (CA) remark about the weakening of
the House provision for postsecondary education counting as
job preparation: "Obviously, most welfare recipients are not
ready for college, but the opportunity should never be foreclosed
to those who have the motivation and capability" (1988). The
final legislation is not looking toward long-term development of
human resources, but rather to short-term saving of money.
There will not of course be real saving as more parents and their
children are unable to gain the skills to move out of poverty and
welfare.
Also lost in the compromise bill was the imaginative approach to research and evaluation. These endeavors are now
placed in traditional fashion solely under the discretion of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is responsible for
the entire welfare effort. It is possible that even under these
conditions the research efforts pioneered by the WIN Program
could be expanded.
A picture could be presented of what is happening in the
different social systems involved in the welfare effort (see Figure 1). A broad evaluation study could be undertaken of worktraining in different locales, considering administrative arrangements and socio-environmental factors such as employment requirements of local industries following the lead of Mitchell,
Chadwin, and Nightingale (1980). Such a study could be enhanced by ethnographic accounts at the same sites of how welfare participants made use of the services and training in the
context of their family/community systems.
Overall results would not only reveal the general impact of
work-training on job placement of welfare recipients, but would
provide detailed information on the kinds of events in local offices and in the lives of welfare recipients that promoted or hindered job efforts. This information could be used by members of
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the administrative and delivery systems to improve the program
and to members of Congress for possible changes in legislative
mandate or level of funding.
A legislative and administrative history of the overall program could be carried forward. This material would help members of all systems, especially those who were new to the scene,
to understand the assumptions guiding different aspects of the
program and the views held by members of different systems.
In short, an integrated set of ongoing research studies that cut
across traditional academic and methodological boundaries could
facilitate the functioning of a national effort to help welfare recipients achieve economic independence. It also could point up
the shortcomings of current efforts.
Summary and Condusions
Welfare policies and programs have changed since their inception. In 1935 the emphasis was on providing support for
widows to stay at home and look after their children. In the
1960s, as welfare rolls increased, emphasis shifted to providing
counselling and work-training for unwed mothers so that they
could obtain employment and leave welfare.
The WIN Program in its initial phase of 1968-71 emphasized
education and training. This resulted in relatively few job placements because the participants required such extensive efforts
in those regards. Pressure built up for more job placements in
order to lower the welfare rolls and welfare costs. The emphasis
for immediate job placement increased from 1972-81, but even
so the welfare rolls remained at around 11,0000,000 persons.
If the WIN Program did not resolve the welfare problem, by
1981 it had undertaken a wide variety of activities aimed at that
goal, including establishment of WIN Laboratories, demonstration projects such as job dubs, and research into such matters
as the attitudes of welfare recipients and the administrative and
socio-environmental context of WIN offices. Overall results indicated that the welfare problem could not be blamed on recipients having deviant goals or values-the latter were much like
those of other Americans. Nor could the problem be attributed
to lack of trying various kinds of work-training efforts, or administrative difficulties.
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Work-training efforts were continued under a more varied
format with the 1981 legislation, giving States a larger role in
determining the activities to be undertaken. Research carried
out on those activities yield essentially the same results as from
WIN: work-training is useful, but in itself will not deplete the
welfare rolls.
The welfare rolls continue at around 11,000,000 personsover 3.5 million families of whom about 95% are headed by
mothers-because of structural, hard-to-change patterns in our
society. These patterns involve the educational system, organization of the job market, housing and living situations, and factors promoting family disruption. These social structural
difficulties that encourage failure in the job market do have psychological consequences, lowering the expectations of ever succeeding. This in turn lowers effort. Thus there is an interplay
between experience and psychological orientations that affect
behavior.
A program that has any hope of lowering welfare rolls must
have a long-range perspective. It must be aimed not merely at
immediate job placement but at helping compensate for social
patterns that have led to inequities in personal background and
experiences. Of particular importance is helping poor fathers
(who are not on welfare) to obtain employment so that there is
greater chance of their staying with and supporting their families.
The new welfare law does not move beyond the thinking or
experience of the WIN Program. There are some positive elements, such as, extension of child care and Medicaid beyond
the welfare period and stronger provision for obtaining family
support from absent fathers. However, the centerpiece of the
effort, the work-training aspect, is so woefully underfunded as
to provide even worse results than the WIN Program it replaces.
No provision is made for upgrading welfare payments that have
fallen farther and farther below the poverty level.
There is some encouragement in the fact that the House of
Representatives was able to pass a welfare reform bill that contained the seeds of a new evolutionary phase in welfare programs. Those seeds may come to fruition at a later time when
we finally recognize that helping the poor is helping to expand
not deplete resources of our nation.
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Work and Welfare: How Industrialists Shaped
Government Social Service During
the Progressive Era
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This article focuses on the welfare work of industrialists which was
developed as a mechanism for fighting trade unionism during the Progressive era. This focus is designed to place welfare in its proper perspective within the political economy and to identify its political and
economic functions. The article concludes that industrial welfare was
one of the instruments used in creating a work ethic in the United
States and one of the mechanisms of social engineering both in and
outside of industry.

The inability to develop a rational social welfare policy in
the United States and the confused public perception of welfare
is a result of deliberate distortion of market realities. Welfare is
seen as an isolated government action; as something done by
government for a few nonworkers who can't help themselves.
The key description is nonworker. Somehow a dichotomy has
been forged between those who work and those who receive
welfare. The legacy of welfare is in fact quite different. It indicates to us that welfare measures are an outgrowth of the work
environment. In fact welfare was designed to aid in controlling
the work process. The separation of work and welfare serves a
very useful ideological function by completely obscuring the actual function of social welfare. Welfare must be understood as
part of the political economy of this country. According to Piven
and Cloward, in their major work on welfare, Regulating the
Poor:
Relief arrangements are ancillary to economic arrangements. Their
chief function is to regulate labor, and they do that in two general
ways. First, when mass unemployment leads to outbreaks of tur-
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moil, relief programs are ordinarily initiated or exapanded to absorb and control enough of the unemployed to restore order; then,
as turbulence subsides, the relief system contracts, expelling those
who are needed to populate the labor market. (1971, p. 3)
The expansion and contraction of public welfare must be seen
as a political phenomenon, one which helps to regulate labor.
This regulation comes not only in terms of the number of people
in the workforce but also their attitudes and behavior. Indeed
the very initiation of welfare measures can only be understood
within the context of work culture in the U.S. Much like today,
early welfare measures were used to reward or threaten workers.
This article looks at one of the early examples of social welfare, industrial welfare. The objective is to identify this form of
welfare as one of the regulatory tools used by industrialists to
control labor. Industrial welfare was seen as necessary during
the Progressive era to help prevent the spread of trade unionism.
More important for contemporary reflection is the way in which
industrialists passed on the responsiblity and expense of these
"welfare" services to government, thereby formalizing the separation of work and welfare. Government still bears the brunt
of responsibility for the casualties of labor (unemployment, disability etc.) while the source of the problem, industry, remains
hidden from view and absolved of responsibility. The historical
record which points out the transferal of welfare services from
industry to government helps us to understand how the separation of work and welfare has been shaped in the consciousness
of the average American.
Industrial Welfare and the Process of Reproduction
The cultural styles and habits of workers posed the most
serious threat to industry at the turn of the century. While industrialists could not hope to shatter or dissolve these traditions
overnight, they did have to address seriously the whole range
of culture, continually trying to adapt the old to their own purposes or attempting to produce new patterns. The disruptive
effect of culture on the industrialization process sparked an urgency among industrialists to insure loyalty and order within
their enterprises. The crude, casual, and personal ways of treating employees in the plant were therefore coupled with the om-
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nipotence of the foreman. But while such informality in factory
life may have had its advantages for workers and owners alike,
decisions were still arbitrary and the tug of war between workers and management over control of the work process resulted
in anarchy as Gerb Korman illustrates in this passage:
For many years most Milwaukee firms kept only meager employment records. This was true even of the E. P. Allis Company which
by the mid-1880's was already employing hundreds of workers.
Foremen and timekeepers simply noted the number of hours
worked, rates of wages, and prices for piecework, often keeping
no formal records at all. Indeed, the company made no effort to
pay by check during its early years preferring to refer to its Polish
workers as 'Mike 1,' 'Mike 2,' or 'Mike 3.' This seemed much easier than trying to master Polish names.
...

According to J.M.J. Keogh of E. P. Allis: 'When I was time-

keeper (in the 1880's) the workmen were given no work tickets.
They obtained the number of the casting or forging verbally from
the foreman and gave their job to the timekeeper who posted it on
a sheet which covered the entire labor cost on the order.

. .

. There

were no time clocks and no production boards to assist the foremen
in knowing the next job to give the workers. The result being that
the foreman would let his men run out of work and then would
have to call at the foreman's desk or trail him around the shop to
see what the next job would be.' Highly skilled pieceworkers haggled with foremen over prices for particular jobs, partly in their
own interests, but also because foremen, not the company, paid
the helpers. (1967, p. 64)
Order, prior to the turn of the century, was impossible in
industry unless employers allowed ethnic connections to govern
employment practices. They could not ignore human relations
even if they wanted to. The result was the unsystematic involvement of companies in the personal lives of workers. For example,
land and money were donated to churches by industrialists but
this was done in an effort to curb alcohol consumption. Thus
church deeds stipulated and/or prohibited the sale of liquor on
the properties. Banquets, company outings, and other celebrations were held. Some employers contributed to workers' benevolent aid societies which helped to pay medical and funeral
expenses for injured or killed employees, while other employers

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

handled such issues on an idividual basis. Stuart Brandes in his
study of these so-called "welfare" practices of employers describes how they were designed to give industrialists a foothold
into cultural habits of the employees.
Some companies made it possible for employees to keep cows or
chickens, and one maintained a company bird sanctuary. Company gardens were very popular with many employers, and floral
displays (perhaps picked from a company greenhouse) graced many
factories and houses, recalling misty memories of an agricultural
past. Urban living required more attention to grooming than had
farm life, and company manicurists cleaned fingernails while company shoe polishers blackened boots. In case employees ran afoul
of the many regulations established by community living, free legal advice was sometimes available.
...Since one of the most important social problems was the acculturation of young persons to the industrial society, by 1900 various American firms operated every form of school short of a college
or university....
•. . Even the most basic problems of food and shelter often aroused
the attention of American executives. Many employees dined at
company restaurants. Company stores proliferated, and many
companies provided milk for their employees from a company
dairy ...(1976, p. 4)
Philanthropic though these activities may seem, the employers
through such actions were able for a while to avoid formal responsibilities towards their workers, such as workmen's compensation and other employee benefits. Later, many of these
functions would be conveniently turned over to local government.
Despite industry's social policies, or maybe because of them
the independent political action of workers continued, both organized and unorganized. We can only guess at the number of
factories which dosed because of workers social obstinancy.
However, between 1880 and 1900 nearly 23,000 strikes affected
more than 117,000 business establishments in the United States,
an average of three new strikes a day for 20 years (Brandes,
1976). These actions often brought state, federal, and local government into the picture as either mediator or supplier of troops
for repression. However, the employer had to find new and/or
improved ways of control for stability. The casual, unsystematic
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managerial response to decision-making and control was
doomed; a more rational means of organization was necessary.
Writers don't agree entirely on the content of the new "rationalization" method. Some, like Korman, combine welfare
programs, scientific management, industrial betterment, and
social engineering and see in them the concerted thrust to bring
order to production. Other writers like Daniel Nelson see welfare work and the scientific management of Taylor as differing
and competing managerial philosophies. But, if we look at the
intentions and motivations which all of these new managerial
techniques and philosophies professed and the definitions given
them, we see that Taylorism and welfare work had common
goals and a parallel course of development. The definitions reproduced by Nelson are instructive:
Taylorism was an outgrowth of the 'works management' movement
and the pioneering work of Frederick W. Taylor at the Midvale and
Bethlehem Steel Companies in the 1880s and 1890s. Its basic premise was that 'human activity could be measured, analyzed, and
controlled by techniques analogous to those that had proved successful when applied to physical objects.' In practical terms it combined a variety of new and old ideas, the most notable of which
were time study and the incentive wage .... [But] Taylor's system
demanded a thorough reorganization of the shop, new roles for
managers and workers alike and most ominously, a 'mental revolution.' (1972, p. 1)
Alongside "Taylorism" stood industrial welfare work. Because of its political function it has a much less precise definition
than Taylorism, although it seemed to be embraced more widely
by industry. The National Civic Federation, an organization of
America's biggest businessmen, was the strongest supporter of
industrial welfare. They wrote:
...welfare work involves special consideration for physical comfort wherever labor is performed; opportunities for recreation; educational advantages; and the providing of suitable sanitary
homes . .. plans for saving and lending money and provisions or
insurance and pensions. (NCF, 1904)
All of the examples of industrial welfare owe their origins to a
common source in the National Civic Federation. Business and
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industry asserted their new organizational fervor and class consciousness in establishing the NCF in 1900, where they undertook collectively the task of exercising control of public opinion.
Smaller and middle range businessmen, manufacturers and
merchants, who were tied exclusively to the domestic market
and who were therefore more vulnerable to labor and financial
fluctuation, maintained very parochial and narrow interests. They
acted as individual entities and not as part of an ownership
"class" in their opposition to unions, their avoidance of national
interests, and their opposition to the big corporations. The NCF
too opposed unions, radicals, and Socialists, but they considered the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), dominated by small business, the "anarchists" among businessmen,
to which they were opposed (Weinstein, 1968).
Even though the NCF was an exclusive business club with
the responsibility of "educating businessmen to the changing
nature of America's business system," they nevertheless maintained a "tripartite" membership with "labor" and "the public"
as well. We therefore find among its members names such as
Grover Cleveland, William Taft, Samuel Gomphers, and John
Mitchell along side the long list of industrialists and financiers
such as Belmont, Hanna, Carnegie, and Morgan. The NCF set
the tone of the age and professed an ideology which denied class
interest, substituting in its place "conciliation" and "reform"
based on "cooperation." Ironically, it was the class interest and
consciousness of the industrialists that allowed them to take on
functions of "public officials." They realized all too well the limitations of individual company action in attempting to establish
control. Therefore businessmen actively reshaped their own image and that of the corporations to win the loyalty of workers.
This included the assumption of many social responsibilities
which today we associate with government.
In the early history of NCF, 1900 to 1905, its main function
was that of mediating labor disputes. It was therefore the forerunner of the government's Commission on Industrial Relations
(1913-1915). While NCF rejected trade unionism as an independent movement, it willingly developed a Trade Agreements Department under the joint chairmanship of Francis Robbins of
the Pittsburg Coal Company and John Mitchell of the United
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Mine Workers, to establish some mechanism of agreement between members of the organizations. Trade unions were viewed
as a "bulkwark" against the great wave of socialism. Where trade
unionism did not stabilize factory relations or where they were
rejected by owners, the NCF suggested welfare measures.
Any uniformity in welfare measures owed a debt to the general policy of the NCF which its member industries followed.
The Welfare Department of the NCF was established in 1904.
The general approach of the Department was to promote "sympathy and a sense of identification between the employer and
his employees" by integrating the lives and leisure time of workers with the functioning of the corporation (Weinstein, 1968).
However, as James Weinstein dearly explains, part of the process
of integrating the lives of the workers with that of the corporation involved the assumption by corporations of many functions
which today we see as government's responsibility. Early welfare
concerns included, technical education for workers, kindergarten for their children, low cost housing, recreation facilities,
some aspects of public health programs, saving and lending
money, insurance and pensions. Such paternalistic labor relations it was felt would undermine union strength, though this
was not always the result. But the NCF was somewhat successful
in individualizing workers' political action and they maintained
their own class-based hegemony. Industry must be credited with
providing the initial impetus for the use of social services in the
structuring of political relations. If industry relinquished much
of its "social responsibility," it was because it was able to pass
on the responsibility to government while retaining the benefits.
Additionally, the conditions which created the need for certain
types of welfare also facilitated their demise. In industry, medical plans, pension plans, factory environment and employee
representation replaced the old emphasis on education, recreation, and religion for workers.
While welfare work was not pervasive throughout industry,
it allowed the industrialists to address pragmatic concerns in the
garb of philanthropy and paternalism. Like Taylorism it was a
response to the specific pressures of labor turmoil. While Taylor
very openly announced the very ambitious promises of scientific
management-greater output, lower costs, higher wages and la-
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bor-management harmony-welfare work programs camouflaged similar intentions of reduced production costs and
increased profits. However, some employers were quite proud
to announce of welfare work that: ". . . [it] decreases the floating
element and secures a stable work force, promotes harmonious
relations and worker loyalty, combats unionism and insures
against strikes" (Cardullo, 1915, p. 197).
In the final analysis the employer would choose those techniques which were least expensive economically and emotionally. Often welfare work was less demanding of owners and
managers because, unlike Taylorism, it allowed them to retain
their traditional paternalistic roles and defend themselves against
trade unions under the guise of "social responsibility." Welfare
work helped to transform the corporation itself from solely an
economic institution into the basic social unity of American society (Scheinberg, 1966). Some historians have recognized the
intent of these reform measures and have placed them in their
proper perspective within the whole web of bureaucratization
which was occurring in the United States at the turn of the century. It is important, therefore, that we see scientific management and welfare work as opposite sides of the same coin. They
were not simply the result of diligent engineers like Taylor and
social workers like Gertrude Beeks of International Harvester.
The pressures of workers' uncontrolled habits brought about the
necessary emergence of what Brandes calls a tripartite system
involving labor, government, and big business (Brandes, 1976).
Mark Hanna, industrialist and President of the National Civic
Federation, became adviser to President McKinley, which gave
national recognition to welfare work. John Commons, in his
efforts to study ways to involve government in employment conditions, brought notoriety to scientific management in 1910 in
the Easter Rate Case, and in 1909 the federal government utilized
features of Taylorism at the Watertown arsenal. Thus welfare
measures and scientific management became means for entrenchment of business hegemony and fulfillment of the corporate state. Both were means of "indoctrinating workers into
accepting corporations as the central institutions of modem
American life. Part of the process of integrating the lives of
workers with that of the corporation involved the assumption

Progressive Era

by corporations of many functions now seen as government responsibilities" (Brandes, 1976, p. 8).
Ironically, because welfare work was based on sentiment
rather than "science," its rationale always served to underscore
the dehumanizing consequences of industrial work which industrialists were attempting to deny. Hence, welfare begins by
calling attention to precisely that which industrialists proposed
to obscure.
Industrial Welfare and Skilled Workers
In industries which attempted to institute scientific management and industrial welfare, the reactions of employees serve
to explain further some of their differences. The old forms of
management were not only predicated on paternalism which
revolved around the whim and good graces of owners and foremen, but also on the loyalty and efficiency of workers, particularly skilled workers. These workers became the primary targets
of industrial welfare schemes. They asserted a great deal of autonomy over work procedures. However, once industries began
to expand and to consolidate, this dependence on skilled labor
became intolerable because it threatened the control of owners.
Skill eventually fell victim to systematization through the mechanism of scientific management (e.g., the introduction of the
assembly line, a new division of labor, new tools, new work
methods, etc.).
In many cases where scientific management was incorporated in a plant, welfare work might also be adopted. Employers
sought to retain some of the personalism of old managerial systems in an effort to maintain workers' loyalty and welfare
schemes allowed this. Theie measures would be instituted as
often inside the factory as outside. Inside, employers, like Pullman in Illinois, might construct modem ventilation systems,
lunchrooms, and restrooms, and hire company doctors for
workers, while their industrial welfare measures outside the
workplace most often consisted of libraries, restaurants, dub
houses, recreational facilities, dancing classes, schools, housing
projects, company bands, Sunday school, and cooking lessons.
Modem systematic welfare programs of the period institutionalized these practices not only by coordinating them nationally
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and regionally, as the NCF attempted to do, but these measures
were professionalized under the direction of experts hired by
the companies and operating out of newly established industry
departments. The professionalization of industrial sociology, industrial psychology as well as social work begin in these
departments.
When industries provided savings and loan associations,
accident insurance plans, and pensions for the elderly, they were
normally directed to skilled workers. While the reorganization
of industry facilitated by scientific management may have antagonized skilled workers by upgrading the "unskilled" and
transferring skilled knowledge to management, welfare measures served as a reward system (carrot and the stick); a way of
encouraging worker retention and a way to salvage worker loyalty. Industry was constantly fearful that antagonizing workers
might force them into the arms of organized labor. Welfare measures were designed to prevent this while at the same time creating a new dependence among workers. David Brody identifies
this in his study of steelworkers: "Through promotions, housing, bonuses, pensions, and steady work, corps of company
retainers were developed. The skilled workmen entered an orbit
of dependence, induced to accept without dispute the terms of
employment set by the steel companies" (Brody, 1960, p. 90).
I don't mean to imply that employers were too generous with
their welfare measures. Workers paid for industrial welfare as
citizens pay for government welfare. For accident insurance,
workmen contributed a specified amount deducted from their
wages and employers never contributed more than a third of the
total costs (Brody, 1960). Additionally, employers were able to
escape the legal responsibility for industrial accidents through
the use of "common law" defenses: the fellow servant doctrine,
the assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. When
worker demands for compensation intensified in such a way that
industries could no longer avoid their legal responsibility they
called on government for support. Either the government would
provide for workers' coverage or regulate the limits of coverage
through the courts. By 1912, after several years of investigation,
a Congressional Commission finally established a compromise
between labor and capital. Weinstein, in his excellent analysis
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of the transfer of these social functions to government during
the Progressive era points out the supportive role of government
when the social welfare expenses of industry were overtaxed.
For example, in the case of accident insurance companies were
able to depend on government to set "limits" on compensation
while ensuring deregulation.
The competition between industrial welfare work and trade
unions for workers' loyalty is further indicated by the historical
presence of programs which rose and fell concurrently with
unionism. The spirit in welfare programs during the 1920s was
in part a response to the gains made by organized labor during
World War I. Welfare work created "mediating structures," which
in some instances came to fulfill some of the function of the
family as well (Brandes, 1976). Regardless of the reaction of
workers to these programs, government and industry imposed
themselves on the daily lives of individuals without request.
Eventually, government would come to dominate the area of
"welfare" services, particularly housing, health, and recreation
as their expense increased for industry.
It is not my intention to prove or imply that any particular
group of workers, women, immigrants, skilled or unskilled, was
more responsive to social welfare than another. To do so would
only duplicate previous errors in analysis which persist in associating this acceptance with the lack of political consciousness.
Welfarism has left its impact on all workers. Today those persons
outside of the industrial environment are the most obvious targets of welfarism, but it permeates all our lives, those who work
and those who do not. Ironically, at the turn of the century, the
only judgement which seems fair, given the contradictory evidence, is that workers in the industrial sector were the primary
targets of welfare, while variations in program application were
influenced by geographic considerations.
According to Brandes, welfare work was also one of the techniques used by government in its attempts to stimulate production. However, industrial welfare waxed in times of prosperity
and waned in depression (Brandes, 1976), expanding when business profits were up and industry anticipated worker demands
for greater compensation, welfarism was a way to head them off.
But this cycle was reversed for government (Piven & Cloward,

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

1971) precisely because government was concerned with mobilizing the economy and the task was more important in bad
times than good. Therefore, during World War I the Wilson
Administration formed
... government bodies to supervise critical goods and services as
food, fuel, railroads, shipping, and housing. Two of these, the
United States Shipping Board and the United States Housing Corporation, encouraged welfarism in industrial housing. The Housing Corporation was created by the War Department to build homes
for workers. It included a town planning division, chaired by famed
city planner Fredrick Law Olmsted, which planned numerous
housing projects near arsenals, munitions factories, and shipyards.
Several developments qualified as full-scale model towns designed
to give pleasant accommodations at mass productions prices. The
Housing Corporation spent a total of $194 million to house about
six thousand families. In effect, the United States government constructed a whole series of "company" towns during World War I.
(Brandes, 1976, p. 4)

These developments show clearly government's assumption of
the responsibility of industrial welfarism and this would clearly
affect the cognitive referents or symbols given to the working
class.
Meanwhile, self-help institutions suffered attack and obliteration at the hands of the new social welfare functions of government. The family, home, neighborhood, community, places
of leisure, taverns, stores, meeting halls, churches, stoops, and
alleys, all of which had been shaped by occupational groupings
at an earlier period of capitalist development, lost their place
within the pattern of labor and leisure. The conditions of work,
long hours and poor wages, seriously affected patterns of relations among "unskilled immigrants" as well. While the urban
political Machine did lend some legitimacy to the urban ethnic
ghettos. Even with the demise of the "Machine," ethnic culture
and ritual still remain a source of strength for immigrants in
resisting the exploitation of work. However, as industry and
government introduced social services into communities, institutions arose which would undermine the functions of the "old"
cultural patterns. To prevent home from being, as some workers
commented, "just the place where I eat and sleep," (Alt, 1976)
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it had to be recreated as a social center. A cynic might argue that
the conditions of poverty and overcrowding therefore came to
serve as a positive function for the poor who were forced to live
together to survive. This description of workers housing from
a study of the Homestead mill community presents a picture of
cultural habits which give positive meaning to the otherwise
negative condition of poverty:
The Slavic workers, plus their families, relatives and intirant boarders, lived together in large numbers and in very close quarters,
usually in tenement houses which would often face and share a
common courtyard. It is in the extended home that the primary
social bonds of mutuality are first reproduced as they originate out
of the conditions of exploitative industrial employment. The extended home and ecological character of the early tenements fostered extensive social interaction among its members. For one, the
homes which occupied a common courtyard used a common water
source and shared one toilet facility. During mild weather, the
courtyard Was typically a focus for discussions between men on
shop-floor political and cultural topics, and was a place for playing
cards, singing, and dancing. The house itself was a major center
for social life: "In the evening a group often gathers around the
stove gossiping of home days, playing cards, drinking, and playing
simple musical instruments. On the Saturday after pay day the
household usually clubs together to buy a case of beer which it
drinks at home." The home was also the scene of larger festivities
during the events of birth, marriage, and death. These gatherings
always drew workmates, relatives, old friends, and new neighbors
together where "joy and grief and religious ceremony are alike
forgotten in a riotous good time." (Alt, 1976, p. 63)
However, deteriorating living conditions always demanded that
the poor plan on leaving rather than remaining in such quarters.
Therefore, either returning to Europe or geographic relocation
in the United States remained an objective. Transiency and geographic mobility became the greatest threat to working class
community life.
Scientific management and industrial welfare combined to
undermine the function of occupational communities as the most
significant peer group. The extended family, the local tavern,
and other working dass community centers lost their earlier
meaning. This is not to say that individualization completely
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replaced group activity among workers, but it is pointed out
here to make reference to social changes taking place for workers
and the new conceptions of life which may have emerged.
Contemporary studies of industrial welfare and its consequences in working class communities, however, do argue that
individualism and consumerism came to completely dominate
working class life and leisure. Leisure, more and more, became
associated with a reaction against work thereby helping to solidify the separation of work from social conscience.
Even though studies show workers maintained a low evaluation of welfare work (Houser, 1927), there is no question that
it left an impact. The Progressive era opened up a whole new
role for institutions in the social life of individuals. The assumption that workers could not provide certain necessities nor
amenities for themselves and/or families, obviously had social
and psychological consequences. When workers accepted such
services, they implicitly exposed a weakness (Brandes, 1976).
Immigrants were fast coming to view themselves not as temporary workers, but as permanent residents in the new industrial order. If the attitude toward work had changed by 1921,
social engineering techniques were largely responsible. There
is no question that these techniques were aimed at the control
of labor. But the long term consequences for political consciousness seem to have been more successful than the short term
control of behavior. Strikes did dedine somewhat at Taylorized
plants and those with welfare programs, but they did not disappear. The promise of social harmony had not been achieved.
Therefore, industry would have to turn to both government and
the craft unions to aid its process of social control.
Even though organized labor came to oppose both industrial
welfarism and scientific management, it is improtant to note
that its leadership was actually a part of the National Civic Federation which brought "welfarism" and employee/employer cooperation to national attention. John Mitchell and Samuel
Gomphers were both members of the NCF and both applauded
the initial creation of the NCFs Welfare Department. Therefore,
while industrialists had as their expressed intent the elimination
of unionism, union officials embraced their goals of "propagating an improved American working man: thrifty, dean, tem-
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perate, intelligent, and especially, industrious and loyal"
(Brandes, 1976, p. 33). Since most industrial welfare measures
seemed beneficial to skilled workers who constituted the membership of the unions at that time, the labor leaders can be seen
as participating in that which ultimately undermined their legitimacy. The AFL not only activiely sought to cooperate with
owners and management on particular issues at the national level
but came, as Dubofsky describes, to "ape their corporate cousins." The labor leaders reorganized their associations in the image of Progressive reform "in which the rank and file obediently
followed the commands of bureaucratically indined well-paid
officials" (Dubofsky, 1975, p. 84). The organizational reforms of
the unions, like those in industry and government, transformed
both the nature and process of decision-making, authority, and
participation. They emphasized appointed rather than elected
to insure loyalty. Administrative techniques became more important than oratory and charisma. Like government, the union,
too, sought to take politics out of their "business." While shunning scientific management, the unions adopted a prostandardization posture in their defense of formal work rules and
procedures. They also emphasized their contractual relationship
with industry.
It was organized labor's antiimmigrant, antiunskilled policies and attitudes which would ultimately be their demise. Not
only did they exclude the unskilled from their locals, but immigrants were chided for their "alien and inferior character." As
for Black migrants to the industrial cities, the AFL exclaimed:
"Hordes of ignorant blacks, possessing but few of those attributes we have learned to revere and love, huge strapping fellows, ignorant and vicious, whose predominating trait was
animalism" (Dubofsky, 1975, p. 84). In an effort to defend their
own craft exclusiveness, the AFL even opposed government efforts to mandate maximum hours and minimum wages for adult
men and provide unemployment insurance and social security.
With everything eliminated from their domain of concern
except business, material gains and efficient organization, unions
lost their ability to describe and critique the industrial economic
environment which fostered them. The interest of skilled labor
was separated from that of the "public interest." But, as orga-
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nized labor maintained their exclusionary position, mass production industry came to rely more on unskilled immigrant
labor.
Ironically, mechanization, particularly in large-scale mass
production industries, reduced the attraction of the craft union
(Dubofsky, 1975). The "unskilled" now dominated the technologically advanced sectors of the economy (auto, steel, meatpacking, rubber, electrical goods). By 1919, it was the
unorganized rank and file, the immigrant, the unskilled workers
who remained the most significant threat to industrial hegemony, not the unions. Strikes increased but not trade union
membership (Brecher, 1972). In fact, the AFL, in a desperate
attempt after World War I to save itself from extinction, entered
an agreement with industry and government alike which went
beyond mere cooperation. Their antistrike, procontract position
was traded for the right to organize and they became facilitators
of the new "company unions."
The Role of the State
Industry would ultimately turn to government as yet another
tool to control workers' behavior. Since welfare work and industrial organization could not completely contain strikes it became necessary to create new "social consciousness" which would
be predicated on a new idea of the government as "imperial
mediator."
The U.S. government did not take on the responsibility of
categorical benefits and of social welfare as we know it today
officially until 1935 and then only as a response to strikes and
the collapse of the economy. However, the precedent for government to assume this role was set at the turn of the century by
industry and the National Civil Federation in their effort to establish government's mediator role. Industry was actively looking for ways of transferring the cost of industrial welfare work
to government. Since industry was involved in everything from
setting up cooking classes for the wives of workers to building
roads leading to and from their establishments this was an expensive and therefore necessary transfer. The cities would "inherit" many of the welfare measures and programs previously
conducted by industry, as is illustrated in the case of Dayton,
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Ohio. Here, the city took over the National Cash Register Company's "welfare" program, "to take care of the education and the
health and working conditions of employees and their families."
Without interfering with the internal dynamics of industry, the
social services were designed around the attitude that "happy
workers are more efficient." Dayton constructed parks, planted
trees, built new bridges. The city's welfare department inspected
milk, provided free legal aid, established a municipal employment agency, a municipal lodging house, provided free medical
examinations for school children, free vaccination, playgrounds,
play festivals, and other social services. The city also created
new employment opportunities by building its own asphalt
plant, new sewers, and instituting city-wide services. Often
these types of services and municipal ownership policies coincided with the aims of radical social reforms, though their objectives remained different.
There was a conceptual change which occurred as well within
this transferal of the responsibility for social services. By the
1920s the old philosophy of laissez-faire had been completely
replaced by a new Republican ideology and organizational direction which enlarged government and its functions. The involvement of the federal government as a "neutral third party"
standing between owners and workers was designed to curb
organized confrontation. Government "presence" it was hoped,
would create an aura of fairness in negotiated settlements, rather
than changing workers' independent action. This new role of
the State is central to understanding other changes at the time.
By the 1890s it had become apparent that society could no
longer allow workers to shift for themselves in an imaginary free
market place, or be subject to the whims of their employers, or
even worse, themselves. Working-class life had to be regularized
and routinized. This was the necessary consequence of bureaucratic-technological society as Wiebe stresses in The Search for
Order. Gigantic modem industrial corporations governed by impersonal, formal managerial bureaucracies replaced the old set
of social relations typical of "island communities." All of the
social reformers agreed that the regularization of working class
life was a necessity, and formalized work rules became a motif
of working class existence. Unregulated working conditions and
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laissez-faire was now seen by industrialists as creating a situation which was totally unpredictable. In this context government was seen by reformers and industrialists alike as a
regulatory alternative.
After 1916, with U.S. involvement in the war and the unions'
surrender of the right to strike, one might conclude that the state
had triumphed in the interest of capital and, in the process, had
gained a secure position for itself as mediator to maintain this
tenuous balance between unequal partners. More important,
however, the State had become the unwilling "sponsor" of collective bargaining. With all of its administrative innovations to
limit participation, it was now forced to amend exclusionary
practices or continually expand the idea of the "public interest."
At the same time, however, the State would give legitimacy to
industrial autocracy when worker and citizen participation were
denied. The State could participate in the process of the reproduction of productive relations only by sponsoring new and
sometimes contradictory social relations. Theirs was a creative
function which helps to point out the reoccurrence of contradictions in capitalism. As with the efficiency engineers, the State
began to embrace diametrically opposed ideas simultaneously:
of consent and manipulation, of men as individuals and as machines, of survival of the fittest and the social explanation of
poverty, workers as individuals and as the "group" object of
policy, of "merit" as the basis of success and the "inherent" superiority of business, access to information and limited
communication.
Conclusion
Work and attitudes about work are cornerstones of American
society. Unlike other countries around the world where members
of the population may share a common language, customs, or
history, the U.S. had to create a commonality for its population.
A culture of work was enforced, that is, methods of work, patterns of authority, work behavior and motivation were created
from a system of rules and organization. A work ethic was
forged at the expense of ethnic cultures and values. Immigrants
were forced to give up past values and beliefs to accommodate
themselves to the new workplace. Ultimately fear of destitution
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was the driving force in the destruction of old cultural values
and the embrace of the new work ethic. The breakup of ethnically specific behavior was part of what industrialists considered
necessary disciplining of the work force. This discipline was
accomplished by a process of social engineering throughout the
society. Industrialists, aided by the emerging class of social scientists relied on reorganization (in government and industry)
and social services through industrial welfare programs to accomplish their goals. The specific objective was to create new
structures of authority, hierarchy and decision making while
cultivating new attitudes to serve as the basis of legitimacy for
these structures. All of the action and procedures used by industry to create a stock of stable, dependent wage earners served
dual functions: production and control. Industrial organization/
scientific management and industrial welfare head the list of
mechanisms for control and the transmission of the new "work
ethic."
Like industrial organization, industrial welfare had a cultural as well as an ideological function. It was not enough for
workers to be controlled on the job, the work force had to be
self-regulating. Workers had to supply their own regular work
habits and timing and their own motivation for work and wages.
As we witness the current debate surrounding new industrial policies toward workers similar concerns emerge. Industrialists and policy makers continue to address the need for
"disciplining" the remaining work force. This has come in the
form of massive lay offs, the erosion of collective bargaining and
unionization, and wage and benefit "givebacks." We are warned
that expectations must be "lowered" in the U.S. less the society
crumble under the pressures asserted by the "internal dynamics
of democracy in a high educated, mobilized and participant
society" (Sklar, 1980, p. 3). The widespread hardship which has
resulted from the attack on the working class is the result of an
effort to "discipline" and lower expectations. This review of the
process of control as it asserted itself at the turn of the century
was intended to develop a dearer perspective of the regular demands of capitalism.
As we continue to be bombarded by the demands of industry, the question of government's function will resurface. Citi-
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zens will have to address the logic of the corporate State in terms
of their own self-interest. On the one hand government has cultivated a client relationship with workers by denying them independent action as a group. By introducing social services the
State has created structures which affect daily life. These structures can be manipulated to shape attitudes.
Ironically, the Reagan Administration's cuts in social services
and the simultaneous attack on workers and unions may be the
source of a new unity. Sectors of the population who had previously been trained to see each other as antagonists now find
they share the same plight: free food lines, welfare offices, dependency. If a working unity emerges we may see a new understanding emerge which addresses the rights of all citizens to a
decent quality of life as an inalienable right. Working people
may see a new function for the State and the Constitution, forcing us to go beyond the Lockean idea of government's function
as securing a "free market of competition."
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The Political Economy of Welfare*
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Analyses of the U.S. welfare system in the tradition of political economy have tended to focus on the maintenance of a pool of low-wage
labor. This paper adds another dimension, as it incorporatesgovernment work programs into a theory of the functions and nature of the
U.S. welfare system. Three dimensions of the welfare system are posited: (a) maintaining a stigma attached to welfare so that people are
encouraged to hold low-wage jobs: (b) maintaining welfare payments
at levels that do not interfere with the functioning of labor markets;
and (c) basing government work programs on principles that are congruent with the logic of the market, i.e., profit criteria. Examples
drawn primarily from the 1930s to the 1980s are used to illustrate the
theory.

Reform of the welfare system has again been on the political
agenda during the 1980s. Increases in the incidence of poverty
focused attention on welfare and its alleged effect of providing
an attractive alternative to wage-labor. Traditional conservative
arguments that welfare increases work disincentives have been
embellished by relatively new charges that welfare is also responsible for the rise in poor female-headed families. Since the
welfare system has been charged with causing poverty, the necessary cure according to conservatives has been forcing recipients to work outside their homes in exchange for their welfare
payments.
These theories of "poverty-by-choice" developed primarily
by George Gilder (1981), Ken Auletta (1982), Charles Murray
(1984), Lawrence Mead (1985), have provided much of the theoretical justification for the Reagan Administration's cuts in welfare spending and implementation of work requirements.
*1 would like to thank Ellen Gruenbaum and two unnamed reviewers for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (1984,
p. 3), while programs for low-income individuals comprised
approximately 10% of federal expenditures in 1980, they were
subjected to about 3 0% of the budget cuts between 1981 and
1984. And the Reagan Administration's support for workfare, in
which welfare recipients considered employable are required to
provide work that is normally paid a wage in order to receive
their welfare payments, has been incorporated into the 1988
welfare reform legislation.
The question arises of how to respond to the new conservative theories about welfare and attacks on the welfare system.
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. doward, in their now-classic
Regulating the Poor (1971), have developed the most convincing
theory to date. They show how welfare reform has occurred as
a response of the government to militant protests of the unemployed. When the protest abates, parts of the reforms are rescinded and restrictive relief practices are restored. Central to
their analysis is the function of welfare in maintaining the "work
ethic" and a sufficient pool of low-wage labor. Theorists writing
since Piven and Cloward's initial work have also addressed the
question of why women and-their dependent children have comprised the bulk of the poverty population (cf. Pearce, 1978; Shortridge, 1985; Abramovitz, 1988). Mimi Abramovitz, in Regulating
the Lives of Women (1988), suggests that the welfare system has
been shaped not only by the work ethic, but also by the "family
ethic." The unpaid labor of all women in the home has been
maintained in conjunction with the low-wage labor in the market of women who have not conformed with the family ethic
and whose improverishment has been caused by divorce, desertion, single motherhood, or failure of their husbands to provide sufficient incomes. The aspect of welfare that needs further
theoretical attention concerns work, both work relief, provision
of welfare in exchange for work that is normally paid a wage,
and wage-labor. 1
In this paper I begin to address the gap in theories about
the welfare system by developing a theory of the functions of
welfare and the constraints imposed on it by U.S. capitalism in
which analysis of the nature and forms of work for relief recipients is integral. Three dimensions of the welfare system are
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posited: (a) the "ideology of the dole" and the segmentation of
the working class; (b) the level of welfare payments and the
maintenance of labor markets; and (c) the form of work and the
logic of the market.
The "Ideology of the Dole" and Segmentation
of the Working Class
The first dimension of the welfare system concerns the creation and maintenance of divisions among members of the
working dass. It includes segmentation between the employed
and the unemployed, as well as among the jobless themselves.
Maintenance of these divisions impedes all members of the
working class, both employed and unemployed, from recognizing and perhaps acting on the fundamental commonality of their
situation-that they have no guarantee of a job and therefore
can be unemployed for periods of time.
The separation between workers who are employed and those
who are unemployed is maintained primarily through the "ideology of the dole," the belief that most of the jobless are unemployed due to laziness and inability to find jobs. However,
this flies in the face of the reality of capitalist economic systems,
which normally rely on unemployment and underemployment
in order to maintain profits. 2 Decisions about production and
investment are made by capitalist owners of the means of production (i.e. buildings and equipment) based on the rates of
profit they expect to earn. Profits are derived from revenue (price
of the product times the quantity sold) minus the cost of producing the product, and wages account for approximately half
of the costs of production. When unemployment falls, the bargaining power of workers with jobs increases as there are fewer
unemployed workers to replace them. They are therefore more
able to obtain both higher wages and more control over the
production process, i.e. better working conditions. But this tends
to reduce profits, which in turn leads capitalists to cut back
production and delay investment projects. As a result fewer
workers are needed-and unemployment rises. Thus unemployment is not caused by "lazy workers"-sufficient numbers
of jobs simply do not exist.
Segmentation among the jobless includes two types of over-
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lapping distinctions. One replicates divisions among the employed working dass-differentiation according to race, gender,
class, and citizenship (i.e. citizen versus noncitizen, commonly
termed "illegal aliens"). The other applies the "ideology of the
dole" to the unemployed themselves, and is expressed in terms
of the so-called "deserving poor" and the "undeserving poor."
The "deserving poor" are those deemed by society as worthy, relative to the "undeserving poor," of receiving relief. Therefore they are given more adequate aid, usually in a less
humiliating manner, than the "undeserving poor." From the early
1600s to the early 1900s the "deserving poor" consisted primarily
of middle-class widows and their dependent children. Considered unemployable, they were usually given "outdoor relief,"
i.e., they could receive welfare (formerly termed relief) while
living in the community. 3 During this period the "undeserving
poor" included the able-bodied unemployed, as well as people
of color, recent immigrants, and women who had not conformed
to the family ethic. They were typically given only "indoor relief"
as they were forced to work in a workhouse (also called almshouse or poorhouse) or poor farm, or were auctioned or indentured to the lowest bidder, in order to receive minimal means
of subsistence.
From the 1870s through the 1930s recurrent severe recessions
that commonly sent unemployment as high as 25 % of the labor
force, combined with periodic widespread and militant strikes,
led to a change in categories for primarily white, able-bodied
men who had proven their labor market attachment. These altered categories were codified in the 1935 Social security Act.
Social insurance-which induded social security and unemployment compensation-was established for the "deserving
poor," and public assistance-consisting of Aid to Dependent
Children, Aid to the Blind, and Old Age Assistance-was implemented for the "undeserving poor." When the Social Security
Act was passed, social insurance mainly covered white males
in the primary labor market (the labor pool for the "giant corporations" that form the industrial core of the economy) who
had worked for sufficient periods of time to qualify. However,
most workers in the secondary labor market (the labor pool for
smaller firms in the economic "periphery" that either deal with
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local markets, e.g. retail trade or construction, or receive subcontracts from the "core" firms) did not qualify. Furthermore,
domestic service workers and agricultural laborers, jobs usually
performed by women and people of color, were specifically exduded from the social insurance programs of the Social Security
Act.
Social insurance coverage has been extended several times
since 1935 as new forms and definitions of labor force attachment
have been enumerated. The first instance was the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act, which expanded eligiblity for
social security-at much lower payment levels-to widows and
children upon the death of the qualifying spouse. Additional
categories of jobs, e.g. government workers and employees of
nonprofit agencies, have also been included in social insurance
programs. Furthermore, new programs have been developed so
that social insurance currently includes the following: Old Age
.Security and Disability Income (OASDI), i.e. social security and
disability insurance; medicare, both Hospital Insurance (HI) and
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); unemployment compensation; worker's disability compenation; Black Lung disability payments; and a variety of veterans benefits.
Public assistance, the second form of welfare, is conditionally
available to people who often work sporadically-part-time and/
or part-year-in secondary labor market jobs. The original programs have been altered and new ones have been added so that
public assistance currently includes the following: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Aid to Families with
Dependent Children with Unemployed Parents (AFDC-UP);
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the needy aged, blind
and disabled; medicaid; Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program (LIHEAP); subsidized housing; food stamps; school
lunches; supplemental food program for women, infants and
children (WIC); and general assistance (state-provided aid with
no federal supplementation).
Several studies have shown that movement between public
assistance, especially AFDC, and low-wage work is indeed the
norm. Bennett Harrison (1979) demonstrated in a five-year study
of 2700 AFDC families that 92% of them included a member
who was employed at least once during this time period. Sar
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Levitan (1982) noted that there is much movement on and off
the welfare rolls, as 3/10 of the families on AFDC leave the rolls
after one year, and 3/4 leave within three years. Additional analysis by Mary Corcoran, Greg J. Duncan, and Martha S. Hill
(1984) of an extensive set of longitudinal and cross-sectional data
collected through the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
showed that only ten percent of welfare recipients are "chronic,"
i.e. remained on the welfare rolls for eight out of ten years.
These facts dispute another widespread notion, as they dearly
show that most welfare recipients do not remain on the rolls
their entire lives.
Differences between social insurance and public assistance
dearly reflect the notions of "deserving poor" and "undeserving
poor." Social insurance payments are based on (mandatory) contributions to trust funds by workers and their employers. Recipients are considered to have a legitimate right to these
"entitlements" and eligibility is determined by past labor force
status. Eligibility for public assistance, on the other hand, is
determined by a "means test" based on people's income, assets,
and need. Subjected to application and recertification processes,
recipients are continually required to prove their neediness. Furthermore, the "ideology of the dole" has led to the widely accepted belief that these payments are not really legitimate.
Women and their dependent children have comprised the
vast majority of those categorized as "undeserving poor" and
receiving public assistance. For example, among families with
income below the poverty line in 1987, 34.2 percent were headed
by women compared to 8.2 percent headed by men (Bureau of
the Census, 1988, Table 714, p. 434), and in 1985 approximately
94 percent of AFDC recipients and 84 percent of food stamp
recipients were women and their dependent children (Coalition
on Women and the Budget, 1986, pp. 15-17). Women's overrepresentation in the ranks of the poor results from both the "family ethic" and the sexual division of labor. Whereas men's work
has traditionally been performed for wages in the public sphere,
women's work has traditionally been done in the private sphere
of the home. 4 Thus the crucial work of childrearing and homekeeping is not generally recognized as "real work"-unless
someone comes into another person's home to perform these
tasks for a wage-and its value is trivialized. This devaluation
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of women's work has then been extended to their wage-labor,
and helps account for the income gap of 64 percent (in 1987)
5
between women's and men's wages.
Furthermore, the tenacity of racism in U.S. society can be
seen in the persistence of the belief that most welfare recipients
are black and hispanic women. In fact, racism is to blame for
the higher incidence of poverty among blacks and hispanics
compared to whites. For example, in 1987, the poverty rate for
blacks was almost three times the rate for whites, and the rate
for hispanics was 2.5 times the white rate (Bureau of the Census,
1987, Tables 714 and 715, pp. 434-435).
The Worktest
An institution that has historically helped maintain the distinction between the "deserving poor" and the "undeserving
poor" has been the worktest. Applied to some or all of the "undeserving poor" much of the time since capitalism developed,
worktests require recipients to perform labor in order to prove
that they are not "shirking work" and therefore deserve to receive welfare. However only relief-not wages-is given in
exchange.
The worktest was dearly evidenced in workhouses that were
set up from the mid-1600s through the 1900s. Eligibility was
determined by the "workhouse test," as only the most destitute
who had no other means of subsistence would enter the workhouse to work in exchange for usually meager amounts of gruel
and bread. Early workhouses, established when increases in the
number of paupers made congregate care more efficient than
indenturing, auctioning, or boarding individuals in homes in
the community, were not the mean-spirited institutions of the
19th century. However, as industrial capitalism took hold in the
early 1800s, the need to ensure an adequate supply of workers
who had no means of support other than their ability to work
led to the implementation of very punitive procedures. This policy was most dearly articulated by the British in the New Poor
Law Commissioners Report of 1834:
Into such a house none will enter voluntarily; work confinement,
and discipline, will deter the indolent and vicious; and nothing
but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which
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must be obtained by the surrender of their free agency, and the
sacrifice of their accustomed habits and gratifications. Thus the
parish officer, being furnished an unerring test of the necessity of
applicants, is relieved from his painful and difficult responsibility;
while all have the gratification of knowing that while the necessitous are abundantly relieved, the funds of charity are not wasted
by idleness and fraud (Quoted in Piven and Cloward, 1971, pp. 3334).
As workhouses were transformed into homes for the indigent
elderly in the first half of the 1900s, the "workhouse test" evolved
into the worktest.
The worktest has been evidenced during the 1980s in the
proliferation of workfare and WIN (Work Incentive) Demonstration programs implemented by individual states. Programs such
as GAIN (Greater Avenues of Independence) in California, ET
(Employment and Training) Choices in Massachusetts, and JEDI
(Jobs for Employable Dependent Individuals) in Maryland, they
have used a combination of incentives (carrots) and sanctions
(sticks) to move welfare recipients into the low-wage labor market. A variety of components have typically been included in
these programs. Job Search involves individual or group ("Job
Clubs") activities, including help with resume writing, interviewing skills practice, access to the state computer job bank,
and/or simply phoning employers who advertise for help. Some
of the programs offer education, including GED (General high
school Equivalency Degree), ESL (English as a Second Language), and/or basic adult education. Training components, both
dassroom and on-the-job, are often included. On-the-job training has often been implemented through Work Supplementation
Programs (WSPs), also called "grant diversion," in which part
of a worker's welfare check is "diverted" to the employer. In
addition, subsidies for a portion of work related expenses
(WREs)-childcare, transportation, and sometimes medicaidare often included. The importance of these "experimental" programs cannot be understated. Although only 22% of all AFDC
recipients in states with WIN Demonstration programs operating a full year by 1985 participated in the programs (General
Accounting Office [GAO], 1987, p. 54), they served as the basis
of the 1988 welfare reform legislation.
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The stick, which can be found in all of the workfare and
WIN Demonstration programs with the exception of Massachusetts and Maine is the work requirement-i.e. worktest-for
those who fail to acquire a job after participating in education,
training and job search components (if the programs contain
them). Ignoring their unpaid labor in the home, welfare recipients considered employable are required to provide additional
work outside their homes in exchange for their welfare payments. Employability for women is defined by the age of the
youngest child, usually six or three, and unemployed fathers in
the states with AFDC-UP are usually considered employable as
well. The maximum number of work hours is determined by
dividing the welfare payment by the minimum wage rate ($3.35/
hour nationally in 1988, but sometimes higher locally). Noncompliance can lead to sanctions, usually temporary reduction or
suspension of the welfare grant (Dickinson, 1986, p. 269; GAO,
1987, pp. 55, 56, 62).
Worktests have historically served several purposes. Eligible
people are sometimes discouraged from applying for or receiving relief, as they try to subsist instead on their own increasingly
inadequate resources. This, in turn, reduces the cost of welfare
by decreasing the number of cases on the rolls. Worktests also
reinforce the "ideology of the dole" by seeming to validate the
view that people on relief are lazy and will work only if forced
to do so. Discrimination against women is reinforced by obscuring the fact that welfare mothers already work-raising children-and forcing them into workfare jobs in addition to their
unpaid work in the home. Furthermore, in the 1970s and 1980s
workfare programs have been criticized as threatening to public
sector unions, who feared replacement of their workers with
less-costly, non-union program participants (GAO, 1987, p. 110).
Current workfare and WIN demonstration programs have
been the subject of much debate. Although supporters claim that
these programs help AFDC recipients learn work skills and habits, and thereby become self-supporting, studies by the GAO
and the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC)
have shown that program graduates primarily end up with lowwage and/or part-time jobs that leave them below the poverty
level and sometimes still on welfare (GAO, 1987, pp. 103-104;
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Gueron, 1986, p. 13). This follows, in part, from the emphasis
of the programs, as relatively little has been spent on either
education or training, which could potentially help welfare recipients increase their skills, and consequently their wages, or
on support services, especially childcare. 6 Instead, Job Search,
least costly and least controversial of all the components, has
been used most often (GAO, 1987, pp. 70-71).
In opposition to the stick of the worktest is the carrot of
voluntary government work programs. Inducement is used instead of force, typically by granting a larger payment than would
be received through direct relief. Voluntary work relief programs
are represented by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), established during the Great Depression of the 1930s. By the time
Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in March 1933, measured unemployment stood at 25 percent of the labor force, with
less than one-fourth of the unemployed receiving any relief (Bureau of the Census, 1970, p. 126; Piven and Cloward, 1971, p. 60).
Responding to hunger marches and other actions organized by
Unemployed Councils for more relief, New Deal officials quickly
implemented policies designed to counter the "ideology of the
dole" by creating voluntary work relief at rates of pay approximating private sector wages (but with less hours). The programs
were sizable. Between 1.4 and 3.3 million people were given
work each month on the FERA and the WPA, and 4.3 million
were on the non means-tested Civil Works Adminstration (CWA)
at its maximum in mid-January 1934 (Whiting and Woofter,
1941, pp. 46 & 48; WPA, 1942, p. 46).
Other government work programs have contained both coercive elements of the worktest and incentives of voluntary programs. Sticks and carrots have been most clearly combined in
the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, established in response to
low rates of unemployment and escalating welfare rolls, and designed to more effectively channel the poor into low-wage labor
markets. From its inception in 1967, welfare recipients over age
16 who were not attending school or needed in the home to care
for a dependent were referred to the welfare department to register for WIN. In 1971 the Talmadge amendments strengthened
the stick by mandating registration for those considered em-
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ployable, primarily unemployed fathers and mothers with schoolage children (under age six), in order to continue receiving welfare. Noncompliance could lead to sanctions, although according
to Mildred Rein (1982, p. 212) they were rarely applied. The
carrot in the WIN program was the "income disregard," as the
first $30 per month plus 1/3 of the remaining income was not
counted in the determination of a recipient's welfare payment,
and a portion of WREs were reimbursed. Despite insufficient
funding for both services and WRE subsidies, the fact that the
proportion of AFDC recipients working for wages remained at
14-16% of the caseload from WIN's inception through the late
1970s led to a consensus that WIN was a failure and to consequent calls for further program changes (Rein, 1982, p. 212; Smith
and O'Brien, 1978).
In 1981, the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA),
which authorized the establishment of workfare and WIN Demonstration programs, also took a large bite out of the WIN carrot
as it ended the income disregard after the first four months of
employment, replaced the unlimited WRE disregard with a flat
monthly disregard of $75 (prorated for part-time workers), limited childcare subsidies to $160 per month per child, and based
the disregard on gross (instead of net) income with an eligibility
limit set at 150 percent of each state's need standard. According
to Robert Moffitt and Douglas A. Wolf (1978), this resulted in
the elimination from the welfare rolls of 35% of the "working
poor" who had received welfare to augment low earnings. The
OBRA's draconian reforms have been modified slightly since
1981-as of 1988 the income disregard indudes the first $105 of
wages plus 1/3 of the remaining during the first four months of
employment, and the $105 portion is extended for another eight
months. The OBRA has brought the WIN program into closer
conformity with its true acronym, WIP.
The Level of Welfare Payments and the Preservation
of Labor Markets
The second dimension of the welfare system concerns the
interaction between the level of welfare payments and the functioning of labor markets. Payments are provided at levels sufficiently lower than prevailing local wage rates to prevent people
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from making the "rational economic choice" of receiving welfare
instead of selling their labor-time for a wage. If this were to
occur, labor markets could be impaired, and the capitalist labor
process could be threatened.
Corroborating evidence for the need to maintain welfare
payments far enough below wage rates can be found in the results of the New Jersey, Seattle and Denver income-maintenance
experiments. In these experiments, conducted in the 1970s,
people's "work incentive," i.e., their supply of labor-time, was
adversely affected by the receipt of welfare payments that were
dose to their potential wages. However, people in different situations displayed varying degrees of responsiveness. Given
similar percentage increases in payments, women, especially
female heads of household, reduced their labor supply more
than men. And both males and females between the ages of 16
and 21 manifested significant reductions in labor supply (Office
of Income Security Policy, 1983; Harold W. Watts and Albert
Rees, 1977).
The welfare system contains several mechanisms to try to
ensure that relief payments remain sufficiently below prevailing
local wage rates. Currently the level of payments varies among
the different states for all forms of social insurance and public
assistance except social security and food stamps. Social security
old-age insurance provides uniform payments throughout the
United States because the recipients are "retired," i.e., no longer
in the labor force. 7 Therefore, the level of payments for social
security poses little threat to the functioning of labor markets in
different areas of the country. SSI covers the needy aged, blind
and disabled, also considered out of the labor force. In fact,
disability is judged by a person's inability to hold a job. Finally,
food stamps are based on the same criteria throughout the U.S.
because they are well below the amount needed to survive, e.g.,
in 1987, the average monthly food stamp payment was $46.07
per recipient (SSA, 1987, p. 296). Furthermore, almost half of
those receiving food stamps also receive AFDC, which varies
throughout the U.S. according to the level of wages in each state.
Consequently, the level of AFDC payments has historically been
higher in the higher-wage states of the North than in the lowerwage states of the South, e.g., in 1987, average monthly AFDC
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payments (per family) ranged from lows of $103.50 in Mississippi and $112.87 in Alabama to highs of $513.66 in California
and $549.84 in Alaska (SSA, 1987, p. 295).
According to the logic of capitalism, welfare payments also
need to be furnished at levels sufficiently below wage rates in
order to maintain profits. Not only do local wage rates function
as a ceiling for the level of welfare payments, but welfare payments also serve as a floor for the entire wage structure. It has
been true historically that by providing some protection against
job loss, higher levels of welfare have helped bolster wage rates
and lower levels of welfare have been one of the factors allowing
capitalists to cut wages. Thus, although the policy elicited often
strident protest from capitalists, New Deal officials were generous with welfare payments partly to increase the "purchasing
power of the masses" and thereby boost consumption and aggregate demand (Rose, in press-a). On the other hand, at times
when wages have been under attack, the amount and level of
welfare payments have also been targets for reduction. This has
been clearly manifested by the Reagan Administration in its
attempt to restore the disciplinary effect of unemployment
through its multifaceted attack on labor. Thus the (inflation-adjusted) value of AFDC payments (per recipient) has continued
the decline that began in the late 1970s, falling 18% from 1977
through 1985 and helping to bolster the 10% decrease in private
sector (non-agricultural inflation-adjusted) wages that started in
1974 (SSA, 1987, p. 294; Bureau of the Census, 1988, Table 648,
p. 392).8 Furthermore, many people in families with incomes
below the poverty line receive no welfare-in 1985 only
33 percent received AFDC and 61% received food stamps (SSA,
1987, pp. 75 & 296).
In spite of this logic, welfare payments are sometimes dose
to, or even higher than, income from wage-labor. This has been
true in the 1980s for many participants, and especially graduates,
in WIN and WIN Demonstration programs because wages minus expenses (the participants portion of childcare, transportation, and uniforms, as well as medical care) are often less than
AFDC payments (plus food stamps and medicaid). Despite this
economic irrationality, the GAO (1987, p. 112) found that many
people continue to work for wages rather than receive welfare.

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Reflecting the effects of the "ideology of the dole," an ET graduate explained: "After living on welfare, just about anything
looks good. It might be just a little bit more money for a lot of
work, but a lot of people will grab it" (Amott and Kluver, 1986,
p. 19).
Welfare payments have also directly subsidized low-wage
labor markets. Historically this has taken three forms:
(a) implementation of the worktest; (b) supplementation of wages
with welfare; and (c) restriction of welfare payments to force
people into jobs, both to increase the supply of low-wage seasonal agricultural workers and to break strikes.
The worktest directly aids the functioning of the secondary
labor market by making these typically low-wage, non-union
jobs more attractive than relief. Consequently, by compelling
unemployed people to accept the lower wages and generally
worse working conditions in these jobs, compared to jobs in
the primary labor market, the worktest in effect subsidizes profits. Furthermore, punitive work relief can help push people into
jobs from their positions as "discouraged workers" who drop
out of the labor force and receive welfare. This seems to have
been one result of the workfare and WIN Demonstration programs in the 1980s.
Supplementation of wages with relief has existed in various
forms for almost 200 years. It was first institutionalized in 1795
in the English Speenhamland system, was wages below the
minimum amount needed to supply workers and their families
with a sufficient amount of bread were augmented with relief.
Criticized for depressing wage rates (since wages were supplemented with relief) and preventing the development of a mobile
working class (since people were required to remain in their
parish in order to receive relief), the Speenhamland system was
terminated in 1834 and replaced by the very repressive revised
Poor Law.
Supplementation of wages with relief has also been evidenced
in the U.S. Despite protestations during the Great Depression
that it would further reduce private sector wage rates, relief was
given to approximately 500,000 wage-laborers (FERA, 1935a,
pp. 9-11). Currently supplementation occurs through the WIN,
WIN Demonstration, Work Supplementation, and some work-
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fare programs, as participants often simultaneously work for
(low) wages and receive some welfare payments. Indeed, the
GAO (1987, p. 105) found that more than 48% of those who
participated in a work program continued to receive AFDC after
they found a job.
Closing welfare roles to force people into jobs has also been
used periodically. Even during the New Deal examples abounded
of FERA and WPA officials closing relief rolls to force workers
into the fields during harvest and planting times (FERA, 1935b,
p. 49). In addition, the initial FERA policy of providing relief
to strikers was abandoned in September 1934 during the widespread East coast textile strike. The practice of dosing welfare
rolls to ensure an adequate supply of seasonal agricultural labor
was continued through the 1940s, 1950s and into the 1960s. Welfare rights organizing focused attention on this policy, and instances of temporarily dosing the relief rolls to force people into
the fields now seem uncommon. However, provision of relief to
workers on strike, which was restored as a result of the progressive reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, was again terminated
in 1981 by the OBRA.
The Form of Work Relief and the Logic of the Market
The third dimension of the welfare system concerns the form
of government work programs, and whether they preserve or
interfere with the logic of the market. Since goods and services
are produced in the private sector only if profits are expected to
be sufficient compared to other uses of the money, e.g., financial
speculation, the logic of the market dictates that profitability is
the primary determinant in capitalists' decisions regarding production and investment. Depending on the degree to which the
logic of basing production decisions solely on needs replaces the
logic of the market, government work programs can potentially
cause people to question the basic rationale of capitalism. The
more consonant government work programs are with production-for-profit, the more supportive they are of capitalism. Conversely, the more dearly government work programs are based
on needs, the more problematic this can be for the economy.
There are three basic forms of government work programs
with respect to the logic of the market vs. the logic of needs.
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They are, in order of their potential ability to create problems
(with the least problematic listed first): (a) work in the private
sector; (b) already existing work in the public sector; and
(c) public sector projects that are created explicitly for government work programs.
The first form, work in the private sector, affords the least
opportunity for issues of needs to be raised. These positions are
firmly embedded in production-for-profit and therefore are the
most consonant with the logic of the market. Most of the jobs
obtained through WIN, WIN Demonstration, and workfare programs-though not the work requirement itself-fit in this
category.
The second form of work, positions already existing in the
public sector, can be more problematic than those in the first
location because the public sector generally does not operate on
profit criteria. Indeed, issues of needs have more easily been
raised with respect to public sector services, in terms of both
social value and the way in which the services are performed,
than has been the case in the private sector. Jobs acquired in the
public sector by participants in WIN, WIN Demonstration, and
workfare programs, though again excepting work requirements,
are representative of this category.
Government work programs that are potentially the most
problematic for capitalism involve projects that are specifically
created or augmented for program participants since they are
outside the normal channels of economic activity. Projects that
are part of programs implemented in response to high unemployment, e.g., the FERA, CWA, and WPA in the 1930s and the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in the
1970s, reveal some of the contradictions of capitalism by showing that the market itself does not create sufficient numbers of
jobs. Furthermore, since these projects allow the jobless to work
together specifically as unemployed, issues of needs can surface
relatively easily. Worktests, which also fall into this category,
have restrained the logic of needs from surfacing by being so
dearly based on punitive principles. Even so, as Piven and Cloward point out that in their discussion of the historical precedents of the 1980 attack on welfare, ". . . manufacturers were
always wary of the possibility that the workhouse, or any or-
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ganized work-relief program, would nurture nascent forms of
social production to compete with the market" (Piven and Cloward, 1987, p. 12).
There are three different sub-types of these specially-created
work relief projects. Again in order of their potential for causing
problems (with the least potentially problematic listed first) they
are: (a) construction and other forms of manual labor; (b) public
services; and (c) production-for-use. Of these, construction and
other manual labor affords the least opportunity for the logic of
needs to replace profit criteria since, of the three, they most
dosely resemble private sector jobs. Public service projects offer
more opportunities for issues of needs to arise because one of
the primary rationales for their existence is the provision of services to meet human needs. In voluntary programs the other
rationale is to furnish jobs for certain groups of workers, usually
those in the white-collar and professional categories. This was
evidenced during the 1930s as both the FERA and the WPA
established projects for teachers, writers, artists, actors, musicians and photographers, as well as thousands of positions gathering data and conducting research.
The third sub-type of specially-created work projects, and
the one that is potentially the most problematic for capitalism,
is based on production-for-use. This is in dear opposition to
production-for-profit. Production-for-use projects were an important component of the FERA, providing work for approximately 350,000 people at their height in the Winter of 1935 (Kerr,
1935, p. 2). Labeled production-for-use, or production-for-use
and distribution, by FERA administrators, they included the
following: sewing and mending garments; gardening and canning produce; canning the meat and producing goods from the
hides of animals dying from the drought; aid to self-help cooperatives set up by the unemployed; producing mattresses and
bedding (using surplus cotton collected by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration); and producing consumer goods (primarily long underwear and other clothing) in factories that had
been totally or partially shut down by their owners and subsequently rented by local relief administrations. Although the goods
produced in these projects were distributed only to others on
relief, the projects elicited such virulent protest from capitalists
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that all except the first two were terminated by late 1935 when
the FERA was replaced by the Social Security Act and the WPA
(Rose, in press-b).
Programs since the 1930s have incorporated lessons learned
then from perceived threats to the logic of the market. Although
workfare programs have created a good deal of service work,
issues of needs have rarely surfaced. Voluntary programs, on
the other hand, have created problems. In the Public Employment Program (PEP) from 1970-1973 and the subsequent Public
Service Employment (PSE) component of CETA, many special
projects were created, e.g., repair of public buildings, summer
recreation and conservation, and weatherization of low-income
homes. Yet restrictions imposed on these projects to ensure that
they not replace "normal government operations" led to unceasing criticisms of inefficiency and "make-work." It then proved
quite easy for the Reagan Administration to end PSE in 1981
and terminate the entire CETA program the following year.
Conclusion
What recommendations does this theory suggest for welfare
reform? Most fundamentally, recognizing that welfare recipients
perform needed work-raising children-and a needed function
for capitalism-maintaining a pool of low-wage workers-leads
to the conclusion that welfare is, in a sense, payment for these
services. As activists in the Welfare Rights Organization made
dear two decades ago, welfare should be seen as a right, not as
a privilege (cf. Tillmon 1976). Treating welfare as an entitlement
would mean that it would no longer be necessary to devote time
and energy differentiating between the "deserving poor" and
the "undeserving poor," and the resources that have been spent
on the often confusing and humiliating procedures of certification and periodic recertification could instead be used to provide
needed payments and services.
Viewing the welfare system through the three dimensions
leads to further guidelines for government work programs. First,
participation should be voluntary. Welfare recipients should have
the choice between working in the home (in exchange for welfare payments) or working outside the home. Following this logic
further, only carrots, but no sticks, should be used to induce
participation in the programs. In place of sanctions, options for
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all program participants should indude educational classes and
a variety of training programs leading to jobs that pay wages
above a redefined poverty line (based on multiplying the minimum food budget by 4, since food now comprises approximately one-fourth of a family's budget, instead of by 3 as is
currently done). To ensure that everyone receives enough to live
decently, welfare payments should also be set to at least equal
this new poverty line. This could be accomplished, in part, by
adopting a $7.20/hour minimum wage (in 1988 and indexing
future increases to inflation), as full-time, year-round work would
then result in redefined poverty-level income for a family of
three. Quality, federally-subsidized childcare for both welfare
recipients and those not on the rolls would serve as a crucial
incentive to enter voluntary government work programs or go
straight into the labor market. Making quality childcare available to all would preclude the development of a two-tiered childcare system, a means-tested one for welfare recipients and a non
means-tested system for everyone else. Furthermore, to help
eliminate the economic rationality of going back on welfare in
order to obtain medical care, a national health system should be
implemented for all citizens regardless of employment status.
Finally, the government should provide jobs when the private sector fails to do so. It is dear from the experience of the
1930s that this capability exists. If, in the depths of the great
depression when the federal government was far smaller than it
is today, work was provided each month for 1.4 to 4.4 million
people out of a labor force of 51 million (in 1933) to 55 million
(in 1938), then surely our current government could create work
for similar percentages of today's labor force of 120 million. Criticisms of inefficiency and make-work that were targeted toward
the FERA, CWA, and WPA in the 1930s, and again in the 1970s
toward the PEP and CETA, could be countered by arguing that
programs should be based on the logic of needs instead of the
logic of the market. We could then begin to develop a welfare
system in which people, instead of profits, are treated with
respect.
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Notes
1. Work relief is contrasted to direct relief, welfare payments in exchange
for work done in the home, primarily raising children.
2. The two other methods of maintaining capitalist profits involve clear
government intervention in the economy: fascism, a political system in
which an authoritarian government uses unconcealed power supported
by a nationalist ideology to secure "co-operation" of workers and limit
their demands; and social democracy, a system that has developed in
countries where the labor movement has been strong enough to form a
compact with capital and demand high wages, good working conditions,
and relatively well-developed welfare states.
3. In fact, the term "unemployable" is a misnomer because the same people
can be considered unemployable at one point in time and employable
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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

later, e.g., disabled people and women with children who were considered unemployable during the 1930s easily obtained manufacturing jobs
during World War II when the unemployment rate fell below 2%.
In addition, poor women, primarily recent immigrants and women of
color, have worked for the lowest wage jobs when they were able to do
so, e.g., not enslaved.
The 64% female/male wage gap includes only those who worked fulltime, year-round. When part-time and/or part-year workers are included,
the wage gap falls to 44%.
The 1985 GAO (1987, pp. 69-70) study found that approximately 10% of
the WIN Demonstration program participants reeived education and
training. More recently, in a 1986-1987 study of California's GAIN program, Casey McKeever (1988, p. 4) found that only 1.5% of the registrants received training. In terms of childcare, the GAO (1987, pp. 8283) study found that the median program paid a maximum of $160 per
month per child for childcare, far below the market rates in many areas
of the country, and that expenditures on childcare were only 6.4% of the
median program's total budget. McKeever (1988, pp. 3-4) found that only
19.8% of all participants (30% of single-parent families) received childcare subsidies.
Social security recipients are not entirely out of the labor force since they
can work a designated number of hours until age 70 before losing part
or all of their benefits and can work an unlimited number of hours after
age 70 with no reduction in benefits.
The 34% decline in inflation-adjusted AFDC payments per family began
in 1968, shortly after the average size of AFDC families began falling
from 4.2 to its current level (maintained throughout the 1980s) of 2.9
(SSA, 1987, p. 294).

Towards a Construct of Employment for Social
Welfare and Economic Productivity*
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This article analyzes Marxian socialist, neo-classical, and Keynesian
economic theories toward developing a construct of employment which
supports social welfare and economic productivity. It considers their
motivational approaches, outcomes, and requirements for social control. A Keynesian construct of employment is recommended as supportive of social well-being, high productivity, and a level of social

control reduced from that in currently dominant economic systems.
Implications and implementation issues are considered.

In her address to the first plenary session of the 1985 NASW
Symposium, Nancy Humphreys called for a dialogue between
economic and social welfare theorists as a way to provide leadership in combating the development of a two-class society in
the United States. A two-class society has distinct upper and
lower classes, with the upper dass having extensive economic
and political power as well as social control over the lower dass.
Indicators of such class separation are apparent. In August, 1986,
a United States Government analysis reported that the richest
one half of one percent of the people in the United States owned
27% of our wealth, an increase over the 25% they controlled ten
years earlier. Robert Kuttner (1984) reports that labor unions are
under attack, workers are being pressed for wage concessions
by powerful employers, and wealthy corporations are shifting
jobs both to the low-paying service sector and to low-paying
parts of the Country. Economist Robert Lekachman (1987) has
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Professor and Chair of the Doctoral Program at the University of Georgia
School of Social Work, for his help in reviewing, editing, and making helpful
suggestions regarding early drafts of this article.
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revealed that for every person who moves from the middle to
the upper dass in the United States, two join the lower class.
In the two-class society, a small, wealthy and/or powerful
percentage of the population (the upper class) has immense social and economic control over the majority of citizens (the lower
dass). To increase profits, the upper class uses its economic and
political power to lower wages as much as possible and to
threaten workers with unemployment if they object. The doctrine supporting this approach is called "neo-classical economic
theory" (Levesson, 1977; Okun, 1975). In order to "appropriately" maximize profits, policies have recently been pursued to
maintain seven percent reported (fourteen percent actual) unemployment as "normal" in the United States (Kuttner, 1984;
Ginsburg, 1983).
Research conducted by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958), Leim
and Leim (1978), Jahoda (1982), and Harrington (1981) has demonstrated that unemployment results in reduced mental health,
a social welfare problem. Neo-classical economic theory argues
for a minimum expenditure on social welfare activities, because
they are a drain on the financial rewards and functions of the
market place (Levesson, 1977; Bernin, 1940). In an environment
influenced by a two-dass society, poverty is often intentionally
untended under the illusion that it effectively "motivates" people
to work, and does so at a low wage. Other social welfare costs
in such an environment include pollution, which business defines as external to its concerns since the costs of clean up would
reduce profits; surveillance of workers, so that they will maintain production quotas for low pay; and the costs of war and
political oppression which emanate from extending class domination to Third World countries (Bowles, Gordon, & Weisskopf,
1983).
Contrary to the view of many in the controlling class, there
are economically productive approaches to employment which
do not effect as many of these costly social welfare consequences. Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf
(1983) define economic productivity as "the term used by economists and statisticians to refer to the amount of real output
produced per hour of labor employed" (p. 122). Economic productivity can have positive relationships with the achievement
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of social welfare goals, depending on how employment is conceptualized and on the general economic approach. Bowles et al.
(1983) demonstrated that the most productive societies share
power with workers; tax highly to provide funding as a way to
generate full employment, and have strong social welfare programs. Such societies maintain full employment as a way to
improve social well-being. Because they are less oriented to excessive social control and economic power through profit maximization, they also reduce social welfare problems associated
with such control.
The approaches to employment in three economic theories
are analyzed with the objective of developing a construct of employment consistent with both economic productivity and social
welfare goals. Employment can be defined as performing work
in exchange for wages, a basic definition that is used throughout
this analysis. The economic theories studied here represent distinct views that have been selected to show how various combinations of social control, social goals, and economic goals affect
productivity and social welfare in current economic systems.
The Marxian, totalitarian view represented here is similar to
systems which have influenced policy in the Soviet Union and
China. The neo-classical view currently prevails in the United
States. Keynesian economics has been the focus of policy in
many social democrat governments and many of its principles
were used to guide United States policy during World War II
(Kuttner, 1984). Unfortunately, other ideas, such as democratic
socialism, which fall on the continuum between the perspectives
analyzed here, can not be considered due to space limitations.
Some of the research cited is provided by authors who have
traditionally been associated with such ideas, e.g., the work of
Bowles, Gordon, & Weisskopf (1983) has been associated with
democratic socialism.
Neo-classical Economics
Neo-dassical economists have promoted two basic versions
of their theory in the United States. The less regulated version,
which has influenced policy since 1981 during the presidential
term of Ronald Reagan, was previously promoted during the
term of Herbert Hoover, leading to the Great Depression of 1929
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(Trattner, 1984; Batra, 1987). The modified, neo-Keynesian version was variously enacted in the United States between the days
of the Great Depression and 1980. Both views will be considered
here.
Neo-dassical economics has been described by historian
William Trattner (1984) as an antiquated economic theory dating
back to the more egalitarian ideas of Adam Smith. Smith's classical economics envisaged a world free of monopolies in which
all people would find employment at a wage determined in a
market of totally flexible wages and prices (Heilbronner, 1986).
As wages went up, prices would go up; as wages went down,
prices would go down. This world required few social services
because all people would have opportunities to work and purchase what they needed at reasonable prices in a free market.
Smith saw monopolies as dangerous because they inhibited
competition and made the market of economic exchange less
free. For example, a powerful monopoly holder could refuse to
reduce prices even though demand for certain goods was low.
A monopoly employer or combination of employers could act to
keep unemployment at a certain level so that workers would
always be threatened with replacement by other, unemployed
workers if they did not comply or were not willing to work for
less than their labor was worth. The monopoly holders' profits
are built in large part on the difference between a fair wage and
how much less workers can be coerced to accept.
Neo-dassical economics uses Smith's free market ideas to
discourage spending on public welfare but limits the freedom
of economic exchange by allowing monopolistic control over
workers and prices. Its approach to employment has dominated
the Reagan administration's policies. Neo-classical economics
directly relates employment to inflation and unemployment to
price stability in a neat formula referred to as the Phillips Curve
(Ginsburg, 1975). It emphasizes the importance of minimizing
inflation and tolerating resultant unemployment (Leveson, 1977).
Decisions about "appropriate" levels of unemployment are
made independently of the problems they may cause the affected
population in favor of maintaining designated price levels, controlling inflation, and assuring adequate profit levels for reinvestment in capital goods. The maximization of profit levels is
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based in large part on keeping labor costs low. Costs are minimized by coercing workers to accept low wages through the
threat of losing their jobs to unemployed individuals, requiring
a pool of unemployed people to drive labor costs down. Wages
earned in producing the supply of capital goods will supposedly
be spent to purchase consumer goods. These purchases then
become a source of demand which requires more supply or production and thus more employment (Leveson, 1977; Okun, 1975;
Kuttner, 1984).
Neo-dassical economics paradoxically attempts to lower employment to keep labor costs low, through competition for scarce
jobs, and to make the economy grow as a way to increase employment. It uses the primary emphasis on maximized profits
as a guide for policy. Employment is sacrificed to generate lower
wages and higher profit margins (Okun, 1975). In accordance
with this confused design, the Reagan administration at first
raised the unemployment rate to record post-Depression levels
in order to decrease inflation, lower wages, and increase investment capital. It has subsequently reduced unemployment
approximately one percent below the rate where it stood when
President Reagan was elected, but under circumstances of lower
wages and higher profits, contributing to the development of a
two class society (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1987; Lekachman, 1987).
In the neo-dassical context, social welfare expenditures are
seen primarily as a drain on needed economic resources or profits (Leveson, 1977; Bernin, 1940). This drain is to be minimized.
As Ginsburg (1975) notes, however, these benefits serve to control the unemployed by allowing them a subsistence existence
and maintaining their threat to lower the wages of others through
competition for scarce jobs. The intention of public assistance
in such a system is that it be inadequate, to provide motivation
through the punishment of not working in normal labor markets.
Neo-dassical economics has been awkwardly merged with
one idea proposed by John Maynard Keynes in a tradition which
Joan Robinson (1978) terms "bastard Keynesianism", referred to
here as neo-Keynesianism. The primary concept that neoKeynesian economics borrows from Keynes is that funding employment will create demand in the economy and stimulate economic growth. Other than that, neo-Keynesianism is essentially
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an extension of the neo-dassical economic ideas noted above.
This logically inconsistent application of a Keynesian principle
in a neo-dassical context was coupled with what Bowles et al.
(1983) call a revolt against the profit maximizing controls in the
mid 1960s which led to the economic stagflation of the late 1970s.
They note that during this time, labor, the general citizenry, and
Third World countries were evidencing their dissatisfaction with
such things as restrictive work settings, environmental pollution, and oppressive domination of such countries as Vietnam.
The result of inconsistent neo-Keynesian policies and the slippage of control on which neo-classical economics depends was
runaway inflation, sluggish economic growth and around seven
percent reported unemployment (Bowles et al., 1983; Kuttner,
1984).
Neo-Keynesian approaches occasionally justify increased inflation and funding for increased employment as a stimulus to
demand, along the Phillips Curve model suggested above. They
do not, however, make any of the necessary structural changes
to support the Keynesian view of a healthy economy. Politically,
neo-classical economists claim that the failures of neo-Keynesianism are those of Keynesianism. They point to the failures
of an essentially neo-classical system in an attempt to discredit
Keynesianism.
In the neo-classical view, findings about the social welfare
effects of unemployment are of limited worth, since unemployment is seen as necessary to economic health. Programs to address the needs of the unemployed would require a drain on the
economic system; disturb the required motivation-by-deprivation, through alleviating "necessary" unemployment levels; and
generate less of the "necessary" capital for investment by the
very wealthy requiring funding from higher taxes.
Neo-dassical policies result in higher than necessary levels
of unemployment, poverty and mental illness related to unemployment (Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958; Leim & Leim, 1978;
Harrington, 1981; Jahoda, 1982); low productivity; a lower standard of living; wasteful domination of workers through imposed
control on the job; acceptance of unnecessary environmental
pollution; and wasteful domination of Third World countries;
induding wars which kill primarily people of the lower class,
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such as the Vietman experience (Bowles et al., 1983). Their social
welfare consequences are severe.
Under the policies of the Reagan administration, it has become common for industries to threaten workers with moving
their place of employment out of town unless the workers take
wage concessions so that profits can be increased. At the same
time, the cost of consumer goods has not gone down. As a result,
workers are worse off because of the freedom of employers to
seek more profits. The very wealthy are able to heavily influence
the government through political support in the form of, for
example, large amounts of money filtered through political action committees. They can promote their policies through buying sophisticated media campaigns and broadcast and print
media to control dissemination of information and disinformation in their interest, and control financial rewards in society to
produce conformity with their intentions. For example, the General Electric Corporation, manufacturer of often unpopular military and nuclear energy products and a company that has paid
relatively low taxes compared to its economic well-being, recently purchased the National Broadcasting Corporation, a major source of media influence. The prospects for tightening social
controls and reducing the freedom of others by this corporate
giant were drastically increased by such a move, yet the freedom
of individual citizens to act against such efforts is consistently
eroded in a neo-dassical system.
Purchasing power is also depleted as wages and benefits are
decreased. Vacation and sick day leaves, child care, medical and
dental coverage, insurance, and other provisions of the employment contract which provide for social welfare are reduced in
the name of maximizing profits. These cutbacks reduce the standard of living for a majority of people, resulting in the lowdemand productivity lags described above, unemployment, and
low utilization of investment capital. There is little wonder that
the economic booms predicted by the Reagan administration
have often showed less-than-expected economic growth. An alternative method for expanding productivity growth in such an
environment is to broaden markets for products by imposing
the neo-dassical system on other parts of the world. This leads
to wars, political conflicts, and arguments for a defense buildup
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which depletes resources from the citizenry but contributes to
profits (Bowles et al., 1983).
Heilbronner (1953) noted that both Keynes and Marx saw
capitalism as promoting unemployment. Where Keynes' approach was to modify traditional capitalist thinking, Marx promoted a more extreme approach to employment as a social goal.
Both views pursue full employment at a reported level of perhaps one half of one percent. Marx's totalitarian socialism is
riddled with many of the same social control problems as the
neo-classical view, however.
Totalitarian Marxist Socialism
Robert Heilbronner (1986) reports a picture of socialist employment as guaranteed, despite economic realities. The Marxian socialist society has an ostensible commitment to equality
and full employment for its people. The state assumes responsibility for economic problems which arise from what neo-classical economists would call over-employment. There is no
commitment to a profit-driven market economy in a totalitarian
socialist society, because all production is ostensibly collective.
Profits are similarly shared and distributed according to need
(Gilbert, 1983). Although many totalitarian socialist states enjoy
consistent full employment, it is accompanied by poor economic
productivity. Therefore, they are currently experimenting with
small market economies to boost economic growth and contribute a more dynamic aspect to employment oriented interaction
(Kuttner, 1984). For many, a major problem with totalitarian
socialist environments is the ultimate social and economic control they exercise. Blau (1977) suggests that social exchanges in
such a setting are not productive in the same way as those in
which exchanges are voluntary.
Totalitarian socialism limits the options of its citizens by
denying private ownership and ultimately controlling resource
distribution through the central bureaucracy. Both socialist and
neoclassical systems deny the greater majority of citizens control
over their economic and, often, social interactions, favoring either
the collective state or the very wealthy few. This centralized
control is counterproductive in economic and social welfare
terms.
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Totalitarian socialism spearates employment from personal
motivation for economic growth. It is as limited as the neo-classical system which tends to profitability goals without consideration of social implications. To a certain degree, earning and
spending personal profits sustains the employment goal. Under
harsh controls which limit personal profits, order is maintained,
but society is frustrated by social welfare problems related to a
low standard of living.
All profits accrue to the totalitarian state which also holds all
resources. Wages and benefits are received according to need
determined by the state, and work is performed according to
ability. The state must dedicate extensive surveillance resources
to controlling and punishing violators of its policies in order to
forestall any efforts at individual profit making, or individual
ownership. Punishment and ideological persuasion are some of
the few means of enforcing compliance, since rewards are ostensibly based on need and not to be used as motivators or
distributed in return for performance quality. Although totalitarian controls are more overt than the neo-classical ones, both
systems promote centralized domination of others and a lack of
personal freedom as they approach their terminal conditions.
Although people are motivated to work for reasons of sustenance, social exchange, aesthetic enlightenment, and other considerations, all else being equal, motivation is limited by the
fact that personal profit is not available, and rewards for work
performed are diffuse. There is little personal reason to increase
productivity. Even if societal productivity goes up markedly,
there is a strong chance that many of the benefits will go into
military or surveillance efforts to maintain totalitarian control.
Since rewards are routed through complex, centralized, bureaucratic, state channels based on societal need, economic motivation for productivity can appear almost random rather than
a reward for performance. The state provides a buffer to what
might be natural economic deterioration given a lack of productivity, an identity for the citizenry, and basic level of social welfare for citizens.
Adequate health, education, and other social welfare benefits, in addition to employment, are seen as human rights in
totalitarian socialism, not as something to be earned. However,
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excessive controls grossly violate personal freedoms of expression and economic activity. This denial undercuts the social welfare of individuals because it erodes their integrity in making
personal choices. Keynesian economic systems attempt to strike
a balance between personal profit and social well-being, with
an emphasis on personal integrity.
Keynesian Economics
The most successful economies (that is, those with the highest productivity growth) in the world have implemented Keynesian principles regarding employment (Kuttner, 1984). Some of
the basic tenets of Keynesian capitalism are strong centralized
economic planning; adequate, non-maximized, widely distributed individual profits; widely held and possibly public savings;
strong social welfare programs; often strong labor unions; equally
footed bargaining between labor and management; involvement
of labor in making management decisions; high taxes; and a
commitment to full employment (Keynes, 1964). Employment,
in the traditional Keynesian view, is seen as the stimulus to a
healthy economy. When monies are required to fund new employment, they are most often taken either from private or public
savings or from tax monies. An example of public savings would
be a Social Security System funded like a private pension plan.
Since social services or new efforts to ensure full employment
are funded from current assets, taxes, or currently saved money,
they are not inflationary in the same way as government borrowing. The tragedy which relates full employment to high inflation and unemployment with economic stability or growth is
neatly bypassed.
Where the neo-classical system encourages a certain imposed level of unemployment to keep wages low, enhance competition for scarce jobs, and maximize narrowly held profits, the
Keynesian approach encourages full employment as the key to
continued economic demand and widely held, adequate, individual profits. Full employment policies result in new jobs. The
income from these jobs generates demand through spent wages,
personal savings of employed individuals, and capital formation
through investment of private and public savings. High taxes,
which reduce maximized profits and the abuses of economic
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domination by one dass over another, also provide an inflationreducing way to fund demand-generating employment.
In 1940, Emmanual Lasker suggested that reducing profits
from a maximal to an adequate level and paying the price of
general prosperity with higher taxes are functions of a unified
economic view toward building "the community of the future."
He proposed that those who advocate motivation to work as a
result of the relative punishment of unemployment believe in a
"false psychology." The Keynesian view is based in the psychology of positive reinforcement, offering people employment
as a motivation to further employment. The challenge of matching full employment to available supply and demand markets
requires the implementation of extensive planning by labor,
management, and government authorities (Bowles et al., 1983;
Ginsburg, 1983; Kuttner, 1984)
Keynesian economic systems are capitalist in that they operate on the principle of private ownership and personal profits.
They exercise an overt control on profit levels to assure that
these are not so high as to promote the destructive domination
of others engendered in the monopolistic control of neo-classical
economic systems. Keynesian systems also act to control the
economy in order to ensure employment for those who desire
it, and economic profits to motivate individuals toward economic growth. Where neo-dassical and totalitarian socialist systems control people in support of profitability goals or a
communal economic doctrine, Keynesian systems control profits
and actively intervene to stimulate the economy in order to support goals of economic gorwth and the social welfare of citizens.
Keynesian economies exert legal controls on citizens to enforce
laws just as neo-classical or totalitarian societies do. Because the
economic system does not promote excessive control over others
in its policies, however, people in a Keynesian society are more
free to achieve the highest status level when starting from the
bottom. This upward mobility is consistent with a Rawlsian
notion of equality (1971). Citizens in a Keynesian economy are
also freer to enjoy a higher median standard of living than those
in neo-classical or totalitarian societies because of the higher per
capita productivity level. An example may help explain how this
operates.
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Consider three individuals who earn $25,000, $50,000, and
$75,000 per year, a typical multiple of lowest to highest earnings
in a Keynesian economy (Ginsburg, 1983). Although these income levels are different, the person with the lowest income
could reasonably save money to the degree that she could make
investments to equal the $75,000 per year wage level in the future. In the Keynesian approach, new economic endeavors are
often funded with tax money from excess profits. Keynesian
policies help people achieve economic growth and provide social
welfare assurances such as adequate child and health care to
give them a solid base from which to proceed. The same amount
of money would likely be distributed into three wage levels of
$9,000, $50,000, and $125,000 in a neo-classical society. Notice
that the total dollar figure is higher in a neo-dassical economy,
because less money is directed to taxes. It is much less realistic
to think that the $9,000 annual wage earner could save money
to invest toward achieving the $125,000 income. This is espedally true since the wage earner's income is not supplanted in
the same way by responsible social welfare policies to provide
low cost child and health care. Tax money which might have
gone for these services is directed instead to the person with the
$125,000 income in the neo-dassical society as a way to provide
investment capital. But the $9,000 wage earners (and the majority of people like them) do not have the extra income to buy
goods produced through this investment. They certainly would
not have the money to invest in a business to try to equal the
status of the person who makes thirteen times as much. The
$9,000 wage earner in a neo-dassical system is less economically
free than the $25,000 lowest wage earner in a Keynesian system.
The totalitarian socialist system precludes participation in this
economic exercise by assuming state ownership from the outset.
The most wealthy citizens in a Keynesian system are less able
to exploit the least wealthy because planning efforts are geared
toward long range economic freedom, productivity, and social
well-being for all people and away from short-term views of
profit maximization.
Countries which emphasize strong centralized economic
planning, accompanied by a strong voice for workers motivated
by reasonable financial rewards for their efforts, as Keynesian
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policies do, have surpassed neo-dasical and totalitarian socialist
systems in productivity measures (Bowles et al., 1983; Kuttner,
1984; Marshall, 1987). When people think they have a continuing
chance to do well and have the support of their society's planners
in continuing to make economic progress, they will respond to
those opportunities and continue to be more productive than in
other, less encouraging environments. When they are oppressed
beyond hope of reasonable economic opportunity, they become
less productive, overwhelmed with the struggle to survive, and
they do not have the resources to fuel productivity with consumer demand. This rather bleak scenario of decreased demand
is the case I have discussed here for neo-dassical and totalitarian
socialist economies.
Keynesian economies support such social welfare benefits
as equal access for those with disabilities, responsible child care
facilities, health care, safe working environments, ongoing opportunities for employment and its related mental health benefits (Jahoda, 1982) and other benefits, as basic human rights.
When people are equipped with such rights, they can be more
involved in developing healthy economies. The money spent on
productivity-oriented social welfare benefits is a wise investment in healthy individuals and a healthy economy. It makes
sense that a healthy worker will be more productive than a sick
one and that a society that maintains the social welfare of its
citizens can more easily direct efforts at becoming productive.
Totalitarian socialist systems have shown us that when social
goals are not accompanied by personal profit motivation, productivity suffers. Neo-dassical economic systems have shown
us that personal profit motivation in itself is inadequate to generate the highest levels of productivity. By liberating their citizens for ongoing social and economic interaction, Keynesian
economies have been able to provide high levels of social welfare and productivity.
Discussion
Bo Hedberg, Paul Nystrom, and William Starbuck (1976)
suggest that the key to effective social and economic systems is
the freedom to interact with others. They imply that the adaptability to environmental changes allowed by this freedom is
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best facilitated when the extremes of profit maximization and
totalitarian control are limited. Counter productive extremes of
behavior develop most readily in economies dominated by unbridled individual freedom to accrue resources and power and
control others as well as in totalitarian socialist states.
The apparent key to the success of the Keynesian approach
to employment and productivity is the way it has been able to
empower workers to achieve economic and social welfare goals
and has allowed a broadly empowered citizenry to participate
in negotiating social controls necessary to maintaining productivity and moderate individual profits. Although arrangements
for sharing power in this way are often complex, they do not
necessarily require a heavily centralized state. The Keynesian
approach limits centralization of power and social control so that
they are much lower than the levels in neo-classical or totalitarian socialist economies.
A graphic summary of how each theory treats social welfare,
social control, and economic goals is shown in Figure 1.
A Keynesian construct of employment is most appropriate
for pursuing both economic productivity and social welfare goals.
It requires employment for all who are interested in working,
moderate individual profits for all wage earners, and implementation of careful social and economic planning, specifically including a reasonable day care and medical care to allow people
to work, and high taxes on the very wealthy to fund services,
minimize excess social control, and increase social equality.
The first step in implementing goals for improved productivity and social welfare is to educate the populace in their benefits. Social workers are in a special position; we have contact
with the increasing number of people who are among or interacting with the lower economic class in the United States. As we
educate students and the populace in the basic realities of how
economic and social goals can act to facilitate each other, they
will be more prepared to support the policy steps recommended
here. In order to successfully educate social welfare professionals
towards empowering others in this way, economics should become a basic element of social welfare curricula. We must also
further explore theories of social exchange towards explaining
the nature of economic exchanges which are symbolic of social
interaction.
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Figure 1. Imposed and secondarily negotiated elements of the
employment construct in three theories of economics
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During the last eight years, neo-dassical policies in the United
States have been intensified, and it may be asked how Keynesian approaches can be implemented. Several deep running currents in American attitudes about public welfare can be expanded
in a positive way to enact the policy recommendations of this
analysis. (a) There is an abiding distrust of welfare dependency
in the American culture, accompanied by a strong work ethic.
Dependency-promoting welfare programs should be replaced
by guaranteed opportunities to work for all citizens who want
to do so. Developing technologies are changing the nature of
work so that people experiencing many disabilities can share in
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these work opportunities. (b) There is a current popular outcry
for benefits such as government guarantees for adequate day
care and health insurance coverage at reasonable cost to allow
citizens to more reasonably be able to work and support themselves. As traditional welfare recipients are normalized into the
for-wage workforce, their need for these types of benefits should
be represented as equal to that of any other worker. (c) Traditional
welfare recipients should not receive any different wage levels
than those in the normal workforce. Indeed, they should become
part of the normal workforce, separated only by the fact that
their employers may be capitalized by government monies taken
from taxes on the very wealthy. These taxes would be used to
promote valued competition in the labor market by supplementing jobs not offered in the private sector, and increasing
freedom in the labor market. (c) Once guarantees for work opportunities have been established, appropriate training programs to prepare those who need them should be offered as
part of the work guarantee. It is traditional in American public
welfare to provide training first and then to have recipients find
their own jobs in the "free market." I have discussed how the
current job market in the United States is not necessarily free.
Successful public welfare programs must strive to restore freedom and true competition to the job market by guaranteeing
ongoing employment as a basic right to those who meet the
qualifications for work prior to offering training programs.
(d) Advocates of employment policies which promote true competition and freedom in economic markets, consistent with
American values, should learn some procedural lessons from
presidential candidate Jesse Jackson. He has demonstrated previously unheard of popularity for a Black candidate based on a
sensible message which argues for higher minimum wages,
guaranteed employment opportunities, equalizing the distribution of wealth in the Country, actively building voter support
among the disenfranchized and growing lower class, and arguing for the rights of labor. This message was conveyed, in
part, by brilliant use of the media at a lower cost than that of
his opponents. Also, he did not give up his message when the
primary elections appeared lost.
My first contacts with Jesse Jackson were on the South Side
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of Chicago in 1969 when he was exciting churches full of poor
people, and others interested in change, through Operation
Breadbasket. Over the past 19 years, his message for social wellbeing has been consistent. In 1988, he excited large portions of
the electorate. Although his message is not new as stories about
his recent success may infer, it is well thought out. Developing
a consistent employment policy based on the Keynesian recomendations described here, and promoting it, despite the vicissitudes of political events, will provide a meaningful basis for
improved social welfare and productivity in the United States.
In many ways, World War II, which economically reconstructed an America devastated by the Great Depression, was
a Keynesian, full-employment, high-savings, high-productivity
effort planned in response to an external threat (Kuttner, 1984).
We have evidence that Keynesian efforts are effective in the
United States and elsewhere. It is a responsibility of social welfare leaders to refine plans for improving the lives of all citizens
and incorporate them into policy at every oppportunity. This
review has been a foundational step in that direction. As public
welfare efforts focus on employment in order to become more
consistent with American values, the door may be open to structure future programs so that components of the Keynesian system described here, and further refinements, may be
implemented.
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The American welfare state has been containedby several developments
that have influenced social policy: the traditionalistmovement, neoliberal ideology, and the budget deficit. These are evident in the minimal
welfare reform of the Family Support Act of 1988. A new paradigm
for organizing thinking about American social welfare is proposed
around themes that have become central to discussions of social policy:
productivity, reciprocity, community, and privatization. In order to
become a viable institution again, social welfare policy should emphasize specific themes: voluntarization, access to services, social choice,
social control, social obligation, transitionalbenefits, community enterprise, and national service.

The 1980s have been punishing for the American welfare
state. A convergence of social, political, and economic developments have not only halted a half-century of steady expansion
but even posed the prospect that government social programsthe heart of the welfare state-would be reduced. To most observers there is little evidence that the momentum to roll back
the welfare state, attributable to these factors, has been exhausted. Accordingly, it remains for those concerned about social justice in the United States to consider alternatives to
conventional social programs to assist the disadvantaged.
Since the New Deal, welfare professionals have relied on the
welfare state paradigm to guide their thinking.' Following this
paradigm, welfare advocates foresaw a central administration
extending benefits to a wider spectrum of the population as a
right of citizenship. Eventually, the American welfare state was
to resemble its northern European counterparts-complete with
a guaranteed annual income, full employment, and national
health care. But, 50 years after the passage of the Social Security
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Act, these objectives have all but vanished from the social policy
debate. If welfare professionals are to remain instrumental in
promoting the commonweal, they must fashion a new paradigm
for social welfare.
Containing the Welfare State
By now it should be apparent that the profound reversals
suffered by public social programs are not temporary; rather,
the reduction of public welfare is a consequence of forces deep
at work within American culture. For American progressives,
the traditionalist movement, neoliberal ideology, and the budget
deficit all make the revitalization of a New Deal-style welfare
state unlikely. Too late, advocates of governmental social policies
recognized that conservatives had stopped sniping at welfare
programs, preferring instead to create a context for governmental
programs that proved so hostile that new, large-scale social programs were effectively precluded.
In a development much depreciated by liberal intellectuals,
a loose amalgam of religious fundamentalists and conservative
populists merged to form the influential "traditionalist movement" (Pines, 1982). Seeking to restore basic values-respect for
family and country, hard work, freedom and independencetraditionalists challenged welfare programs which were alleged
to fracture family life, erode the work ethic, and encourage undesirable behavior. Substituting protest and telemarketing for
fire and brimstone, the traditionalist movement flexed its political muscles during the 1980 election which not only brought
Ronald Reagan into the presidency, but also placed a Republican
majority in the Senate. Allegiance to this movement provided
the Reagan administration with the political mandate it needed
to alter domestic policy during the early 1980s. The election of
George Bush to the presidency in 1988 and the likelihood that
he will install more conservatives in high positions within the
federal judiciary promises to continue the momentum of the
traditionalist movement.
Smarting from the defeats of Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale, many liberal Democrats began to reevaluate their party's
time-honored position on domestic policy. In place of adherence
to New Deal-type programs, a new variant of liberalism em-
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phasized the productivity of business over the needs of the disadvantaged. Christened "neoliberalism" by Washington Monthly
editor Charles Peters (1983), the new ideology provided younger,
ambitious Democrats an opportunity to avoid association with
the high price-tag social programs of "paleoliberalism." As early
as 1982, the Democratic party dropped the classic liberal trinity
of welfare reform-full-employment, a guaranteed annual income, and national health care-from its platform for more modest (and vague) objectives (Rothenberg, 1984; pp. 244-245). Even
Democrats schooled in federal social programs admitted that
their ideas were out of sync with current events. "The New Deal
will live in American history forever as a supreme example of
government responsiveness to the times," acknowledged Ted
Kennedy before the Woman's National Democratic Club, "But
it is no answer to the problems of today" (Broder, 1988, p. 25A).
By the end of the 1980s, many Democrats of national stature
could be identified as neoliberal-Richard Gebhardt, Charles
Robb, Albert Gore, Jr., Bill Bradley, and Tim Wirth. Without the
vocal support of the Democratic party, the prospects for major
governmental welfare initiatives fade rapidly.
If Democratic presidential reversals were not enough, the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act precluded
launching new social programs. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has
gone so far as to suggest that the budget deficit was a deliberate
contrivance on the part of the Reagan administration to cap popular social programs that had been consistently defended by
Congress, concluding that the budget deficit would "virtually
paralyze American national government" for the next several
years (1988, p. 293). A deficit-driven budget meant that not only
were new welfare initiatives which required additional funds
unlikely in the foreseeable future, but also that further cuts in
social programs were probable. In 1987, for example, $23 billion
was cut from government expenditures, half from domestic programs, an amount that is likely to increase in subsequent years.
"Through the creation of a national debt exceeding $2 trillion,"
observed Thomas Edsall of the Washington Post, "a Republican
White House has severely restricted the ability of the Democratic
opposition to restore action and vitality to its own agenda" (1988,
p. 49). Unable to borrow money to float new social programs
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because of the deficit, Democrats are forced to consider acrossthe-board tax increases, an implausible alternative for a working
public that is already strapped financially. The budget deficit
served as the rationale for freezing social programs and effectively straight-jacketed the welfare state.
Welfare Reform, 1988
The forces that have constricted the welfare state help explain
the marginal-if not regressive-changes in public welfare enacted through the Family Support Act of 1988.2 Heralded by
Thomas Downey, chair of the House subcommittee on public
assistance, as "the most significant change in the welfare system
since its inception over 53 years ago" (Eaton, 1988, p. 15), the
Family Support Act essentially changed the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) from an income support to a mandatory work and training program. The Act requires states to
develop workfare programs which compel women on welfare
with children under 3 (at state option, age 1) to participate in
a work and training program. By 1990, each state will be required to enroll at least 7% of its recipients (by 1995 the required
enrollment will rise to 20%)in a state basic education, job training, work experience, or a job search program. Adoption of the
AFDC-UP (Unemployed Parent) program will become mandatory for all states, although states can decide to limit enrollment
for two-parent families to six out of twelve calender months in
a year. Beginning in 1992, one family member of an AFDC-UP
household will be required to participate at least 16 hours per
week in an unpaid make-work job in return for benefits. Although initially only 40% of AFDC-UP recipients will be expected to be in a make-work program, by 1997 that number is
slated to increase to 70%. The Act also provides transitional
benefits-eligibility for day care grants and Medicaid-for one
year after leaving AFDC for private employment (Family Support
Act of 1988). Dan Rostenkowski, chair of the House Ways and
Means Committee which oversees most welfare legislation, estimated that an additional 65,000 two-parent families would receive benefits, that 400,000 people would participate in workfare
by 1993, and that 475,000 would be eligible for transitional Med3
icaid benefits under provisions of the Act (Rich, 1988).
Yet, despite the fanfare, the Family Support Act of 1988 hardly
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qualifies as "reform", particularly when compared to those of
the New Deal and the Great Society. Perhaps the dearest illustration of the inadequacy of the Act is found in the substantial
loss of income to AFDC families since the War on Poverty. From
1970 to 1988, the effect of inflation lowered the median state's
AFDC benefit by 35% (Committee on Ways and Means, 1988:
415). In other words, had AFDC simply remained constant with
inflation, beneficiaries in 1988 would have received about $5.88
billion more than what they are getting. 4 The Family Support
Act proposes, in effect, to "reallocate" over a five year span only
57% of this lost income ($3.34 billion) back to the poor, primarily
through compulsory workfare. For the welfare poor, welfare reform in 1988 represents little more than diverting a portion of
the income supplement lost since 1970 to welfare managers who
operate stringent workfare programs.
Nor does the Family Support Act adequately address the
realities of the working poor. The Act is grounded in a debatable
premise-that those on AFDC can become totally independent
of public assistance through workfare. Here the expectations of
proponents of the Act are frustrated by the ubiquitous, secondary labor market. For the working poor who are dependent on
a service-oriented economy, complete self-sufficiency remains
an elusive if not unreachable goal. If 44% of the new jobs created
during the recent economic recovery are part-time service-sector
jobs that pay less than $7,400 per year, how many of the working
poor can become truly independent of welfare (Compa, 1985,
p. Cl)? The great majority of people on AFDC exhibit a job
history in which welfare complements episodic and low-wage
employment. In light of this, the Family Support Act will extend
important benefits to the working poor who are upwardly mobile, but it is unlikely to boost but a few recipients off of welfare
altogether. "Most work-welfare programs look like decent investments, but no carefully evaluated work-welfare programs
have done more than put a tiny dent in the welfare caseloads,"
concluded David Ellwood of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Results of various workfare experiments show that
"annual earnings are raised $200 to $750," noted Ellwood, hardly
enough to vault AFDC families out of poverty and toward selfsufficiency (1988, p. 153).
Ultimately, the Family Support Act does little to alleviate the
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magnitude of the economic and social dislocation of America's
poorest communities. That the Act provides additional assistance to approximately 1 million of the poor, seems inadequate
considering the 30 million Americans with incomes below the
poverty level in 1988 (Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1988, p. 433). That the Act requires a relatively small portion of
female heads-of-households to engage in workfare, seems futile
considering the precipitous drop in life opportunities in the nation's economic backwaters. With increasing frequency, social
observers have identified an American "underclass"-a growing
population which is trapped by economic stagnation, occupational immobility, and self-destructive behavior-that seems
resistant to the both the incentives and penalties of conventional
social programs (Glasgow, 1981; Auletta, 1982; Reischauer, 1987;
Wilson, 1987, 1988). For these most vulnerable Americans, the
Family Support Act is virtually irrelevant.
Reclaiming the Welfare State
Clearly, the Family Support Act is a poor examplar of welfare
reform. Its provisions are inadequate for the relatively small
number of AFDC beneficiaries for whom it is intended, to say
nothing of the majority of the poor. Indeed, there is much more
reform that is necessary for social welfare to be a viable cultural
institution. Rather than resort to the old formulas of the New
Deal (epitomized by Ronald Reagan's partial recollection of Harry
Hopkins' dictum: "tax, tax; spend, spend; elect and elect"), the
charge to human service professionals today is to configure a
social welfare institution that conforms to a post-industrial capitalist economy in which life circumstances of the poor are rapidly deteriorating. The challenge here is no less than the
reconstruction of a social institution around a new set of precepts.
Productivity
It is essential to demonstrate how social programs contribute
to the nation's productivity, rather than being a drag on the
economy. After decades of aversion, liberals are no longer treating "work" as if it were a four-letter word, but they need to go
well beyond workfare in reformulating welfare. Universalizing
benefits, such as health care and child care, for all who partic-
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ipate in the labor market is not only justifiable, but also shows
middle-income workers that social programs enhance the nation's competitiveness. Funding of workfare through the Family
Support Act and child day care proposals given serious consideration by the 100th Congress (one by Orrin Hatch!) indicate
that additional funding for social programs can be had by coupling social welfare to economic productivity.
Reciprocity
Since Lawrence Mead's Beyond Entitlement (1986), the idea
that welfare beneficiaries owe a standard of conduct in exchange
for receipt of public assistance has become a basis for welfare
policy. It is time to expand the idea of social obligation between
social classes to indude those who are better-off. Upper- and
middle-income groups should be encouraged, through economic incentives or appeals to altruism, to fulfill their social
obligation toward the less-fortunate in more meaningful ways
than paying taxes. The civic mindedness of both the poor and
the well-to-do is essential to both democratic government and
a free society. Recent discussions of a voluntary national service
reflect the concern of many that social obligation is not a responsibility of the poor alone (Rothenberg, 1984; Noah, 1986;
Moskos, 1988).
Community
Despite lip-service to "mediating structures"-family,
neighborhood, church, and voluntary association (Berger and
Neuhaus, 1977)-social policy of the last decade has extracted
a dreadful toll on social institutions in poor communities. The
failure of the Reagan administration to convince Congress to
approve its Urban Enterprise Zone plan, while it proceeded to
gut Urban/Community Development Action Grant programs,
has left a vacuum in community development policy. While
many states and cities have attempted to compensate for the
absence of federal leadership by establishing their own programs, often with the assistance of nonprofit groups, those with
a deteriorating economic base are ill-prepared to deal with the
social and economic debris of underclass communities. The restoration of social institutions in poor communities should be a
priority of future welfare initiatives.
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Privatization
If government is to carry less of a welfare burden that is
increasing, it must transfer some of the load to the private sector.
"Privatization", unfortunately, is one of the more misunderstood
terms of the decade, having been defined as the cashing out of
public commodities for private entrepreneurs (Linowes, 1988).
Yet, since de Tocqueville, much of what we identify as unique
about America-from metropolitan museums to the civil rights
movement-has been attributed to the voluntary initiatives of
private groups of individuals (Gardner, 1978, p. 13). Today, many
of the pioneering projects around social problems that are too
sensitive to attract broad public support or that serve those who
do not represent profit margins-patients with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, the homeless, and refugees-are
managed under private, nonprofit auspices. On the other hand,
a new generation of corporations has emerged specializing in
human services, such as hospitalization, long-term care, corrections, and child day care (Stoesz, 1986b). For social welfare advocates who believe that the corporation is the institutional
manifestation of a capitalist economy which generates many social problems for which welfare programs are then necessary,
the human service corporation is an oxymoron. Rather than reject outright the for-profit provision of social welfare, human
service professionals would be more effective if they were to
acknowledge that millions of Americans now receive health and
welfare benefits from proprietary firms. Instead of viewing capitalism-and privatization, for that matter-as "the problem",
welfare advocates should view the nation's economic base as a
premise upon which to conceive of creative solutions to social
welfare needs. Following from this is a central question: what
is the social carrying capacity of a market economy?
The precepts of productivity, reciprocity, community, and
privatization provide benchmarks around which future thinking
about American social welfare can be organized. While some
of these terms have been used by conservatives to make the case
against New Deal-type welfare programs, they also present opportunities to recast social welfare in a form that is more consonant with the American experience. The following strategies
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suggest how productivity, reciprocity, community, and privatization can help reclaim the welfare state.
Strategies
Voluntarization The institutional origins of social welfare in
the United States are reflected in the myriad nonprofit agencies
of the voluntary sector. Nonprofit social agencies offer virtues
that strike a chord with most Americans-local control, neighborliness, and community well-being. Yet, these organizations
are besieged by increased demand for service while government
support has ebbed. Between 1977 and 1984 government funding
of nonprofit social service agencies dropped from 53.5 to 43.9%
of their revenues (Hodgkinson and Weitzman, 1986, pp. 119120). In actual dollars, the loss was particularly acute during the
latter part of this period. According to an Urban Institute study,
federal funds to programs in which nonprofit agencies had been
active (excluding Medicare and Medicaid) were reduced by about
$26 billion each year between 1982 and 1984. Yet, fund raising
by nonprofits the following year recouped only one-eighth of
that amount (Independent Sector, 1986, p. 2). Traditionally, the
voluntary sector has relied on individual and corporate contributions to balance governmental aid, but neither promises to
offset the loss of governmental revenues. Individual contributions are unlikely to increase substantially, since half of all charitable giving to nonprofits comes from families making less than
$25,000 per year (O'Connell, 1984, p. 2)-families whose income has failed to increase since the mid-1970s. Corporate contributions flagged with the October 19, 1987 stock market crash
(Skrzycki, 1988). Facing a probable recession after so many years
of expansion, few corporate directors are willing to risk capital
reserves to bail-out the nonprofit sector. Compounding the loss
of fiscal support, the voluntary sector faces the competition of
the for-profit, corporate which has begun to exploit markets in
areas traditionally served by nonprofits. Health care, nursing
home, child care, and recreation businesses have begun competing in the same markets served by voluntary agencies, in
some cases complaining that nonprofits enjoy an unfair competitive advantage because they are tax exempt. Such accusa-
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tions eventually led the House Ways and Means Committee to
investigate ways to limit the entrepreneurial behavior of nonprofits, an untimely event considering the fiscal dilemma faced
by the voluntary sector.
Revitalizing the voluntary sector will require several changes
in social and economic policy. Foremost, people should be given
incentives to contribute to local, nonprofit social service agencies. The most immediate way to do this is to restore the deduction for charitable organizations by nonitemizing taxpayers,
which was withdrawn by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. If voluntary agencies are to fill the void left by government cuts in
welfare expenditures, however, it will be necessary to raise more
revenues than deducted contributions would produce; thus, the
individual deductions should be changed by a partial tax credit.
The relationship between altruistic citizens and nonprofit social
service agencies could be strengthened by rewarding those who
commit substantial time as volunteers. For all practical purposes, these volunteers become quasi-employees, often assuming a function that cannot be provided by a salaried employee
because of inadequate agency funding. Persons committing more
than 30 hours per month to a tax exempt social service agency
should be able to establish Volunteer Tax Credit Accounts which
would allow them to deduct a portion of the economic equivalent of their volunteering (based on current employment) against
their tax liability.
Finally, the relationship between nonprofit and for-profit
organizations must be clarified. If government is to rely on organizations of both auspices to provide social welfare services,
it is important to account for the volume of tax dollars transferred to each sector. In instances where organizations of both
sectors compete in the same market, a nominal tax should be
levied against proprietary firms since they tend to skim more
profitable clients from a market, leaving the more troubled portion of the population to nonprofit agencies. If the voluntary
sector is to survive a post-industrial environment in which government and corporate bureaucracies dominate, its function must
be clarified and enhanced.
Access to services. To the extent that the private sector assumes more of the responsibility for welfare, it is essential to
assure that people have the right to access to services. For-profit
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health and welfare firms have discriminated against people with
complex problems and who are dependent on government insurance. Instances of preferential selection (when providers skim
more treatable, less costly dients for care) and dumping (when
indigent clients are capriciously transferred to public agencies
without provision of necessary care) have been documented
(Stoesz, 1986a). Even voluntary sector agencies have been criticized for avoiding multiproblem clients (Cloward and Epstein,
1965).
Severe penalties should be levied against private sector service providers which discriminate against clients who have public sponsorship. This is a fair price to pay on the part of
proprietary firms who are profiting from human misfortune.
Parenthetically, modest regulation would corrrect market incentives which now tend to disadvantage a provider willing to serve
a disproportionate number of high-cost dients by spreading the
obligation among all providers. A nondiscriminatory requirement would be incontrovertible for voluntary sector agencies
who profess primary concern for community welfare in order to
become tax-exempt. Nonprofits that demonstrate a pattern of
discrimination would lose their tax-exempt status.
As a related measure, a nondiscriminatory clause should be
included in professional licensing standards. Professions are
granted the exclusive right to use particular skills by the statethe professional monopoly-in exchange for the assurance that
service to the community will be a priority in the deployment
of said skills. For some time, the community's welfare has suffered as some professionals have used the freedom to practice
as license for personal aggrandizement. Flagrant disregard of the
interests of the broader community are no less than a violation
of the social contract between the profession and the state. When
human service professions cease to function in the interest of
the society, the state reserves the authority to oblige them to do
so. If a licensing authority determines that a human service
professional shows a pattern of discriminatory practice against
certain people seeking and eligible for care, that provider's license to practice should be revoked. Penalties exist regarding
access to education, housing, and employment; social welfare
should be included.
Social choice. Since World War II, we have seen a slow pro-
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gression in choices available to populations often associated with
welfare programs. The GI Bill offered returning veterans a choice
of educational providers. Significantly, Blacks used their
GI benefits more than other groups (O'Neill, 1977). Medicaid,
enacted during the War on Poverty, provided poor people with
access to health care they had not had theretofore (Rogers, et al.,
1982). By the 1980s, Medicaid recipients, for the first time, were
using health services at the same rate as their middle-class compatriots. Section 8 of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act offered thousands of poor people the opportunity
to escape the gulags of public housing (Palley and Palley, 1977).
There is no reason why social services should not be added to
the choices extended to welfare beneficiaries in these other areas
(Stoesz, 1988).
Social service vouchers would allow welfare clients to shop
for services in the same way that someone from the middle class
has been able to select the psychiatrist, psychologist, or social
worker whom they think is most useful. Under a voucher arrangement, clients eligible for public social services would be
given vouchers authorizing service providers to bill the welfare
department for services provided. Service providers from the
private sector would be required to meet standards established
by government for reimbursement purposes. Because the kind
of service needed by welfare beneficiaries varies widely, a payment schedule, similar to the Diagnosis Related Groups established by Medicare, would be developed. Rates would be
negotiated annually between providers and the welfare
department.
In addition to increasing the choices available to welfare recipients, social service vouchers offer other benefits. Vouchers
would allow indigenous service organizations the financial support that they would otherwise lack. Modest but effective efforts,
such as the Chicago school founded by Marva Collins to educate
inner city youth, and the Philadelphia youth center begun by
Sister Falaka Fattah to redirect delinquents (Murray, 1984, p. 232).
would be free to provide services relevant to community needs
and be reimbursed according to actual usage by clients. For
committed human service professionals hampered by the meetings and paperwork required by the welfare bureaucracy,
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vouchers provide a means to encourage innovative approaches
for working with the welfare population.
Social Control. Public credibility of welfare has diminished
as social policies fail to deal effectively with people identified as
being unable to care for themselves or capable of doing harm
to others. Unavoidably, welfare professionals are held responsible by the public when people known to welfare officials engage in life-threatening behavior. Two current problems illustrate
this: homelessness and child abuse. As a result of deinstitutionalization, thousands of psychiatric patients were discharged
from state hospitals to often nonexistent community programs
during the 1970s. Unable to maintain themselves independently,
ex-patients have become a prominent part of the urban landscape as homeless street people. A series of legal decisions exacerbated the inability of former mental patients to get the help
they needed. Of these, Alan Stone, a psychiatrist and professor
in the Harvard University Law School, candidly suggested that
the true symbol of the Supreme Court Donaldson decision was
none other than the "bag lady" (Stone, 1984, p. 117).
The social control issue contributes to what has become crisis in child protective services (CPS). Douglas Besharov, a social
worker and fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, noted
that "of the 1,000 children who die under circumstances suggestive of parental maltreatment each year, between 35 and 50 percent were previously reported to child protective agencies" (1987,
p. 7). Larry Brown, author fo the American Humane Association
standards for CPS, observed that "the biggest indictment of [CPS]
today is that there are plenty of children in the system whose
victimization is not treated appropriately" (1987, p. 21). In 1988,
the situation regarding CPS had degenerated to the point that
the Supreme Court agreed to determine if governments were
liable for the failure of CPS workers to discharge their duties
properly (National Association of Social Workers, 1988).
A solution to these difficulties is simply to consider lifethreatening behavior a public safety problem, rather than a welfare problem. Accordingly, child and adult protective service
workers should be transferred to the police department where
they would work with police officers in social intervention teams.
What little evidence exists suggests that for relatively modest
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investment, police-social work teams can be established and that
they can effectively manage a wide range of problems that welfare departments are not prepared for (Treger, 1975).
A review of the social control issue is likely to aggravate
relations between welfare professionals and legal advocates representing clients' rights and civil liberties groups. During the
last two decades, attorneys have used the courts effectively to
protect clients against neglectful and harmful welfare institutions. Unfortunately, legal decisions-and the courts, themselves-have not had the authority to require changes in
administration practices and institutional funding to remediate
these injustices. Consequently, clients now have established
rights regarding treatment, but states remain free not to fund
necessary services. The result is a stalemate to which only the
most callous can remain indifferent. To reassert the human rights
of clients in a system in which civil rights have dominated will
require certitude about the social consequences of ill-conceived
legalisms. However, human service professionals have little
choice but to participate vigorously in the debate-their public
credibility is at stake, as is the welfare of their clients. Civil
rights at the expense of human rights is no virtue; it is inhumane.
Social obligation. In the past, welfare professionals justified
taxing some in order to provide welfare benefits to others on the
basis that a particular status entitled someone to benefits. When
resources are scarce, however, unconditional welfare is perceived by the public as wasteful. Worse, unconditional welfare
is popularly viewed as eroding individual initiative necessary
for self-support. Programs that provide unconditional payments-the means-tested programs, such as AFDC-have taken
a drubbing largely because they have been associated with welfare dependency (Anderson, 1980; Murray, 1984). Despite evidence that only a small minority of welfare beneficiaries are
generational recipients (Committee on Ways and Means, 1985,
pp. 43-47), the fact that some are is unacceptable in an era of
fiscal belt-tightening. Further, increases in unwed parenthood,
particularly among black teenagers, raise a fundamental question about the relationship between welfare grants and family
stability. Whatever the causes for the rise in adolescent parenthood, the consequences are dear-a lower probability that par-
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ents will be able to support themselves through work and a
higher probability that mother and child will have to rely on
welfare for support. Welfare advocates have been implicated in
this social tragedy because they have not included reciprocitythat a standard of conduct is a condition of eligibility for benefits-in social welfare policies (Mead, 1986; Butler, 1987).
During the last decade, a series of community work experience programs administered by the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation (MDRC) showed that workfare could prove
an effective strategy for reducing welfare costs, depending on
the presence of supports for job-training and employment, as
well as the availability of nearby jobs. Much to the credit of
Judith Gueron, president of MDRC, the conclusions of the early
workfare demonstrations were presented with cautions against
broad generalizations about weaning large numbers of families
from public assistance (Gueron, 1986). However, a recent analysis of five workfare experiments generated a surprising finding: the most-dependent AFDC recipients-those with no preassistance earnings and on public assistance for more than 2
years-showed the greatest savings from participation in workfare because they customarily consume a greater portion of welfare resources. In other words, workfare focusing on the hardcore welfare dependent can result in greater savings than workfare designed for AFDC recipients possessing more employment
assets (Friedlander, 1988).
The Family Support Act of 1988, of course, incorporates a
workfare requirement for parents with older children; but, beyond that, addresses the social obligation of the poor inadequately. There are multiple exemptions to participation of AFDC
recipients in workfare, and states will be free to cut-off AFDCUP families for six months each year and require one parent of
AFDC-UP families to engage in make-work 2 days each week
during periods of eligibility. A serious deficiency of the workfare
component of the Family Support Act is that, aside from engaging in job-seeking activity, there is no expectation about what
employment is ultimately desired. "In structuring jobs programs, policymakers have paid insufficient attention to the types
of service performed," argues Charles Moskos; "Only when
training programs involve young adults in the delivery of vital
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services to the community can they hope to inculcate the values
that make for good citizenship" (1988, p. 90). McJobs will not
solve the underclass problem.
Incorporating civic content in workfare could be accomplished by allowing welfare beneficiaries to select a community
development agency to which their benefits would be assigned.
In order to collect benefits, those on welfare would have to engage in job-like tasks identified by the community development
agency. Community development entities would be nonprofit
organizations meeting standards of the welfare department relating to personnel and benefit management, but would otherwise be free to define community development projects and
assign beneficiaries to them. In contrast to the dependency associated with public welfare, beneficiaries would be treated like
employees of the community development agency. Although still
receiving public assistance, beneficiaries could develop a trackrecord that would be of use in the private labor market. "You
cannot get good at welfare," William Raspberry shrewdly
observed.
"It does no good for a welfare mother to impress her caseworker
with her quick grasp of her sense of responsibility or her willingness to take on an extra task. There is no way for a welfare client
to distinguish himself, in any economically useful way, from any
other welfare client. There are no promotions on welfare" (1988,
p. A15).
In order to encourage responsiveness of community development agencies toward beneficiaries, welfare recipients should
have a choice among community development agencies in which
to enroll. Once enrolled, beneficiaries could transfer to another
community development agency-or to other employmentmuch like employees change jobs in the labor market. Such an
arrangement would assure a measuure of social responsibility
on the part of welfare beneficiaries in a way that directly benefits
the communities in which they live. Community-centered
workfare would address Barbara Ehrenreich's contention that to
rebuild the community in America, "we need a tough-minded
communitarianism that goes beyond coziness" (1988, p. 21).
Transitional benefits. A focus on social obligation promises
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a future of marginal employment at dead-end jobs without a
corresponding emphasis on transitional benefits. If people are
to escape the "poverty trap," they must have incentives to do
so. Currently, the low-pay and absence of benefits that typify
work in the secondary labor market fail to do this. As a result,
welfare programs often take the place of benefits that should be
provided by employers. Consideration of the relationship between public welfare and employment is frequently limited to
questions of continued eligibility for welfare while working. If
welfare beneficiaries are to make the transition to employment,
however, the private sector should be expected to finance its
share of the benefits that often make that possible. Current practices of denying benefits to part-time workers, yet structuring
employment around-part-time work, is a disincentive for workers to view work as a basis for livelihood. This is a critical issue
for many poor adolescents who populate the counters of fastfood franchises and convenience stores, which have prospered
from exploitation of the secondary labor market.
Ultimately, adequate transitional benefits would assure all
workers that minimum health, child care, and leave allowances
would be credited to their portable accounts. The Family Support Act provides Medicaid and child care benefits for workfare
participants for one year of entering the labor market, but thereafter such benefits are terminated. A further proposal in this
direction is the Minimum Health Benefits for All Workers Act
submitted to the 100th Congress by Ted Kennedy. This plan
would enroll workers of at least 17.5 hours per week in a "minimum benefit plan that covers specific basic health services and
provides protection against catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses," financed through a fund maintained by mandatory
contributions from employers and employees (Committee on
Labor and Human resources, 1988, p. 2). Unfortunately, this
proposal is limited to health care. A more direct approach would
be to levy an ear-marked tax on sales of businesses using a high
proportion of part-time workers, which would be pooled to finance a health, child care, and leave a benefit package for workers that would be portable, allowing them to add benefits for
future use.
Transitional benefits are necessary for poor workers retiring
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from the labor force, too. Data provided by the Employee Benefit
and Research Institute show that workers earning less than
$10,000 per year represent 37% of all tax returns, yet only 5%
of returns with Individual Retirement Account (IRA) deductions, and only 3% of total contributions to IRAs (Falk and
Schmitt, 1985, p. 8). Clearly, pension policies have not encouraged lower-income workers to plan for their retirement, leaving
Social Security as the sole base of economic support. A transitional benefit policy would use credit, rather than deductions
to adjusted gross income, as the basis for calculating contributions to an IRA and by instituting a progressive schedule
whereby more credit is allowed for the smaller contributions
likely to come from lower-income workers and less credit for the
larger contributions from generally higher-income contributors.
A progressively structued "poor man's" IRA would reinforce the
values of hard work and thrift already evident among many of
the working poor (Stoesz, et al., forthcoming).
Community enterprise. During the 1980s, the quality of life
in many American communities plummeted. When Claude
Brown returned to Harlem twenty years after the publication of
Manchild in the Promised Land (1965), he was shocked at the
casual viciousness of the gang members toward their victims
(1984). The level of health care in inner-city areas is so inadequate that the infant mortality rate in parts of Detroit, Chicago,
and the nation's capitol is equal to that of third-world countries
(Newland, 1981). "In many if not most of our major cities, we
are facing something very like social regression," wrote Daniel
Patrick Moynihan. "It is defined by extraordinary levels of selfdestructive behavior, interpersonal violence, and social class
separation intensive in some groups, extensive in others" (1988,
p. 291). The social pathology precipitated by economic dislocation has not been ameliorated by policies of the Reagan administration. Without a strong community development initiative,
the administration has had to rely on economic growth as a
vehide for benefitting lower-income workers, but the trickledown has been mere seepage. Sar Levitan, director of the Center
for Social Policy Studies at George Washington University, estimates that 20 to 30 million people have been bypassed by the
economic recovery (Pear, 1986).
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To strengthen poor communities a Community Enterprise
Zone (CEZ) program should be created which would provide
technical assistance and time-limited grants for the purpose of
generating basic commodities, such as jobs and housing. The
geographic basis of a CEZ would be an economic catchment
area of from 4,000 to 50,000 population to accomodate rural and
urban environments. Eligibility for community development
grants would depend on the social and economic conditions of
the catchment area as determined by specific socio-economic
indicators-incidence of poverty, unemployment, and business
closings. Catchment areas in which the rates for two of these
three indicators exceeded one standard deviation above the national average would be eligible for benefits.
Two types of aid would be provided to communities. For
those in which the infrastructure has deteriorated substantially,
CEZ benefits would consist of technical assistance and development grants. Rather than provide assistance directly, government would contract services from those organizations which
have established a successful track-record in economic development, such as the Enterprise Foundation or the Local Initiatives Support Corporation. For communities experiencing acute
dislocation, a system of incentives, including tax credits, would
be instituted to retain and promote entrepreneurial activity.
Funding for the CEZ program would be derived from a
"Community Enterprise Zone Insurance Fund" created by taxing
public and private construction. In 1986, for example, a 2% tax
on construction in the United States would have netted $77.7
billion, more than the amount identified by Jesse Jackson during
his 1988 presidential campaign as necessary for domestic economic development and neighborhood revitalization (Shaughnessy, 1988). In effect, CEZ funding would insure communities
against economic distress. Since benefits would be drawn from
a self-financing insurance fund, they would not be as vulnerable
to budget recissions imposed on programs that are dependent
on general revenues.
The purpose of CEZs would be to trap capital and skills in
communities which often lose these vital elements during deep
recessions (Stoesz, 1985). Community development credit unions
could not only manage accounts but also provide technical as-
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sistance for projects. If workfare were operated through community development agencies, AFDC recipients could provide
some of the labor for CEZ projects. A community development
strategy, in other words, could rebuild communities and empower people who live in them.
National Service. If social welfare is to function as a unifying institution, it must draw together the social classes of America. In 1960, John F. Kennedy sparked the idealism of young
Americans by giving them the opportunity to help others through
a short-term commitment to live and work in disadvantaged
communities. The Peace Corps, and later VISTA, provided many
poor communities abroad and in the United States with technical assistance they could not have otherwise afforded, and it
provided young people with an exposure to other peoples they
would never have encountered. By 1987, 6 states had deployed
conservation services, the most well-known being the California
Conservation Corps (Moskos, 1988, p. 64). The popular support
these programs have enjoyed indicates that a range of income
groups would participate in a national service program.
A national services corps, according to a proposal fielded by
Charles Moskos, would allow volunteers to elect one-year stints
in a nationwide program for which they would be paid $100 per
week plus benefits, and upon completion of service be eligible
for "generous postservice educational and job training benefits."
Enrolling approximately 600,000 youth (exduding those enlisting in the military), a national service corps would make a substantial contribution
toward reconstructing
distressed
communities. Volunteers would engage in such activities as establishing tutorial programs for school children, helping residents in slums rehabilitate housing, assist the frail elderly who
need assistance if they are to stay out of nursing homes, and
organizing child care services, among others. Approximately
half of the budget for the Moskos proposal of $7 billion could
be derived from consolidating current jobs and training programs (1988, pp. 155-160), the remainder from CEZ
appropriations.
A national service corps is appealing for several reasons. It
would make available to hard-pressed communities personnel
that they would not otherwise attract. Significantly, national ser-
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vice would expose affluent volunteers to circumstances of their
less well-off compatriots, and it would demonstrate to less-advantaged Americans that others are not indifferent to their plight.
Perhaps most significantly, a national service provides an essential function for a political-economy that constantly pushes
the social classes apart-"increasing the variety of class mixing
situations" (Noah, 1986, p. 38). A national service also complements the need to reinvigorate the voluntary sector. "With our
own tradition of voluntary organizations," noted Moskos, "coupled with comprehensive national service, we could set our
country on an entirely new course of effective yet affordable
delivery of human services" (1988, p. 154).
Conclusion
What is the feasibility of evolving a new paradigm for social
welfare? Public opinion research suggests that the prospects of
reclaiming the welfare state are actually quite good. Most Americans, perhaps 70%, support social programs that help the poor,
although they balk at subsidizing a governmental bureaucracy
that is associated with expensive and wasteful welfare programs
("The Public's Agenda," 1987). In order to capitalize on such
public sentiment, however, proponents of the welfare state must
get beyond the intuitive response of defending programs
grounded in the New Deal, and begin to reconceptualize social
programs so that they reflect the social, political, and economic
imperatives of contemporary American culture. In this regard,
the Family Support Act is more a lesson in the consequence of
pallid imagination than it represents welfare "reform" in any
real sense. Still, the future of the American welfare state rests
with the capacity of those who profess to help the disadvantaged
to conceive of new ways to serve the public interest.
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Notes
1. As used here the term "paradigm" refers to a system of propositions
professed by most members of a discipline. This is similar to the usage
of T. S. Kuhn, whose work popularized the term (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956]). Kuhn's
book sparked a flurry of works. For a review of the paradigm concept in
the social sciences, see the second chapter of Gary Gutting (ed.) Paradigms
and Revolutions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980).
2. The author acknowledges the contribution of Howard Jacob Karger of
Louisiana State University in the development of this segment of the
paper.
3. The Family Support Act also toughens child support enforcement, among
other provisons.
4. This amount is based on the 1988 expenditures for AFDC (House Ways
and Means Committee, Background Material and Data on Programs within
the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means (Washington, D.C.:
U.S Government Printing Office, 1988): 412.
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Welfare reform has received a great deal of public attention in recent
months. Historically, many states have enacted welfare reform legislation, with mixed reviews. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania implemented a Welfare Reform Act in 1982 which reduced the able-bodied
General Assistance population to a maximum of 90 days of cash assistance in any twelve-month period. This study decribes the previous
occupations of a segment of the Transitionally Needy in Philadelphia,
the Transitionally Needy who did and did not find work, and how

many were still receiving some form of in-kind benefits after discontinuance of cash assistance.

Although welfare reform is currently being discussed and
implemented on federal, state and local levels of government, it
is not a new idea. Welfare reform has long played a major role
in the history of the United States' welfare system, and its historical philosophy has been based on differentiating between
the poor who are unable to work, classified at various times as
"deserving poor" or "truly needy," and those who can work: the
"able-bodied," "undeserving" or "employable poor". This philosophical differentiation has influenced the development and
implementation of past social welfare policy. This article reviews
how the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has implemented welfare reform policy for a portion of its able-bodied poor, and
describes the employment experiences of a segment of the ablebodied welfare population.
The Influence of the Reagan Philosophy
on Pennsylvania Welfare Reform
In 1980, the Reagan Administration took the position that
the federal government could not perform social welfare functions as well as state and local governments (Emling, 1983). A
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goal stated in the Health and Human Services Budget of 1982
was a federal commitment to protecting those most in need
through the so-called "safety net" programs of Medicare, Social
Security, Unemployment Insurance, AFDC, SSI, and social obligations to veterans (Emling). The administration wanted a
sharper line drawn between those who could work, the ablebodied, and those who could not work, the truly needy. The
primary means of reform was to increase the emphasis on the
employability of welfare recipients through the development of
a variety of work programs.
The Reagan philosophy exerted a strong influence on states
in their development of welfare reform legislation. As a reaction
to increased expenditures for General Assistance by some states,
various welfare reform programs were undertaken for able-bodied recipients of General Assistance. In some instances, states
enforced strict work requirements, including increased dient
activity in Community Work Experience Programs, job search
and job readiness programs, vocational and remedial education
programs and job placement. As a result of these changes, more
emphasis was placed on discontinuing and reducing welfare
cash grants for clients who failed to comply with work
requirements.
In 1981, Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh stated
that since General Assistance encouraged dependence by providing an alternative to work without a work incentive, those
individuals who were able to work would be taken off the cycle
of welfare dependence and placed into jobs. The Governor believed that a labor market existed for the employment of General
Assistance recipients who were considered able-bodied (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Welfare Reform, 1982).
On March 23, 1981, House Bill 720, which was to become
the Welfare Reform Act of 1982, was introduced in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania House of Representatives (History
of House Bills, 1982). When voting for this act, one legislator
stated, "We are taking care of the truly needy, of the poor. This
is the vote to test if you are for welfare reform or not, to take
the chiselers, the people from Alabama who come up and apply
(sic) take them off the rolls and put welfare into the perspective
of what it should be." (Legislative Journal of the House, Part 3,
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1982). Specificially, the development of the Act was based on the
view that welfare reform was necessary due to fraud and abuse
in the state welfare system, a need to reallocate scarce welfare
resources to those most in need, and a belief that those who are
able to work, should work.
For the most part, opinion regarding this bill was divided
along party lines-Republicans were enthusiastically in favor of
the bill, while Democrats were decidedly against it. House Bill
720 was signed into law by Governor Thornburgh on April 8,
1982 (Legislative Journal, Part 3, 1982).
The Welfare Reform Act of 1982 in Pennsylvania
The rationale for the Act was that there were some individuals who could find jobs and for whom welfare was hampering
their desire to find work. The underlying assumption was that
this population was employable and therefore should be able to
find employment.
The major change made by the Welfare Reform Act of 1982
was the division of the General Assistance population into two
distinct groups: the Chronically Needy and the Transitionally
Needy. The Chronically Needy would be entitled to General
Assistance cash benefits for as long as they fit the established
criteria, while those classified as Transitionally Needy, those
between the ages of 18 and 45 and considered able to work (ablebodied), would be eligible for General Assistance cash benefits
for only 90 days in any 12 month period (Department of Public
Welfare, Status Report, 1982).
Eligibility for cash assistance under the General Assistance
category is based on a means test which requires that the welfare
recipient complete a welfare application. Eligibility for General
Assistance is assessed by a caseworker and is based upon criteria that indude the dient's physical and mental condition, age,
number of dependents, income, and work record. If the client
is eligible for assistance, the caseworker also determines whether
the dient will be dassified as Chronically or Transitionally Needy.
The Chronically Needy are considered indefinitely or truly
needy individuals eligible to receive cash payments under General Assistance who, due to medical or social difficulties, are not
able to work as are the Transitionally Needy (Purdon's Pennsyl-
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vania Statutes Annotated, 1982). To be classified as chronically
in need, a person applying for General Assistance must conform
to one or more of the following categories: (a) under 18 or over
45 years of age; (b) 19 years of age or under and attending secondary or vocational school full-time; (c) has a physical or mental handicap which prevents him or her from working;
(d) suffering from drug or alcohol abuse and actively undergoing
treatment; (e) employed full-time but who does not have earnings in excess of the current levels for eligibility for General
Assistance; (f) ineligible for unemployment and whose income
falls below the assistance allowance because of a natural disaster;
(g) employed full-time for at least 48 months out of the previous
eight years and who has exhausted his or her unemployment
benefits (Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, 1982). Redeterminations of Chronically Needy status are conducted on an
annual basis by a Department of Public Welfare caseworker
(Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, 1982).
The Transitionally Needy consist of those eligible for General
Assistance who do not have any of the characteristics that would
make them eligible for Chronically Needy status. Two programs
are used to service the Transitionally Needy in finding employment. These programs are the Pennsylvania Employables Program (PEP) and the Community Work Experience Program
(CWEP). PEP provides assistance to the Transitionally Needy in
finding employment. This program is available to the Transitionally Needy during the time they are on General Assistance
as well as after discontinuance. The Community Work Experience Program (CWEP) requires able-bodied recipients to accept
public work assignments in exchange for their General Assistance benefits. This program is available to the Transitionally
Needy only during the 90 days on cash assistance. It is mandatory that the Transitionally Needy participate in these two
programs during the 90 day period. At the completion of the 90
days, the Transitionally Needy are still eligible to receive in-kind
benefits of Food Stamps and Medicaid.
Since the passage of the Act, some of those previously dependent upon General Assistance and considered able to work
have become ineligible for cash assistance for 9 months out of
every 12. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, the re-
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search question was: as a result of the Welfare Reform Act of
1982, what changes have taken place in the employment opportunities of the Transitionally Needy in Philadelphia?
Method
A random sample of 113 Transitionally Needy persons was
selected from the files of the Department of Public Welfare in
the Philadelphia area in order to determine the previous occupations of the Transitionally Needy, the Transitionally Needy
who did and did not find work, the amount of time those who
obtained jobs remained employed, and how many were still
receiving in-kind benefits after discontinuance. The names of
those selected were cross-matched by the Department of Public
Welfare with job information from the Bureau of Employment
Security. Social security numbers were used to identify those
who were working. Employer's name, length of period of employment, and wages were recorded in an automated form listing for each client. Job participation was measured by the number
of quarters worked. A quarter consists of three months in a
given year. If an individual worked during one quarter, he or
she worked at least part of a three month period, and if an
individual worked for two quarters, he or she was employed at
least four but not more than six months, and so forth.
The limitations of this methodology are that there are forms
of acquiring income through underground employment and illegal activities which are not, obviously, reported to the Bureau
of Employment Security. Underground employment, which may
consist of part-time jobs such as domestic or janitorial work for
a neighbor, is not reported since it is a cash transaction and no
taxes are claimed. Illegal activities such as selling contraband or
numbers are not reported for obvious reasons.
Findings
Table 1 shows that over 60 percent of the Transitionally Needy
in Philadelphia had either never been employed or were semiskilled or unskilled laborers employed in service-related jobs
offering limited opportunities for advancement and minimal
medical benefits. The data contradict the stance taken by the
Thornburgh Administration concering the employment poten-
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Table 1
Previous Occupations of the TransitionallyNeedy in Philadelphia
Occupation
White Collar
Professional
Sales Work
Clerical
Blue Collar
Craft Workers
Machine Operators
Laborers
Farm Laborers
Service Workers
Work Unknown
Employment Status Unknown
Never Employed
TOTAL

N

Percent

2
5
16

1.8
4.4
14.2

8
3
25
3
19
4
7
21
113

7.1
2.7
22.1
2.7
16.8
3.6
6.1
18.5
100

tial of the Transitionally Needy, since persons possessing these
characteristics are not in demand in the present job market
(Ginzberg, Mills, Owen, Sheppard, and Wachter, 1982).
As Table 2 indicates, the total number employed for one
quarter or more is 42 out of the 113, while 71 of the 113 remained
unemployed. However, as Table 2 points out, most participants
did not find long-term employment. As the number of quarters
increase, the number employed decreases with only 26 of the
original 42 remaining employed after the second quarter. Consequently, sixteen individuals from the original 42 were unemployed going into the second quarter which left 26 employed for
two quarters. After the end of the third quarter, 17 of the original
42 still remained employed, leaving 25 without jobs. The number of those employed for 4 quarters or more decreased dramatically. Out of the original 42 clients, only 3 remained employed
beyond a year.
Table 3 indicates that 16 participants were employed one
quarter, 9 were employed two quarters, 14 were employed three
quarters and only 3 were employed for all four quarters. Of the

Welfare Reform
Table 2
Length of Employment of the Transitionally Needy After Discontinuance
of General Assistance

Participants Not Employed
Participants Employed One
Quarter or More
Participants Employed Two
Quarters or More
Participants Employed Three
Quarters or More
Participants Employed Four
Quarters

N

Percent

71

62.9

42

37.1

26

23

17

15

3

2.6

Duration of Employment

N

Percent

One Quarter
Two Quarters
Three Quarters
Four Quarters
TOTAL

16
9
14
3
42

39
21
33
7
100

Table 3
Duration of Employment By Quarters

42 participants in this study who found employment, the average number of quarters worked was 1.8. In addition, 22 or over
50% of the 42 employed had intermittent forms of employment,
while 20 were fully employed during the quarters worked.
Table 4 indicates that 33 of the 42 individuals who were
employed continued to be eligible for the in-kind programs of
Food Stamps or Medical Assistance. This indicates that the employment they had obtained was insufficient to bring them above
the poverty level.
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Table 4
ParticipantsReceiving Food Stamps and/or Medical Assistance and
Working One to Four Quarters

Participants receiving Food Stamps
and Medical Assistance and
working one to four quarters
Participants receiving Food Stamps
only and working one to
four quarters
Participants receiving Medical
Assistance and working one to
four quarters
Participants not receiving Food
Stamps and Medical Assistance

N

Percent

20

48

3

7

10

24

9

21

42

100

and employed one to four quarters

TOTAL

Table 5 shows that 60 of the 71 individuals who were not
employed were still eligible for the in-kind benefits of Food
Stamps and/or Medical Assistance.
Summary
Of the initial 113 who were discontinued from General Assistance, only 42 found employment, while 71 remained unemployed. Only 3 of the original 42 were employed beyond four
quarters. An important area for further research would be to
determine what percentage of those who were no longer employed reapplied for General Assistance after their nine month
period of ineligibility expired. This would have occurred at the
beginning of the fourth working quarter.
The average number of quarters worked was 1.8. Seventeen
of the 42 were either employed part-time or only worked a portion of the quarter. This observation is based on the lower wages
reported in the wage statements. Additionally, of those who did
work, 33 were still eligible for Food Stamps and/or Medical As-
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Table 5
Total Number of ParticipantsReceiving Food Stamps and/or Medicaid
and Not Employed
N
The Transitionally Needy not
receiving Food Stamps and Medical
Assistance and not employed after
discontinuance
The Transitionally Needy receiving
Food Stamps and Medical
Assistance and not employed
after discontinuance
The Transitionally Needy receiving
only Food Stamps and not employed
after discontinuance
The Transitionally Needy receiving
only Medical Assistance and not
employed after discontinuance
TOTAL

Percent

11

16

40

56

5

7

15

21

71

100

sistance, which indicates that the income received from wages
reported was not above the level of eligibility for assistance. As
Table 1 shows, the types of skills possessed by this population
were limited, and most of the able-bodied individuals in this
study did not find work or did not continue in their jobs beyond
nine months.
Conclusions
This study contradicts the premise of the Welfare Reform Act
of 1982, that is, that the Transitional Needy can and will find
suitable employment. A stated purpose of the Welfare Reform
Act, according to the Governor, was to remove employable people
from the welfare rolls with the understanding that they would
find work (Department of Public Welfare, Status Report, 1982).
However, this does not appear to be the outcome, since 71 remained unemployed while 42 of the original 113 found employ-
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ment, and only 3 of the 42 remained employed beyond the fourth
quarter.
Recommendations
Barriers to employment exist for the Transitionally Needy
population. Among these barriers are limited work histories and
lack of job skills. Consequently, job training and educational
programs must be enhanced in order to adequately prepare the
Transitionally Needy to join the labor force.
More areas of employment development should be considered, e.g., use of community colleges for training and day care
in order to develop a work force suitable for available jobs. Determination of employability should be based on work experience and skill levels, and their compatibility with the types of
jobs available in the geographic labor market.
Welfare reform has been discussed for the last thirty years.
However, discussion has resulted only in general recommendations. In designing welfare reform, it is not enough to emphasize work versus welfare. Policy-makers must develop
programs that offer services such as vocational training and remedial education for the improvement of human capital and
must also determine how to increase and improve the labor
market so that jobs exist after the training has been completed.
Without the latter, the employment programs operating in most
states today will not succeed in offering the poor the opportunity
to become self-sufficient. Other areas of government such as
education, economic development and labor should be held more
accountable in diminishing the poverty rate and working more
dosely with employable welfare recipients.
Those who make policy need to review their goals. Is the
charge of government to reduce the welfare rolls by removing
some recipients from welfare or to decrease the rate of poverty
by providing programs that offer an opportunity for self-sufficiency to an employable population that is truly congruent with
geographic employment demands?
Based on the findings of this study, it is evident that welfare
recipients, who are classified as able to work and therefore able
to find jobs, may not find employment. Consequently, welfare
reform policy based on removing employable clients from the
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welfare rolls may create economic hardship. Policymakers and
public officials should make use of this information when developing welfare reform initiatives. Welfare reform programs
that project realistic objectives should be planned when considering the employable poor on welfare.
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As a focus of research, the noncustodial low income mother, particularly the mother who has received Aid to Families of Dependent Children, (AFDC) has been virtually ignored. Yet, she is central to many
fields of study-foster care, child support enforcement, child maltreatment, and single parents. This article reports on 8 respondents from
a cohort of 518, urban, AFDC mothers who lost custody of all children
during the 17 months following their selection into the study sample.
Findings reveal that most of the children were living with relatives; the
majority of mothers had long-standing mental health problems; and
most of the mothers not only wanted more children but were trying to
get pregnant.

Recent literature has provided a beginning understanding of
mothers who do not have custody following a marital breakup
(Fischer & Cardea, 1981; Greif, 1986; Greif, 1987; Greif & Pabst,
1988; Herrerias, 1984; Paskowicz, 1982). These studies, however,
have focused on only one segment of the noncustodial mother
population-white, middle-dass, once married, likely to have
children who are living with their father, and who may have
relinquished custody voluntarily. While this segment of the
population may be the largest, it is not the only one with which
social workers have contact. Child protection and foster care
caseworkers provide services to populations predominantly consisting of low-income, single, noncustodial mothers who must
manage reunification with or permanent separation from their
children.
*The research reported in this paper was partially supported by grant award
FPR-000028-01-0 from the Office of Population Affairs to Susan Zuravin.
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The purpose of this paper is to further understanding of the
noncustodial mother population served by many child welfare
programs by examining a subpopulation that has not been very
well-studied-mothers with low-incomes, who may never have
been married, may not be white, and have become noncustodial
following contact with child protective services. Eight mothers
who lost custody of all children during the 17 months following
their selection into a study sample of 518 AFDC mothers form
the basis for our discussion.
Literature Review
To gather information about low-income, noncustodial
mothers, we reviewed five areas of study, all of which have
potential for focusing on issues of custody and low-income families. Little information was found. The noncustodial mother literature, as noted above, has almost exdusively focused on the
middle-income mother without custody. The recent foster care
literature (e.g., Fanshel, 1976; Rzepnicki, 1987) does not, to the
best of our knowledge, focus on the needs of noncustodial mothers as differentiated from those of noncustodial fathers or twoparent families. Moreover, it does not address situations where
parents have children living in any of a variety of informal arrangements, i.e., with relatives, spouses, etc.
The child support enforcement literature (e.g., Cassety, 1984)
predominantly focuses on noncustodial parents whose children
are recipients of Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC).
However, because the vast majority of AFDC caretakers are single parent mothers, the typical child support enforcement study
focuses on noncustodial fathers. The child maltreatment literature (e.g., Parke & Collmer, 1975; Polansky, Hally, & Polansky,
1975; Wolfe, 1985), is peripherally related to custody issues in
that some maltreating parents lose custody of one or more children. It does not, to the best of our knowledge, address noncustodial mothers separate and apart from parents who maintain
custody, or parents who lose custody of some but not all of their
children. In fact, most studies do not mention whether respondents have lost custody of any children.
After analyzing our data and seeing the prevalence of alcohol
and drug abuse among these mothers, we reviewed that body
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of literature, too. Loss of child custody as an outcome of drug
addition was mentioned in one study (Nurco, Wegner, & Stephenson, 1982); the study reported that children were more
likely to be removed from their parent(s) because of neglect
rather than abuse.
Based on these reviews, there seems to be no one area of
inquiry that daims these mothers as their own. Consequently,
we know little about them. Yet, this little known population
may be a fast-growing one for three reasons: (a) the increase in
size of the population of single parent, female-headed families
with children, many of whom are overburdened with financial
and emotional problems; (b) the ever-increasing range of culturally sanctioned roles for women; and (c) the increased attention to and reporting of child maltreatment.
Increases in this population have particular import for child
welfare, namely an increase in the number of children at high
risk for child maltreatment. Theory (Finkelhor, 1985) as well as
empirical findings (Finkelhor, 1980) suggest that children who
live away from their natural mothers for periods of time may be
at higher risk for sexual abuse than children who always live
with their mothers. Studies of child maltreatment in formal,
licensed foster care suggest that children living in such homes
may be at higher risk for all types of maltreatment than the
average child in the population-at-large (Bolton, Laner, & Gai,
1980). And, if the maltreatment rate is high in licensed foster
care-homes that are monitored, even if only on a periodic basis-one can only imagine how high the rate of maltreatment
must be for informal care arrangements, i.e., custody arrangements with friends, neighbors, relatives, etc., situations that are
not likely to be licensed and if monitored, not very dosely. For
most middle-income mothers, concern about maltreatment is
not an issue. Greif and Pabst's survey (1988) of such mothers
reveals that more than 90% of their children were living with
their fathers.
Conceptual Framework-Characteristics of the
Mother Without Custody
Lacking specific theory or findings with regard to low-income, noncustodial mothers, we decided to use Belsky's model
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of the determinants of parenting, "one derived from research on
the etiology of child abuse and neglect" (Belsky, 1984, p. 83), as
well as various hypotheses and findings from the child maltreatment and psychiatric literature to identify areas for study. These
guides are particularly relevant because our sample includes a
large proportion of abusing and/or neglecting families. The two
areas that we decided to explore-mental health problems and
future childbearing plans-were selected from an array of potentially important topics on the basis of their relevance for clinical practice.
Rationale-mentalhealth problems
The Belsky model (1984) posits "three general sources of influence on parental functioning: (a) the parents' ontogenic origins
and personal psychological resources, (b) the child's characteristics of individuality, and (c) contextual sources of stress and
support" (p. 83). Of these three sources, parent psychological
resources are identified as the most influential "not simply for
their direct effect on parental functioning but also because of
the role they undoubtedly play in recruiting contextual support"
(p. 91).
On the basis of Belsky's position (1984) regarding the salience
of parental psychological resources as well as the large and consistent body of findings from the psychiatric literature which
reveal that maternal mental health problems (e.g., Colletta, 1983;
Longfellow, Zelkowitz, & Saunders, 1981; Susman, Trickett, Iannotti, Hollenbeck, & Zahn-Wexler, 1985; Weissman, Paykel, &
Klerman, 1972) have a particularly adverse affect on parenting
behaviors, we decided to examine mother's history of mental
health problems. It seemed reasonable to surmise that the prevalence of mental health problems might be highest among mothers without custody. Moreover, on the basis of findings which
show that neglectful mothers are more likely to have mental
health problems than abusive or nonmaltreating mothers (Friedrich, Tyler, & Clark, 1985; Zuravin, 1988), we reasoned that more
neglectful than abusive or control mothers might be noncustodial.
Rationale-future childbearingplans
The clinical impression of many caseworkers is that mothers
who are separated from all of their children are at high risk for
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having another child. On the basis of information about the
contracepting patterns of maltreating mothers alone (Zuravin,
1987), this impression seems to be a reasonable one. Both abusive and neglectful mothers are likely to use contraceptives less
adequately and effectively than comparable control mothers. In
addition, regardless of the problems noncustodial mothers had
with their children, it is likely that these children were meeting
some specific need-a need that the mother may well try to
fulfill by having another child. Thus, we reasoned that the noncustodial mothers may be more likely to want to conceive another child than custodial mothers.
In summary, this presentation of information about eight
low-income, single mothers who do not have daily care and
custody of any of their children represents a beginning attempt
to describe low-income, noncustodial mothers, particularly those
who once received AFDC. While no claim is being made that
these eight mothers are representative of noncustodial, low-income mothers, it is our hope that this presentation will help to
(a) stimulate interest in this under-studied population group,
(b) generate questions and hypotheses for future study, and
(c) provide the social work practitioner with a beginning description of this population. Specific objectives are: (a) to determine the composition of the noncustodial mother group by
maltreatment status, (b) to identify the range of situations in
which the children of these mothers live, (c) to characterize the
mental health problems as well as the future childbearing plans
of these mothers.
Methodology
Information for this exploratory, descriptive study of eight
low-income, noncustodial mothers and their children comes from
an extensive set of interview and case record data (Zuravin &
Taylor, 1987) on 518 low-income, urban, single parent mothers.
The original purpose of this data set was to identify personal,
social, and contextual factors that increase the low-income child's
risk of being physically abused and/or neglected. Methodological information pertinent to the construction of the data set is
detailed in the final report to the funder (Zuravin & Taylor, 1987)
and various papers (e.g., Zuravin, 1987; Zuravin, 1988). Below
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is a summary of information about the 518 respondents and a
description of measures pertinent to the above study objectives.
Study participants
The eight women who are described in this paper come from
a group of 518 women who were interviewed in their homes by
one of ten trained interviewers sometime during the period 9/
1/84 to 6/30/85. These 518 women had five characteristics in
common. During the study sampling month, January 1984, all
were (a) residents of Baltimore, Maryland, (b) single parents
(defined as not being legally married), (c) recipients of financial
assistance from the Aid to families of Dependent Children program, (d) had custody of and provided daily care for at least one
natural child, and (e) had at least one natural child 12 years of
age or younger even if care and custody of the child was no
longer the mother's responsibility.
The 518 were purposely selected to differ relative to how
adequately they were known to care for their natural children;
119 respondents were known to Baltimore City Department of
Social Services (BCDSS), Division of Child Protective Services
for personally neglecting their children, 118 were known to
BCDSS for having one or more physically abused children, and
281 were not known to BCDSS for having any neglected, physically abused, or sexually abused children. The 237 maltreating
respondents were selected from a specially constructed sampling
frame prepared from the cohort of 1,744 families who were receiving child protective services during the sampling month.
The 281 control group respondents were selected from a specially
constructed sampling frame prepared from the cohort of 37,158
families who were receiving AFDC but not child protective services during the sampling month.
Measures
Information pertinent to objective a-specific custody arrangements for children of the eight women-was obtained during the personal interview. Each respondent was asked to identify
by name, age, and relationship to her each member of her
household. During a comprehensive history of each of the
mother's livebirths, the interviewer checked the household roster
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to see if the child in question was currently living with the
respondent. If the child was not among the household members,
the interviewer asked, "Where is she/he living now?" Where
possible, information from the interview was corroborated and
supplemented by information from the child protective service
case record.
Information pertinent to objective b-mental health problems and childbearing plans-was obtained during the personal
interview and where possible corroborated with information
from the case record. Given the prevalence of depression and
substance abuse problems among the population of urban, lowincome, young women (Robins, Helzer, Croughan, & Ratcliffe,
1981) information was obtained about current and past problems
with depression, alcohol abuse, and drug abuse. The Beck
Depression Inventory (Beck, 1970) was used to assess severity
of depressive symptoms on the day of the interview and a variety of questions from the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (Robins, Helzer, et al., 1981) were used to obtain information about
life-time incidence of depression as well as alcohol and drug
problems.
Relevant to the women's future plans with respect to parenting, two types of information were gathered: (a) expectations
for future pregnancies and family planning strategies around the
time of the interview, and (b) plans for assuming daily care and
custody of their children. To obtain information about future
pregnancies and family planning strategies, respondents were
asked a series of relevant questions taken from the National
Survey of Family Growth, Cycle 3 (National Center for Health
Statistics, 1982). Information about plans for return of children's
daily care and custody to the mothers was obtained, where possible, from the child protective service case record narratives.
Data analysis
Because of the small size of the group of women who became
noncustodial during the period from sampling to interview, formal statistical comparisons of this group with relevant groups
of women who did not lose custody are not warranted. Findings
from such analyses would be seriously compromised by statistical conclusion validity problems (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
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However, to give the reader a feel for how these women may
differ from the other groups of women included in the study,
we present comparable data on all measures for the abusive (n =
116), neglectful (n = 113), and control (n = 281) mothers who
had custody of at least one child on the day they were interviewed for the study.
Findings
Objective 1: To determine the composition of the noncustodial mother
group by maltreatment status
The eight women who are the subjects of this paper became
noncustodial sometime during the period 2/1/84 and the day
they were interviewed, 7 to 17 months later. All eight are from
the two maltreatment samples. As predicted, the majority, six
of the eight (75%), are from the neglect sample.
Objective 2: To identify the range of situations in which the children
of study mothers live
Inspection of data on the custodians of the 29 children of the
noncustodial mothers (see Table 1) shows that the majority were
not in formal. foster care on the day their mother was interviewed. The largest proportion, 20 of 29, were with a relative.
The remaining nine were in formal foster care, seven in family
care and two in group care. Of the 20 children who were with
a relative, seven were with their father and 13 were with either
a maternal or paternal relative. Examining the identity of children's custodians by mother's former marital status suggests, as
might be expected, that once-married mothers are more likely
to have children who live with their fathers than mothers who
were never married. The two mothers who were married have
children living with their father (the man to whom the mother
was married) whereas only one of the six never married mothers
has children living with their father.
Although highly detailed information on the transfer of daily
care and custody for all 29 children is not available from the
child protection case records, what is available leads to three
conclusions. (a) Child protective service intervention led to the
transfers of custody. It is not likely that any of these mothers
would have voluntarily on her own sought to make suitable daily
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Table 1
Proportionof Children Living With Each of Three Types of Custodians
and Proportionof Mothers Who Have Children With Each of the
Three Types
Custodian

Children
(n =29)

Mothers
(n=8)*

50% (4)
31% (9)
Formal foster home or group home care
37 (3)
(7)
24
With childs father
37 (3)
44 (13)
With paternal or maternal relatives
*The number of mothers sums to more than eight because some of the
mothers have children in more than one type of placement.

care and custody arrangements for any of their children. In many
instances, it was necessary to involve juvenile court in the custody transfer. (b) Caseworkers tended to be extremely conservative about transfers of custody. A concerted effort was made
to keep the children with their mother. Most families received
an extensive array of supportive services (i.e., day care, parent
aide service, mental health services, parenting programs etc.),
none of which they were able to effectively use, prior to removal
of all the children. (c) Every effort was made to keep the children
out of formal foster home or group home care by making it a
priority to place them with relatives.
Objective 3: To characterize the mental health problems as well as
the future childbearing of low-income mothers without custody of
their children
Demographic description. Information about six demographic characteristics (displayed in Table 2) suggests that the
eight noncustodial mothers may differ not only from the average
control mother but also the average neglectful and abusive
mother. The mean age of the noncustodial mothers during the
sampling month (1/84) was 26.1 years, younger than either the
average neglectful or average abusive mother. Four respondents
were black and four were white, suggesting that white mothers
may be over-represented among noncustodial mothers compared to the groups of abusive, neglectful, and control mothers.
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Table 2
Demographic Characteristicsof Eight Noncustodial Mothers and
Neglectful, Abusive and NonmaltreatingMothers with Custody of One
or More Children
Characteristics

Age as of 1/84

Noncustodial
(n =8)

Neglect
(n =113)

Abuse
(n =116)

Control
(n =281)

26.1

28.3

27.7

25.9

Grade completed

9.1

9.8

10.4

11.1

Number of livebirths

3.6

3.9

3.0

1.9

Race (percent white)

50.0
(4)

31.0
(35)

23.3
(27)

13.5
(38)

75.0

50.4

52.6

37.4

(6)

(57)

(61)

(105)

75.0

55.8

69.0

73.0

(6)

(63)

(80)

(205)

Employment
(percent never employed)
Marital history
(percent never married)

Two (25%) of the mothers had been employed and two had been
married, quite a few less than the other three groups. They
lagged behind the other three groups of mothers relative to educational achievement. The average number of years of education per mother is 9.1; not one of the eight had graduated from
high school. And finally, the eight mothers had given birth to
29 children, all of whom were still alive at the time of the study.
The number of children per mother ranged from one to seven
with the average being 3.6.
Naturally, these mothers also differ from the middle-class,
white mothers studied by others in that they had less education,
were less likely to have ever been employed, were less likely to
have ever been married, and had more children. Also of interest
is that the eight mothers all lost custody involuntarily as compared with many of the middle class mothers who, in part, as
a response to the women's movement, relinquished custody voluntarily (Greif & Pabst, 1988).
Mental health problems. Inspection of the data in Table 3
suggests, as predicted, that noncustodial mothers may have more
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Table 3
Depression, Drinking, and Drug Problems Characteristicof Eight
Noncustodial Mothers and Neglectful, Abusive and Nonmaltreating
Mothers with Custody of One or More Children
Characteristics

Mental health problems

Noncustodial
(n =8)

Neglect
(n =113)

Abuse
(n =116)

100.0%

85.0%

81.9%

66.9%

(96)
69.0
(78)
58.4

(95)
60.3
(70)
46.6

(188)
47.3
(133)
35.6

Control
(n =281)

Prenatal depression

(8)
75.0
(6)
62.5
(5)

(66)

(54)

(100)

BDI > 13

62.5

47.8

47.4

23.8

(5)

(54)

(55)

(67)

62.5
(5)
25.0
(2)

21.2
(24)
10.6
(12)

14.7
(17)
5.2
(6)

6.1
(17)
2.1
(6)

Two weeks depression

Drinking problem
Hard drugs

difficulties with mental health types of problems than noncustodial, neglectful, abusive, or nonmaltreating mothers. Differences are most apparent with respect to alcohol and drug
problems and least apparent with respect to depression. Overall,
the noncustodial mothers differ most from the custodial nonmaltreating mothers and least from custodial neglectful mothers
suggesting that perhaps some of the custodial neglectful mothers
may be at high risk for losing custody of their children.
All eight of the custodial mothers (100%) reported problems
with at least one of three mental health problems-depression,
alcohol, and/or drug usage. High percentages (87% and 82%)
of the neglectful and abusive mothers also reported one or more
of these three problems.
Of the three mental health problems, depression was by far
the most prevalent. All eight of the noncustodial mothers gave
a positive response to at least one of the three indicators of
depressive symptoms: (a) five (63%) were moderately or severely depressed on the day of the interview according to their
Beck Depression score (scored 14 or greater) (Beck, 1970); (b) six
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(75%) reported a life-time incidence of two or more weeks of
depression; and (c) five (63%) were depressed after the birth of
at least one child even though the child was "wanted and
planned." Of the eight mothers, five (62.5%) had serious enough
depressive symptoms to obtain formal help: three (37.5%) had
been hospitalized at least overnight and two had received help
on an outpatient basis from a mental health professional. Comparison of the noncustodial mothers with the three groups of
custodial mothers on the three depression measures reveals that
they differ most from the nonmaltreating mothers.
Drinking and drug problems. It is with respect to these two
problems that the noncustodial mothers differ the most from the
remaining abusive and neglectful mothers. "Having periods of
drinking for a couple of days and not being able to sober up"
was characteristic of 63% of the noncustodial mothers, as opposed to 24% of the neglectful and 15% of the abusive mothers.
Using hard drugs (cocaine, PCP, heroin, or LSD) for two or more
weeks was characteristic of 25% of the noncustodial mothers
compared to 11% of the neglectful and 6% of the abusive mothers. Three of the five (60%) women with drinking problems and
both of the women with drug problems had received some sort
of formal help from a mental health professional. Unfortunately,
this help seemed to have little impact on their serious substance
abuse problems.
Future childbearing plans. Just as the noncustodial mothers
differed from the custodial mothers with respect to alcohol and
drug problems, they also differed with respect to their future
childbearing plans. Despite the many serious child care problems experienced by these women and the very high incidence
of behavioral, physical, and emotional problems characteristic
of their children, all six of the women who were not sterile
(either because of tubal ligation or hysterectomy) wanted to have
at least one more child. All six answered "yes" to the question,
"Looking to the future, do you intend to have another baby at
some time" (National Center for Health Statistics, 1982). Five
wanted one more child and one wanted two more children. So,
while 100% of the noncustodial mothers who could have another
child wanted another child, only 43% of the neglectful (n = 67),
54% of the abusive (n = 59), and 57% of the control mothers
(n = 202) wanted another child.
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And, not only did the six women want more children, all six
had a steady boyfriend and all except one were trying to get
pregnant by that boyfriend during the two week period prior
to the interview. In response to the question, "Did you use any
method of birth control the last time you had intercourse?"
(National Center for Health Statistics, 1982) all five answered
"no."
The descriptive statistics provide some information about
these eight low-income, noncustodial mothers; however, due to
the size of the study group, the picture is an abbreviated one.
To fill in this picture, we dose with a detailed description of
Roberta, a mother who is typical of the eight women who form
the basis of this study.
The story of Roberta. Roberta is a 32-year-old, never-married, mother of three children. All three are living with relatives:
John, age 14, and Mary, age 12, live with one family while
Brenda, age 3, lives with another. Roberta was first reported to
child protective services during 1975 for severe neglect of John
and Mary. Since the time of this report, daily care and custody
of these two children has been provided by their maternal aunt.
During 1982, Roberta was reported to child protective services
for failure to make appropriate child care arrangements for Brenda,
a complaint very similar to the one that had lost her custody of
John and Mary. Several days prior to the complaint, she had
been found guilty of shoplifting and required to serve 9 days
in city jail. Rather than make appropriate arrangements for the
care of Brenda (two years old at the time), she left Brenda with
her current boyfriend, Bobby, a known heroin addict. Bobby
contacted a friend of Roberta's who not only came and got Brenda
but reported the problem to child protective services.
Problems with depression, drinking, and drugs have repeatedly punctuated Roberta's life. She was positive for all three
depression measures: (a) depressed after the birth of each of her
three children even though the first two were planned conceptions, (b) felt sad, blue, and depressed for at least two consecutive weeks during the six months preceding the interview, and
(c) moderately depressed on the day of the interview, according
to her Beck Depression Inventory score. And, as if the problems
with depression were not enough, Roberta also had long-stand-
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ing problems with substance abuse. As recent as six months
prior to the interview she had periods of drinking for a couple
of days or more without sobering up and of "shooting herself
with heroin." The case record narratives describe heroin and
alcohol addiction problems dating back as far as 1975-the year
when she was first reported for child neglect.
Despite the long-standing mental health problems, the repeated encounters with child protective services for child neglect, and the loss of custody of all her children, Roberta not
only planned to have two more children before she reached 35,
she was working on getting pregnant. At last intercourse (the
night before the interview), neither she nor Bobby had used any
method of birth control. During the year preceding the interview, they used birth control about half the time.
Discussion
The data describe these mothers as having more problems
than their counterparts either in the low-income population
(maltreators and controls) or in the noncustodial mother literature. The questions we sought answers to and their findings
point in many directions.
1. Overrepresentation of neglect as opposed to abuse among
the eight noncustodial mother situations directs attention to the
adequacy of services for intact neglectful families. Even though
neglectful mothers may suffer more frequently from mental health
problems (Freidrich, Tyler, et al., 1985; Zuravin, 1988), it is important to pose the question-are we providing sufficient services, soon enough to these families? Conceivably, neglectful
situations do not receive services until the mother's mental health
problems have deteriorated to the point where they are virtually
intractable. According to Wolock and Horowitz (1984), "in spite
of data showing that neglect is no less severe than physical
abuse, there is some evidence that preoccupation with abuse
may have led the protective service worker to view neglect as
being of lesser severity, and, in the face of unmanageably high
caseloads, to be more likely to screen out neglect cases" (p. 537)
(also, see Selinske, 1984).
2. The fact that many of their children are not in formal
foster care raises the question of who is caring for these children.
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Are they in adequate placements with relatives or are they as
much at risk for maltreatment as they were when living with
their mothers? This takes us back to one of the possible adverse
consequences, mentioned earlier in the paper, of an increase in
the population of low-income, noncustodial mothers. We may
be seeing a growing number of unmonitored, unattached children, ones that are shuffled from place to place after having been
maltreated by their mothers. Who know what happens to children, who, for example, go with one relative, do not fit in there,
and then move on to another and another informal placement.
More than two-thirds of this group of 29 children could be in
this situation. Are these children at high risk for maltreatment?
Do these children constitute a large proportion of a rather newly
recognized American social problem, "runaway children and
teenagers?"
3. Most troubling of the facts learned about these eight
mothers is that the six who have not been sterilized want and
are trying to have more children. While middle class mothers
have also started families again after becoming noncustodial
(Greif & Pabst, 1988), it appears to occur in a small proportion
of cases. We could thus hypothesize that having a low income
and becoming noncustodial as a result of child protective service
intervention are linked to a desire to have more children in a
way that may not apply to middle-income noncustodial mothers.
Will history repeat itself for these mothers and their new children? If so, short of mandatory sterilization, what is the solution?
There are at least three directions for future research on noncustodial mothers. The first direction centers on differences between low- and middle-income noncustodial mothers. For
instance, "Are noncustodial low-income mothers compared to
noncustodial middle-income mothers (a) a less prevalent phenomenon? (b) less likely to voluntarily relinquish custody of
their children than middle-income mothers? (c) more likely to
become noncustodial involuntarily because of intractable mental
health problems including depression and substance abuse?
(d) more likely to want more children and to try to have more
children once they become noncustodial? The second direction
centers on differences between low-income mothers who are
noncustodial and comparable mothers who have custody of some
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but not all of their children. Do these two groups of mothers
differ, and if so, how?
Does a mother lose some children on the way to losing all
of her children? And, if so, what could be done preventively to
reverse this cycle? And, finally, the third direction centers on
low-income fathers. When and under what circumstances do
they become custodians of their children (Greif & Zuravin, in
press)? How do those fathers who assume daily care and custody
of their children differ from those who do not?
Traditionally, foster care literature has focused on and documented the consequences for children of being in formal foster
family and group care placements. It has not, however, to the
best of our knowledge, addressed the issue of children who are
living in "informal foster care arrangements", i.e., the child who
lives with relatives. Given the current crisis in the formal foster
care system-not enough placements to meet demand-placement of children with relatives is likely to increase. The consequences of these placements need documentation. Is the
population of children in "informal foster care" growing? Are
children in "informal foster care" at increased risk for child maltreatment of all types? Do they constitute a large proportion of
the "runaway minor" problem?
We have attempted to show that more research on the lowincome, noncustodial mother is needed. The study of this population, which has been virtually ignored, can provide a key to
unlocking many fields of study relevant to social service policy
and social work practice.
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The Benefits of Competition
Competition has long been recognized as a necessary ingredient of our economic system. Competition, it is argued, is
needed to combat the negative effects of monopoly. Downs describes the negative effects of monopoly and the benefits of competition in these terms:
The classic antidote to monopoly is competition. By introducing
alternative sources of supply, competition expands the choice available to consumers. Moreover, these alternative sources are likely
to use different methods and approaches, or even to develop wholly
new products, thus greater variety makes expanded choice really
meaningful. Since consumers can shift their trade from suppliers
who do not please them, suppliers have a strong incentive to provide what the consumers want. This attitude also means competitors regard innovations positively, as potential means of winning
more business ... In contrast, monopolists usually view innovations negatively (Downs, 1970, p. 264).
A number of authors have criticized government's historic
monopoly of human services delivery in this country. These
critics maintain that government monopoly has led to a human
services delivery system that is inefficient, ineffective, unresponsive, and in some cases irrelevant, to the real needs of clients
and communities (Drucker, 1969; Reid, 1972; Pruger and Miller,
1973; Savas, 1977, 1982). What is needed, in the view of these
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authors, is for government to promote competition in human
services delivery. The anticipated benefits of promoting competition in human services delivery are said to be numerous:
promotion of innovative and creative approaches to service delivery (Newman and Turem, 1974), improved service quality
(Fitch, 1974), and the creation of a pricing mechanism (Fisk,
Kiesling, and Muller, 1978), that can lead to lower service delivery costs (Kettner and Martin, 1985).
Competition & Purchase of Service Contracting (POSC)
The two principal methods of promoting competition in human services delivery are the use of vouchers and purchase of
service contracting (Bendick, 1984). Vouchers have been used
for some time in such service areas as education, day care and
transporation services (Hatry and Valente, 1983; Agranoff and
Pattakos, 1985; Hatry and Durman, 1985). Purchase of service
contracting (POSC) has also been used as a means of promoting
competition in the human services (Kettner and Martin, 1985;
Hatry and Durman, 1985). By making public funds available
through POSC, the expectation is that private sector service providers will compete with one another to win human services
contracts.
Of the two principal methods available, POSC dearly holds
the greatest potential for generating competition in human services delivery. The federal Department of Health and Human
Services, all fifty state human services agencies, and a sizable
proportion of municipal and county human services agencies all
use POSC (Mueller, 1980, Martin, 1986, Agranoff and Pattakos,
1985). POSC has been the major mode of state human services
delivery since the late 1970's (Benton, Field, and Millar, 1978;
Mueller, 1980; Martin, 1986; Kettner and Martin, 1987). Based
on studies of state human services agencies, it is estimated that
POSC expenditures under the federal Social Service Block Grant
program alone exceed $1 billion dollars annually (Mueller, 1980,
Martin 1986, Kettner and Martin, 1987).
Despite its potential importance as a means of promoting
competition in the human services, little is actually known about
the real extent of competition in POSC. From a theoretical perspective general agreement exists that most types of human ser-
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vices are at least candidates for competitive contracting (Hatry
and Durman, 1985). From an empirical perspective, however,
most of what is known about competition in POSC for human
services is derived from a limited knowledge base that is perhaps best characterized as being of a case study or anecdotal
nature (e.g., Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., 1980;
Terrell and Kramer, 1984; Hatry and Durman, 1985; DeHoog,
1985, 1986; Kramer and Grossman, 1987). The evidence that does
exist, however, suggests that competition in POSC for human
services may be more myth than reality. If competition is generally absent in human services contracting, a disturbing question is raised in some minds: has the widespread use of POSC
created situations where private sector monopolies have simply
replaced public sector monopolies? (Florestano, 1982).
In an attempt to determine the extent of competition in POSC
for human services and the factors that may promote, or impede
it, the authors conducted a secondary data analysis of a recent
national survey of the POSC activities of state Social Services
Block Grant (SSBG) agencies (Martin, 1986).
Study Design
The original study conducted in 1986, involved a mail survey
sent to the top administrators of the fifty state SSBG agencies.
Forty-three state SSBG administrators responded to the survey
as the result of the original and one follow-up mailing constituting a response rate of 86%. Specific questions were asked
concerning: (a) the extent of competition present in the POSC
activities of state SSBG agencies; (b) the criteria, or factors, used
in making decisions about POSC; and (c) the types of POSC
administrative mechanisms most frequently used by state SSBG
agencies. The variables used to operationalize these concepts are
discussed in the following sections.
Competition
Competition was defined as two or more contractors submitting bids or proposals to provide a service. This is a fairly
standard test for the presence of competition in contracting and
is based on government procurement theory (Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, 1979; DeHoog, 1985; Kettner and Martin,
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1985, 1987). In an attempt to determine the extent of competition
experienced in each state, SSBG administrators were asked to
indicate the percentage of time two or more bids or proposals
were received in response to the issuance of invitations for bids
(IFBs) and requests for proposals (RFPs). Because the effort necessary for precise calculations would have made responses impractical, state SSBG administrators were asked to make their
best, and most informed, percentage estimates.
POSC Decision Factors
Beginning in the late 1960s a series of studies was conducted
in an attempt to identify the criteria, or factors, used by state
human services agencies in making decisions about the use of
POSC. The question posed in these studies, in short, was: what
factors were most important in your state's overall decisions to
use POSC? (Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 1969; Wedel, 1974; Benton, Field and Millar, 1978; Pacific Consultants, 1979; American
Public Welfare Association, 1981). The findings of these studies
were distilled into eleven POSC decision factors: (1) cost considerations-the use of POSC to control, contain, or reduce the
cost of service delivery; (2) service system considerations-the
use of POSC to maintain or expand the human services system
through increased involvement of the private sector; (3) funding
considerations-the use of POSC to integrate federal and state
funding with local government and private sector funding;
(4) productivity considerations-the use of POSC to increase the
amount of services delivered; (5) availability and capability of
contractors-the effect that the presence or absence of multiple
capable potential contractors has on the ability to use POSC;
(6) service considerations-the nature of the services to be provided that might make POSC a more, or less, useful option;
(7) client considerations-the use of POSC to enhance client access or increase service impact; (8) government organizational
and policy considerations-the extent to which POSC is favored
by agency policy or necessitated by the lack of government expertise or equipment; (9) history and tradition-the influence
of established public-private sector relationships on the use of
POSC; (10) legal requirements-the influence of state laws and
regulations governing the use of POSC; (11) politics and com-
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munity pressures-the effects of power on decisions to use
POSC.
State SSBG administrators were asked to rate, using a six
point scale, the relative influence of each of these eleven factors
on their agencies' overall decisions to use POSC. A score of six
was used to indicate that the POSC decision factor was considered "very important" in the contracting decisions of the state
SSBG agency and a score of one was used to indicate that the
POSC decision factor was considered "not at all important." By
determining the relative priority state SSBG agencies place on
these various POSC decision factors, it is possible to explore
potential relationships between these factors and competition
levels.
Based on the findings of the five studies cited earlier and
other relevant literature dealing with POSC and contracting, it
was hypothesized that four of the identified POSC decision factors would be positively associated with competition levels and
seven negatively associated. The POSC decision factors hypothesized to be positively associated with competition levels are:
cost considerations, productivity considerations, availability and
capability of contractors, and legal requirements. Cost and productivity considerations are hypothesized to be positively associated with competition levels because increased competition
in human services delivery is generally viewed as a method to
drive down service delivery costs, increase productivity, or both
(Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1979; The Council on State
Governments, 1983; Hatry and Durman 1985). The availability
and capability of contractors (i.e., potential contractors) is generally considered to be the sine qua non of competition (Hatry
and Durman, 1985; Kettner and Martin, 1987). Legal requirements generally fall within the context of state procurement laws
and regulations, which tend to promote competitive contracting
(The Council of State Governments, 1983).
The seven POSC decision factors hypothesized to be negatively associated with competition levels are: service system considerations, funding considerations, service considerations, client
considerations, government organizational and policy considerations, history and tradition, and politics and community pressures. Service system considerations and funding considerations
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are hypothesized to be negatively associated with competition
levels because evidence suggests that when these factors are
important in POSC decisions, maintenance of the status quo
rather than any attempt to increase competition tends to be the
result (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc.; DeHoog, 1985,
1986). Likewise, when service considerations or client considerations are considered more important in POSC decisions,
competition tends to be less important (Hatry and Durman,
1984; Kettner and Martin, 1987).
Government organizational and policy considerations are
hypothesized to be negatively associated with competition levels
because where state human services agencies have a formal policy position on POSC, the policy tends to be collaborative, rather
than competitive (e.g., State of Connecticut, 1984). When government lacks the necessary expertise to provide a service directly, it also is frequently less well equipped administratively
to contract competitively for that service (Kettner and Martin,
1987).
History and tradition tend to promote collaboration rather
than competition in POSC because established public-private
sector relations were based on partnership arrangements rather
than competitive arrangements (Kettner and Martin, 1986). Finally, where politics and community pressures are brought to
bear on POSC decisions, these pressures are related to the funding of particular services or agencies, rather than to the promotion of competition (Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation,
Inc., 1980: DeHoog, 1985).
If the hypotheses formulated above about the relationships
between POSC decision factors and competition hold true for
state SSBG agencies, an analysis of the study data should reveal
positive and negative correlations as follows:
Prediction of Positive
Correlationwith
Competition Levels
" Cost Considerations
"Productivity Considerations
* Availability & Capability
of Contractors
* Legal Requirements

Prediction of Negative
Correlation With
Competition Levels
- Service System
Considerations
* Funding Considerations
• Service Considerations
* Client Considerations
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" Government Organizational
& Policy Considerations
" History & Tradition
" Politics & Community
Pressures

POSC Administrative Mechanisms
Based on a review of the POSC and government procurement
literature, eight administrative mechanisms used by government
contracting agencies were also identified. These POSC administrative mechanisms include: the procurement processes of
(a) invitation for bids (IFBs) and (b) the request for proposals
(RFPs); the contract payment mechanisms of (c) cost reimbursement contracts and (d) unit cost, fixed-fee, and incentive contracts; the length of contract term either (e) single year contracts
or (f) multi-year contracts; and the type of contractors used
(g) government and non-profit contractors and (h) for-profit
contractors.
State SSBG administrators were again asked to rate, using
a six point scale, how characteristic each of the eight POSC administrative mechanisms was of their agency's overall approach
to POSC. A score of six was to indicate that the POSC administrative mechanism was considered "very characteristic" of the
state SSBG agency's contracting approach and a score of one was
to indicate that the POSC administrative mechanism was "not
at all characteristic."
In examining these eight POSC administrative mechanisms,
one can again hypothesize that some would be positively associated with competition levels and some negatively. The use
of the invitation for bids (IFBs) is generally associated with a
more competitive environment because price or cost is the primary decision criterion, with the resulting contract usually being
awarded to the lowest bidder (Office of Federal Procurement
Policy, 1979). The use of the request for proposals (RFPs), on the
other hand, is frequently associated with a less competitive environment because program design and service issues tend to
take precedence over issues of cost or price (The Council of State
Governments, 1983; Hatry and Durman, 1985).
Unit cost, fixed-fee, and incentive contracts are generally
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held to promote competition because contractors know they will
be paid a predetermined price for their services and, consequently, they are ultimately responsible for cost control and productivity. Conversely, the use of cost reimbursement contracts
is generally associated with a less competitive environment because contractors know that this type of payment mechanism
holds them harmless from financial risk since the government
contracting agency agrees to defray all the contractor's costs of
service delivery (Kettner and Martin, 1987).
The use of single year contracts is generally considered to
have a positive effect on competition because contractors can
change annually (Fisk, Kiesling and Muller, 1978; Hatry and
Durman, 1985). Thus, single year contracts tend to promote competition more than do multi-year contracts. The use of for-profit
contractors is also generally considered to promote competition
because in a competitive environment, it is likely that every
available type of contractor would be given an equal opportunity to compete. Excluding for-profits from being POSC contractors, as some state human services agencies apparently do
(State of Connecticut, 1984), and restricting POSC contracts to
only government and non-profit agencies is, therefore, considered as more characteristic of a less competitive environment.
If these generally held notions about the relationships between POSC decision factors and competition are consistent with
the actual practices of state SSBG agencies, an analysis of the
study data should reveal positive and negative correlations as
follows:
Prediction of Positive
Correlationwith
Competition Levels
" Invitation for Bids
" Unit Cost, Fixed-Fee &
Incentive Contracts
" Single Year Contracts
" For-Profit

Prediction of Negative
Correlation with
Competition Levels
- Request for Proposals
• Cost Reimbursement
Contracts
* Multi-Year Contracts
• Government & Non-Profit
Contractors

Study Findings
Extent of Competition
As Table 1 illustrates, nationally competition is present less
than 25% of the time in the POSC activities of the responding
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Table 1
Mean PercentageCompetition Levels Nationally and By
Geographical Region

Nationally
(40)

North
East
Region
(7)

27.7%
23.9%
of
) = Number Cases
*p=.05

North
Central
Region

South
Region

West
Region

(7)

(14)

(12)

11.6%

11.6%

43.3%

F-Test
3.165*

state SSBG agencies. This finding certainly calls into question
the notion that competition in POSC is a widespread national
phenomenon. There are, however, significant regional differences in the amount of competition present in the POSC activities of state SSBG agencies. Again referring to Table 1,
competition occurs 43% of the time in the West region, while
competition levels approximate the national average in the North
East region (27.7%) and are considerably below the national average in the North Central (11.6%) and South (11.66%) regions.
These four regional groupings were developed by the International City Management Association and have been used in previous studies involving POSC (Agranoff and Pattakos, 1985;
Kettner and Martin, 1987).
Competition and POSC Decision Factors
As Table 2 illustrates, none of the POSC decision factors are
significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, with
competition levels. At this point we might well conclude that
either: (a) the priorities of state SSBG agencies have no impact
on competition levels-that stated priorities to reduce costs or
increase productivity simply do not get translated in action, or
(b) that the degree of competition may be influenced more by
other factors and less by the conscious policy choices of state
SSBG agencies. When the focus of the analysis of Table 2 shifts
seven
from the size of the correlations to their signs, however,
of eleven signs are in the predicted direction. Five of the seven
POSC decision factors predicted to correlate negatively with
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Table 2
Predictedand Actual CorrelationsBetween POSC Decision Factorsand
Competition Levels
POSC Decision Factors
Cost Considerations
Productivity Considerations
Availability &Capability
of Contractors
Legal Requirements
Service System Considerations
Funding Considerations
Service Considerations
Client Considerations
Government Organizational
&Policy Considerations
History & Tradition
Politics & Community Pressures

Predicted
Correlation

Actual
Correlation

Positive
Positive

-. 06
.07

Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative

-. 19
.23
-. 03
-. 21
-. 07
.17

Negative
Negative
Negative

-. 22
-. 01
.08

competition levels have negative signs: service system considerations, service considerations, funding considerations, government organizational and policy considerations, and history and
tradition. Two of the four POSC decision factors predicted to
correlate positively with competition levels have positive signs:
productivity considerations and legal requirements. These findings provide at least some support for the notion that POSC
decision factors may be related to competition, but obviously
more precise measurements are needed to further probe the nature of these relationships.
If POSC decision factors do not explain the variation in competition between state SSBG agencies, the next most probable
source would be POSC administrative mechanisms.
Competition and POSC Administrative Mechanisms
Table 3 reveals a number of statistically significant correlations between POSC administrative mechanisms and competition levels, but few are in the direction predicted. In terms of
procurement mechanisms, both the invitation for bids (.35) and
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Table 3
Predictedand Actual CorrelationBetween POSC Administrative
Mechanism and Competition Levels
POSC Administrative Mechanism
Invitation for Bids (IFBs)
Request for Proposals (RFPs)
Unit Cost, Fixed-Fee &
Incentive Contracts
Cost Reimbursement Contracts
Single Year Contracts
Multi-Year Contracts
Government & Non-Profit
Contractors
For-Profit Contractors
*p =.05

**p =.01

Predicted
Correlation

Actual
Correlation

Positive
Negative

.35*
.27*

Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

.01
.01
-. 30*
.58* * *

Negative
Positive

-. 34*
.26*

***p =.001

the request for proposals (.27) are positively correlated with
competition levels indicating that these two POSC administrative mechanisms are characteristic of state SSBG agencies with
high competition levels. The contract payment mechanisms show
no correlations whatsoever, with both unit cost, fixed-fee, and
incentive contracts (.01) as well as cost reimbursement contracts
(.01) having zero order correlations.
Type of contractor variables do reveal signs in the predicted
directions, but the correlations are moderate. Government and
non-profit contractors show a moderate negative correlations
(-.34) with competition levels, while for-profit contractors demonstrate a moderate positive correlation (.26).
The length of contract term variables show moderate to strong
correlations, but their signs are in the opposite directions from
those predicted. Single-year contracts reveal a moderate negative
correlation (-.30) with competition levels, while multi-year contracts evidence a strong positive correlation (.58). These two
findings are surprising in that they run counter to generally
accepted notions that multi-year contracts retard competition
and single year contracts promote competition (Fisk, Kiesling,
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and Muller, 1974; Hatry and Durman, 1985; Kettner and Martin,
1985, 1987). A plausible explanation for this finding is that prospective contractors may be more willing to compete for POSC
contracts when they know that success will mean a long term
multi-year contractual relationship as opposed to a short term
single year contractual relationship.
Summary & Conclusions
What, then, can be said of competition and purchase of service contracting (POSC) based on these findings? First, that
competition does exist in the POSC activities of state SSBG
agencies, but less than 25% of the time. Second, that competition levels vary significantly between regions of the country
with the most competition taking place in the West region. Third,
that the policy priorities of state SSBG agencies, as operationalized in the selected POSC decision factors used in this study,
apparently have little effect on competition levels. Fourth, that
the different POSC administrative mechanisms used by state
SSBG agencies appear to have the greatest effect on competition
levels. Of the eight POSC administrative mechanisms included
in this study the most important in terms of promoting competition levels are: multi-year contracts, invitation for bids, request for proposals, and for-profit contractors.
While this study opens up for discussion the question of
competion in POSC and, by extension, competition in human
services delivery, a large number of important questions remain
for subsequent research. Most notable among these are: (a) do
state SSBG agencies see competiton as desirable or undesirable?
(b) are state SSBG agencies attempting to promote or reduce
competition? (c) what benefits do state SSBG agencies perceive
as resulting from increased or decreased competition? and
(d) what has been the impact of competition on the cost and
quality of service delivery so far? At this point, in the absence
of answers to these questions, it is too early to speculate on the
success or failure of competition in POSC or competition in
human services delivery.
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The clients of emergency hunger centers in an urban area were studied
to assess the problem of hunger from the clients' vantage point. The
findings indicate that hunger remains a problem even among those who
have availed themselves of emergency food services. A great deal of
time and effort is spent in activities to cope with hunger. The adequacy
of the present system for meeting the needs of the hungry and implications for policy are discussed.

Hunger is a major social problem in America. National, state
and local data have documented both the existence of the problem and its increasing magnitude (Physician Task Force on Hunger in America, 1985). In 1982, the U.S. Conference of Mayors
was the first group to officially recognize the hunger crisis (United
States Conference of Mayors, 1982). Again in 1983 and 1985, the
Mayors' Conference reported on the status of hunger and concluded that the problem had grown, is expected to continue to
grow, and recommended an increase in federal program assistance. (United States Conference of Mayors, 1983; 1985).
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In response to the hunger problem, emergency food services
have been established in record numbers. Wenocur and assodates found that 15% of the citizens of Baltimore turned to
nongovernment emergency assistance programs for food services because of low levels of public assistance, the lack of public
emergency resources, and problems of ineligibility (Wenocur
et al., 1980). These authors concluded that needy people were
falling through the cracks of social insurance programs and the
public assistance safety net. In looking into the reasons Americans have developed a need for food assistance, the General
Accounting Office concluded that some Americans have developed a need for food assistance because they do not receive
government nutrition assistance (United States General Accounting Office, 1983).
Several national studies of emergency food service providers
have found that these programs have been unable to keep up
with increased need and demand for food (Salvation Army of
America, 1983; Bread for the World, 1983; Food Research and
Action Center, 1984; Social and Scientific Systems, Inc., 1983;
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1983). The main reason
appears to be inadequate food supplies. The evidence shows
that private charity cannot meet the need for food assistance in
local communities. In almost all cases, the centers are serving
more people today than in the past with major increases noted
in the numbers of families and children requesting emergency
food (Food Research and Action Center, 1984).
The Physician's Task Force on Hunger in America (1985) examined the consequences of hunger and concluded that serious
harm is being done. They found that low-income adults are at
greater risk of certain nutrition-related diseases and face significantly greater likelihood of dying at relatively earlier ages than
other Americans. The task force also concluded that as a group,
poor children are less likely to be adequately nourished and are
more likely to suffer growth failure and are at greater risk of
death from malnutrition than their nonpoor peers. Moreover,
infants of poor mothers are at greater risk of death and of lowbirth weight and later health impairment than those of the
nonpoor.
This report provides descriptive data on the hunger problem
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from the perspective of emergency food recipients in an urban
area. The study examined the characteristics of hunger center
clients, their food consumption patterns, strategies for feeding
themselves and their families, and perceptions of their service
needs. Particular attention was paid to the clients' own views as
to whether their own resources and existing services were adequate for meeting their food needs. Resources included income
from work, public assistance, the voluntary sector and the social
network. This study assesses the extent to which emergency
food centers are able to respond to this national problem and
reach those in need, and how well current policies and programs
are addressing the hunger problem. Implications for policy are
offered.
Methods
For the purpose of this study, emergency food centers were
defined as units run by voluntary organizations that provided
emergency food or meals on some regular basis. Thirty-four
emergency food centers participated in the survey and constitute
most of the major units in the greater Cleveland area. Survey
sites included hunger centers that supply food bags in 21 innercity and 7 suburban locations and 6 congregate meal centers in
the city. The hunger centers provide three-day food supplies
(adjusted for family size) once every two months in city locations
and once a month in suburban locations and use an income
criterion for eligiblity. The congregate meal sites serve meals
during the last week of every month to anyone who walks in.
There is no eligibility requirement and recipients generally live
in the immediate vicinity (i.e., within walking distance).
Hunger center clients at the 34 sites were surveyed by 40
interviewers over a period of ten consecutive days at the end of
May, 1987. Interviews were guided by a structured questionnaire which took approximately 15 minutes to administer. Interviews were facilitated by the center managers and/or meal
coordinators who approached clients and requested their participation in the study. Clients were told that the study was intended to gain understanding of the needs and problems of
people who use hunger centers and that participation was strictly
voluntary.
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An attempt was made to interview as many of the clients
who were present at each site suring the hours of operation on
each day of data collection. An opportunistic, nonprobability
sample was selected and only a small number of clients refused
to be interviewed. The findings from this study cannot be generalized to all service recipients nor to the broader group of
people who experience hunger.
Findings
Client Characteristics
Six hundred and sixty-four emergency food recipients participated in the survey and 72.6% were interviewed in the city
hunger centers, 12.7% in the suburban hunger centers and 14.8%
in city congregate meal sites (see Table 1). Females outnumber
males by almost two to one. Ages of respondents range from 17
to 89, with a median age of 38. About 7 out of 10 respondents
are black, while a quarter are white, and 4.2% are from other
racial/ethnic groups. Only 2 out of 10 respondents reported being
married and half had completed high school or had a higher
education. Forty percent reported living alone while almost half
indicate the presence of children 18 years or less within the
household.
The median monthly income for a family of two in the sample is $386 per month inclusive of food stamps which is substantially below the 1987 poverty level of $617 per month (United
States Government Printing Office, 1987). Only 7.3% of the sample hold either full- or part-time jobs and 70% of these center
clients indicate they presently receive food stamps with a value
of $0.74 per person per meal for a family of two in the previous
month. When asked about other sources of public assistance,
35% said they received ADC, 30% General Relief, 13% SSI, and
14.5% Social Security.
A third of the clients report a hypertension condition, 11.7%
say they suffer from heart disease, 9.6% from diabetes and 3%
have cancer. Approximately 22% report being overweight and
9% report being underweight.
Food Availability and Consumption
Seventy-eight percent of survey participants report that they
generally eat two to three times a day while those who are par-
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Table 1
Client Characteristics
Characteristic

n

%

238
426

35.8
64.2

175
461
28

26.4
69.4
4.2

19
179
179
111
84
53
38

2.9
27.0
27.0
16.7
12.7
8.0
5.7

Sources of Income*
ADC
GR
SSI
SS
Unemployment Insurance
Job
Food Stamp Recipient

233
200
86
96
7
48
466

35.1
30.1
13.0
14.5
1.1
7.2
70.2

Marital Status
Married
Not Married

129
535

19.4
80.6

Education
Some College
High School Graduates
Some High School
Less than High School

97
238
209
120

14.6
35.8
31.5
18.1

Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Other
Age
Under 20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
Over 70

Total n = 664 (Due to missing data, the n on each variable may differ slightly.)
*Note, multiple responses are possible
ents note that for the most part the children eat three to four
times daily. Eight of ten respondents indicate that during a usual
month they eat fewer meals or serve less food at meals because
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of inadequate food supplies. Of those respondents with children
in their households, almost three-quarters report eating less or
different food at meals than their children in order to save food
for them. Finally, almost half the clients surveyed revealed that
even with the use of food services, during a typical month there
are times that they have to go without eating due to insufficient
food supplies. These 311 respondents who ran out of food fall
into two subgroups: 81% who receive food stamps that are inadequate to meet their food needs, and 19% who are not food
stamp recipients, a majority of whom are not receiving any form
of public assistance. It was beyond the scope of the survey to
determine whether this latter group was ineligible for public
services or failed to receive them for other reasons. This subgroup
of food stamp recipients had a median family size of two and
a median monthly income of $253 while the nonrecipient
subgroup had a median family size of two and a median monthly
income of $300. Fifty-seven percent of these food stamp recipients have children whereas 40% of the nonrecipient subgroup
have children. The nonrecipients are more often male and more
likely to be married.
Coping Strategies
In order to gain an understanding of the ways in which
emergency food center clients cope, survey respondents were
asked what kinds of strategies they employed during a typical
month in order to feed themselves and/or their families beyond
the use of emergency food services. A majority of respondents
(73%) indicated that they borrowed money from friends or relatives, about half borrowed food from friends or relatives, more
than half said they found odd jobs or day work, over a third
said they bought food on credit or sold items to raise money,
and almost a sixth reported selling blood. Other coping strategies were also reported: (a) budget management such as buying
on credit, borrowing, stretching food dollars, and eating fewer
meals; (b) income generation strategies such as working odd
jobs, selling one's possessions, recycled items, or drugs, prostituion, begging, gambling or stealing; and (c) food procurement strategies including eating at friends'/relatives' homes or
community events, borrowing or pooling food, requesting or
stealing food from grocery stores or restaurants, or gardening.
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Respondents were also asked if there were other things they
had seen people do in order to feed their families. This question
was included to see if respondents would mention socially taboo
or illegal means. It was reported that children go begging or
take part in pornographic films, that people eat dog food, kill
for food and money, get sent to jail, and avoid problems through
use of alcohol.
Service Needs: Met and Unmet
The data suggest that the emergency food centers play a crucial stabilizing role in clients' lives. The interviews contained
comments like "people would starve to death without them,"
"thank God they are here," and "they have been wonderful to
me." Most clients commended the service and the staff of the
centers for the job they are doing with what is available. However, the inadequacy of the centers' food offerings was noted
repeatedly in terms of quality, quantity, and frequency. Respondents indicated that emergency centers run out of food,
have limited hours of operation, and are inadequately staffed,
which results in long waits and the possibility of being turned
away. In addition, some centers did not have refrigerators, thus
special dietary or medical needs, or the needs of the elderly or
children could not be considered. Other concerns included the
lack of baby food and the need for household staples, particularly at the end of the month.
Almost uniformly, respondents expressed the need for more
food, more often, since the allotted amount and frequency of
food provisions is insufficient. In addition, clients recommended
longer hours of operation and increased staffing to allay long
waits. Several access issues were also raised which included the
proximity of food centers to residents. Elderly clients, in particular, reported problems in reaching the center since walking is
difficult and transportation is not always available. Moreover,
food offerings are sometimes counterindicated for those on
health-related diets. Clients noted that many people need help
but are unaware of the food service or have too much pride to
avail themselves of it. For some respondents, service acceptability was hampered by negative or condescending staff attitudes in some centers, crowding, summer heat, and waiting in
line outdoors in inclement weather.
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Improving the selection of food offerings was requested by
numerous center clients. Specific suggestions include offering
more varied foods, fresh vegetables and meats, canned goods,
paper products, and household staples. Finally, some clients
mentioned the need for other concrete services such as job services, clothing and social activities.
Summary and Conclusions
What becomes dear from this study is the vulnerability of
people who need food. The use of emergency food centers has
become a necessity, an integral part of their daily routine, not
a temporary means of crisis management as originally intended.
Managing to feed themselves and their families consumed a
good deal of time and effort, as the wide variety of coping strategies illustrates. The feeling of strain due to inadequate resources and income assistance was evident. Respondents spoke
of hard choices poor people are forced to make, such as selling
food stamps to pay rent or utilities, foregoing medicine for food,
or skipping meals to feed the children. The portrait of unmet
need was augmented by personal statements about how difficult
it is to beg for food, embarrassment over use of emergency food
centers, and the giving-up of pride.
This study has provided a portrait of people who have drawn
upon all three tiers of the social protection system, the family,
the public sector, and the voluntary sector, and who are still
facing a hunger problem. Evidence emerged that both food stamp
recipients and nonrecipients are falling through the safety-net
and at times go without food.
Several implications for policy can be drawn. The food stamp
budget needs to be adjusted to keep up with inflation and made
adequate to purchase an appropriate diet. The combination of
income support and food stamps needs to be restructured so
that recipients can purchase needed food. Moreover, this study
identified a group of people who need food but who are without
food stamps, which suggests that eligibility criteria need to be
broadened and barriers need to be removed to provide public
food assistance to this subgroup.
Emergency food centers which emerged as a short-term solution to serve a tertiary level, safety-net function, have become
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major service providers. While emergency food services have
been thrust into a front-and-center role in meeting the needs of
the hungry poor, inadequate resources which limit availability
of food supplies prevent them from meeting the demand. The
proper mixture of public and private support needs to be reassessed to assure food availability. In addition, policies and procedures which limit the amount and frequency of food provision,
times of operation, and eligibility requirements must be revamped. Thus, while the centers have become a widespread
outlet for addressing the nation's growing hunger problem, current policies and funding patterns have not provided sufficient
supportive resources to meet the need for emergency food despite the increased public awareness of the problem and dramatic documentation early in this decade.
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The quality of life for many single mothers and their children is shrouded
in economic hardship. Women outside the traditional nuclear family,
attempting to raise children, are doing so in poverty and without much
public support. Marital disruption, teenage mothers, and out of wedlock births have resulted in an alarmingnumber of improverished children living in America. This paper examines census data in the state
of Hawaii and the impact of family structure on the quality of lives of
women with children. Women living in multigenerationalfamily arrangements, rather than in "traditional"families have higher income,
holding family size constant. Social policies that do not focus on the
issues of insufficient wages, job security, education, racial, sex and
wage discriminationand child care needs will only fail.

Family structures in America have been changing rapidly.
Social policies aimed at supporting the family, particularly single
mothers with dependent children are inefficient, unhelpful and
often inappropriate. Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and other means-tested welfare programs undermine
the labor force attachment of poor single mothers by promoting
female headship and reducing the likelihood of marriage. With
low wages, little available and affordable child care and expensive health insurance, poor women have few options but to remain taking welfare. Data that attend to the real life circumstances
of single mothers, the types of family structures in which they
live and the needs of these new families are needed and would
perhaps reshape and improve the social welfare policy making
*The authors acknowledge the data manipulation assistance of Ron Williams,
University of Hawaii. We appreciate both his skills and his sense of humor.
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process and interventions. This paper examines the variety and
complexities of living arrangements of women and their children in the state of Hawaii. To date, little has been reported
about the changing living arrangements of new family structures
and how they may influence and support its members. Of particular interest here are the new forms of nontraditional families
that are female headed with dependent children.
Changes in Family Structure and Living Arrangements
In America, a significant proportion of adults (and their children) are currently experiencing a dramatic reorganization of the
family. The U.S. Bureau of Census reported that the number of
white families headed by single mothers increased by 105%
from 1970-1984. For black families the increase was 150%. Bumpass (1984) reported that a full 86% of black children and 45%
of white children will spend a part of their youth in a female
headed family. The Census reported in 1984 that almost 60% of
all black families and 20% of white families were headed by
single females (Nichols-Casebolt, 1988). The "traditional" family
is changing and the changes are profoundly affecting women.
Two decades ago, the modal American family consisted of a
working father, a stay-at-home, nonemployed mother and at
least one child. This constituted almost 70% of all households.
Today, this "norm" accounts for less than 11% of all families in
America. In less than 20 years, family structure in the United
States has changed from the nuclear family arrangement into
many, more varied patterns, and no one category comprises a
majority.
Changes in family structuring that result in a female headed
household may occur in two distinct ways: marital disruption
and out of wedlock births. The high divorce rate in the United
States has had a significant social impact on all family members
but it has particular impact on the quality of life of the adult
women (DeFrain, 1981; Hopkins, 1987; Pearce, 1979; Bhar, 1983;
Espenshade, 1979). Most mothers are unable to earn suficient
income to support themselves and their children so that after a
divorce, many mothers find themselves in poverty. Cultural stereotypes continue to influence the patterns of child care responsibilities so that mothers retain the physical custody (and the
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costs) of children after a divorce. Even with the recent popularity of Court decreed joint custody, the vast majority of mothers
must seek child support from their ex-husband to supplement
their inadequate wages. (Little, 1982; Espenshade, 1979).
The second factor causing changes in family formations and
the role of women is the large number of young mothers having
babies and not marrying (Hoffert, 1987). Each year in the United
States, over 1.3 million 13-19 year olds become pregnant. Adolescents are now responsible for one out of every five deliveries
and many of these pregnancies were unintended and are unwanted; yet less than 7% of these teenagers give up their babies
for adoption (Tietze, 1978). Teenagers who marry and have children tend to experience social, legal, psychological, educational
and economic difficulties as they attempt to bring up their children. And since 500,000 babies are born to unwed mothers each
year, these mothers face additional difficulties when bringing
up their children alone. Teenagers have more marital problems
and a higher divorce rate than couples marrying in later years.
Teenage pregnancy is the most common reason for dropping
out of school and young mothers seldom recapture their lost
years of education. This seriously reduces their future choices
and has long term ramifications for future employment possibilities. Young parents' educational setbacks are frequently irreparable. Early motherhood is usually followed by
unemployment, reduced income and dependency on public welfare. Moore and Burt (1982) found that young mothers were
twice as likely to fall below the poverty line as women having
their first babies after their teenage years.
Thus, while less than 50% of all American children will
spend their childhood living in families composed of both natural parents, little social policy has been specifically formulated
or adopted to assist such families. Traditional welfare programs
such as Aid to families with Dependent Children do not adequately meet the needs of this new, but common type of family.
New mothers often must set up separate domiciles apart from
other family members, in order to receive welfare benefits. Support systems and relatives living in the mother's household
threaten the mother's eligibility for public support. Thus, while
there is political rhetoric about strengthening family life, the
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cuts in federal welfare programs have merely decreased poor
mothers' well being.
Poverty Among American Mothers
Female headed households, while perhaps varied in their
living arrangements, have one strong characteristic in common-they are poor. Half of all of the female headed families
are poor and dependent on welfare (Bell, 1987). These families
have a substantially higher rate of poverty than any other category of the poor including the disabled and the elderly. And
while affirmative action legislation may have brought about the
entry of more women into traditionally male-dominated, higherpaying occupations and professions, there is a dear and disturbing trend of increasingly large numbers of women (and
women who work) entering the ranks of the poor. Studies consistently find the majority of female headed families at the bottom of the scale on every measure of economic well being
(McLanahan and Garfinkel, 1989). The Census Bureau in 1985,
estimated that even when in-kind benefits were calculated for
mother-only families, between 29-41% remain poor. Even this
lowest estimate far exceeds the post transfer rate of the aged
(2.5%-11%) and two-parent families (9.1%-10.9%). (The large
range is due to the method of calculating the value of post transfer benefits).
Contrasted with the 1970s, female headed families are now
remaining in poverty for longer "episodes". In 1984, mother only
white families were living in poverty for about five years and
black families for about seven years (Garfinkel and McLanahan,
1986). This represents a substantial length of time for a child to
live in poverty. Ellwood (1987) concludes, after an extensive
summary of the welfare dependency literature, that single mothers rarely leave welfare because they have found employment.
Rather it is because the single mothers marry or the divorced
women remarry. The small percentage of women who find an
adequate job that permits them to leave public assistance, usually were better educated and trained prior to getting onto welfare. And most of the short term successes are among women
who have recently been divorced or deserted, not among never
married mothers.
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A major reason for the increase in impoverished femaleheaded families is the failure (or inability) of fathers to provide
sufficient economic support to their children. Duncan and Hoffman (1985) found that the income of recently divorced women
one year after a divorce is only 67% of their pre-divorce income.
Weitzman's study (1985) of the economic consequences of divorce reported that divorced women experienced a 73% decline
in income one year after the divorce, compared to a 42% increase among divorced men. Studies of child support payments
from the noncustodial father find that only a minority of women
consistently receive the Court decreed support their children
were awarded.
Another reason for these womens' low standard of living is
the low wages they earn. Wages for women remain significantly
lower than for men and the lack of available and affordable child
care severely limits single womens' work opportunities. Public
income transfer payments designed to assist children in need of
support were never designed to bring them out of poverty.
Public Support for American Mothers
Policy analysts are now debating the influence of welfare
supports on family formation. Some argue that an increase in
welfare benefits (sufficient to move families above the poverty
line) would result in the fostering of long-term dependency. This
argument concludes that if the government increases or broadens
its responsibility to care for needy women and their children,
individuals will be less likely to feel responsible themselves and
parents (usually fathers) will participate even less than they do
now to support their children. Murray (1985) suggests that the
increases in AFDC benefits have contributed to the large increase in mother-only families and is the reason why absent
fathers do not feel an obligation to support their children or
marry. Others critique this position as simplistic and contend
that this analysis ignores the real difficulties families have in
obtaining and securing employment with sufficient wages to
bring a family out of poverty. It also makes no mention of the
lack of affordable child care that a single mother needs if she is
to secure employment, nor the reality of racial and sex discrimination in finding employment.
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Ellwood and Bane (1985)'s careful analysis of welfare benefits
and economic incentives conclude that AFDC does not appear
to be the underlying cause for the dramatic change in family
structure. Garfinkel and McLanahan (1966) study concludes that
while welfare support may provide the funds for single mothers
to set up separate living arrangements they find no data to support the contention that welfare dollars have influenced the rise
in number of female headed households. Rather they suggest
that, particularly for black families, the large increase in female
headed families may reflect the decreasing employment opportunities for black men and thus the small pool of eligible marriage partners who could contribute to their support and their
children (see also Wilson, 1987). The lower rates among white
women may reflect some increased economic and employment
opportunities for them that provide some economic independence and the ability to choose not to marry.
It is now being frequently suggested by politicians that families must be forced to become more financially responsible for
the support of their children. Changes in AFDC policies now
require relatives (even step-relatives) to assume financial responsibility for children in an attempt to shift the financial burden from AFDC to the parents of single mothers.
Private Support for American Mothers
In the face of failing social policies, many poor women receive assistance from their own families of origin. Mary Ann
Scheirer (1983) contends that poor families who live in multigenerational households, experience some easing of the economic burdens by pooling their resources and achieving some
economies of scale. There is also some evidence that the presence of multiple adults may improve the psychological functioning of family members (Kellam, Enominger, & Turner, 1977;
Furstenburg, 1978). Stack's (1974) ethnographic work depicts the
exchange of goods and services within family networks that
helps to mute economic uncertainties.
Of particular interest in this research is the quality of life
among women not in traditional family structures. Our concern
is with mothers who are living alone or in nontraditional families. Mothers living outside of the "traditional" family structure
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are likely to have fewer support systems, fewer social contacts
and less access to support and resources than mothers living
with partners or with other family members.
Definitions of Family Status
Since little quantitative data have been reported in the literature on the nature, incidence and circumstances of the many
new forms of families, and since the Census Reports present
data on families in very narrow, traditionally defined ways, the
researchers turned to the U.S. Census Public Use Microdata
Sample (PUMS). Use of the microdata allowed us to create new
varibles from the original census information so that a variety
of family structures could be defined for our research purposes.
It also enabled us to devise surrogate "quality of life" variables
for manipulation. The data set was from the full U.S. Census
questionnaire, induding the detailed household and labor force
experience data asked of 16% of the census population. The data
for this paper were from a 1% sample from the state of Hawaii
(n=9638), but the methodology is applicable to other states and
for the U.S. as a whole.
Several difference definitions of "family status" have been
used in the research literature to describe the life circumstances
of men, women and children. Two variables have been shown
to have a significant relationship to women's economic status.
These are: (a) household headship status (whether a woman is
the head of a household, be it family or nonfamily), and
(b) parental status (whether the woman has her own or partner's
children living in the household and the age of the children).
Bradbury, Danzinger, Smolensky and Smolensky (1980) found
a relationship between family status and poverty. Bell (1986) and
Pearce (1979) also document the relationship between female
household headship (particularly with children present) low income and welfare receipt.
We attempted to develop a family categorization scheme that
more nearly reflects the variety and diversity of family types that
now exist. From the census tapes, it was possible to identify
women living in multigenerational households, or living with
other adults present, as well as those who were living truly alone
as single parents. We could thus consider a woman with a male
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"partner or roommate" to be more like a married couple than a
"nonfamily" household, as the Census would have classified
them. For all women over age 15, we found 18 different living
arrangements that could be described due to differences in the
presence and age of children, number of generations in the
household, and the relationships among the members of the
household. The age distribution within these 18 classes reflects
a life-cycle pattern of women living at home with family of origin, then becoming more independent and beginning to raise
their own families, then at a later age moving again into a family-dependent situation (often an extended family) or into solitary life or an institution.
Ten of the 18 family arrangements related to women with
dependent children. As these women are the focus of this paper,
data are presented here only for "mothers", and for brevity have
been restricted to 4 types which reflect the extremes of the range.
These are: nuclear family (mother, husband/partner and child/
ren); multigenerational family (mother, husband/partner, child/
ren and adult's parent/s); single mother family (mother with
child/ren only); and single mother in a multigenerational family.
"Mothers" are defined as women who are responsible for their
own or their partner's dependent children.
For the entire sample, (n=352,500) 26% were married women
without children; 31% were married women with children; 6%
were single mothers; 13% were women living alone or in a
nonfamily situation; and 22% were women in a family household, but were not mothers or wives. The ethnic distribution
within family arrangements appears to reflect the emphasis on
individualism among caucasians, contrasting with the emphasis
on group and family units among other cultural groups such as
the Japanese and Filipinos in Hawaii.
Family Structure and Characteristics of Mothers
Hawaii's unique ethnic mix, where no one ethnic group is
in the majority, is reflected in the ethnic distribution of family
structures (see Table 1). Whereas caucasians are the largest single group, many other ethnic groups are strongly present. This
suggests that these statewide data are a good source for the variety of family types which may be found across the United
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Table 1
Ethnicity of Family Status Classes
FAMILY STATUS
RACE

White
Japanese
Other Asian
Hawaiian/
Pacific Islander
Other
TOTAL
TOTAL
NUMBER

Nuclear

Multigenerational

single
parent

1 Mom
Multigen'l

(Percentage)
33.6
14.3
22.9

34.4
21.9
15.6

32.1
29.0
22.6

All
Women

34.8
24.4
23.1

15.3
33.1
37.1

13.6
4.0
100.0

12.1
2.4
100.0

25.0
4.3
100.0

18.8
9.4
100.0

12.8
3.5
100.0

105,600

6,000

14,000

3,300

352,500

States as a whole. Blacks are less than 1% of the population of
Hawaii, however their role in the socioeconomic structure is
closely paralleled by that of the native Hawaiians-some 10%
of the total population. As with the total U.S. population, the
economically depressed minority groups in this study (Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders) are heavily overrepresented among
single mothers. Caucasian women are slightly overrepresented
in the single mother category. Multigenerational arrangements
are much more frequent among the Japanese and other Asian
groups.
The data indicate that almost 70% of mothers in Hawaii live
in a functionally nuclear family with another 13% being single
heads of households. These figures suggest that Hawaii may
have a somewhat slower rate of change away from the traditional
family form than the rest of the U.S. and that other "family"
structures are emerging.
Using the broad indicator of mean total household income
per person in the household as a quality of life measure, female
headed families are dearly vulnerable to poverty. Thirty three
percent of all single mothers are below the poverty line in Hawaii contrasted to only 5% of all married mothers. Women living
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Table 2
Income, Poverty, and Labor Characteristicsof Family Types
Family
Status

Nuclear
Multigenerational
Single parent
1 Mom
multigen'l

Average
Total
Income

Average
Household
Income

Average
Income/
Person

6289

25672

6412

6069
8165

35888
10193

7210

26861

Percentage
in
Poverty

Average
Wage
Income

Percent in
Full-Time
Work

7

8611

41

5911
3494

2
40

8139
8098

48
49

5110

0

5775

56

alone or in a non-family situation are also extremely vulnerable
to poverty with 29% of them falling beneath the poverty line.
However, these aggreggate statistics hide an important effect of
living in a multigenerational family, which appears to provide
substantial protection from poverty for the women who are able
(or choose) to live in such an arrangement. (See Table 2) This
finding supports Garfinkel and McLanahan's (1988) study demonstrating that welfare provides no incentive to live
independently.
Comparison of the labor force status, income level, and poverty experience of mothers across the four family types confirms
the points made in the earlier discussion.
Mothers living in a nuclear family have the highest average
level of income per person in the household; 41% of them work
full-time; 7% of these families still are in poverty but less than
4% are welfare recipients.
Married mothers in multigenerational families are on average a little younger and have fewer children than their nuclear
counterparts. The average income per person in these households is low, but only 2% are below the poverty line and none
are welfare recipients; 48% of these mothers work full-time.
These data indicate that the extended family may indeed offer
some financial protection (and child care benefits) to these
mothers and their children as suggested by Scheirer (1983), and
certainly relieves the state of welfare responsibility. In Hawaii,
70% of these mothers are of Japanese or other Asian ethnicity.
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Single mothers have a smilar age profile to their married
counterparts, but are more likely to have only one or two dependent children. Importantly, they have the highest level of
labor force participation (49% work full-time) and the highest
average level of total income (reflecting some effect of child support payments), yet they are the most impoverished group with
40% in poverty and they live in families with the lowest average
level of income per person in the household. Consequently, over
half of those with young children and almost a third of those
with older children are receiving welfare. Twenty-seven percent
of the employed mothers are still living in poverty, thus while
these mothers earn money to try to support themselves, many
are unable to earn enough to raise their families out of poverty.
Hawaiian and other Polynesian women are overrepresented in
this group.
Single mothers living in multigenerational families are young
(many had teen pregnancies) and often with only one dependent
child, but with a high rate of labor force participation (56%
work full-time). They earn significantly lower wages than other
mothers, yet none of these families are living beneath the poverty line. Apparently, their relative inability to earn income
(partly related to lack of education) is considerably offset by their
access to income earned by other members of the household.
Thus, it appears that for those single mothers for whom this
option is available, multigenerational living arrangements raise
the level of family income, holding family size constant, and
contribute to an improved quality of life for these mothers and
their children. Welfare receipt also reflects this, with only a
quarter of these mothers of young children, and none of the
mothers of older children having welfare income.
Children as the "Cause" of Poverty
Examination of the number of children mothers are responsible for elicited two important findings which have implications
for policy development. First, there is a strong, inverse association between a woman's years of education and the number of
children she had borne, regardless of her family structure. While
this relationship may not be directly causal, it suggests that the
fewer children a woman has, the greater her chances of educa-
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Figure 1. Number of dependent children compared to the mother's
total personal income
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tional achievement. Similarly, the number of children was also
strongly associated with the amount of personal income a mother
earns (see Fig. 1).
Second, there is an unsurprising but patently dear association in the data between the woman's age at the birth of her first
child and the average household income per family member, a
broad indicator of quality of life. Thus teenage mothers live longterm in households with substantially lower total income than
do women who begin their childbearing in later years (see
Fig. 2).
As a final analysis, the researchers attempted to define the
relative contribution of a variety of characteristics to the quality
of life among these mothers using the poverty threshold as an
indicator. This was done via a stepwise regression analysis of
independent variables: the mother's age at the birth of her first
child, the number of dependent children in her household, her
educational level, race, family structure and labor force partici-
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Figure 2. The relationship of the mothers age at birth of her first
child and her household income
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pation level, and the age of her child/ren. Table 3 displays the
cumulative contribution of six of these variables that explain
35% of the variance in the poverty level of mothers.

The number of weeks a mother can work obviously contributes
substantially to her ability to rise above the poverty level and
this explains over 16% of the variance. However, her family
structure, as defined by authors, contributes to the explanation
of another 11% of the variance and thus may be considered an
important factor in understanding the life circumstances of female headed households. Years of education, presence of schoolage children, age at birth of the first child and membership in
a minority ethnic group also help explain the likelihood that a
mother will live in poverty.
Summary and Conclusions
These data confirm for Hawaii what has been suggested
widely in the research literature for the rest of the United States.
Women outside of the traditional nuclear family, attempting to
raise children, are doing so in poverty and often without much
public support. While many of these women are working full-
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Table 3
Regression Analysis Summary Table For Poverty

VARIABLE

CUMULATIVE
CONTRIBUTION TO
VARIANCE

Number of Weeks Worked
Family Structure

16.6%
27.6%

Years of Education
Presence of School-Age Children

30.8%
33.8%

Age at Birth of First Child

33.8%

Member of Minority Race

34.1%

time, they are not able to bring themselves and their families
above the poverty threshold. The quality of life for these mothers
and their children is shrouded in economic hardship. The feminization of poverty may be mitigated somewhat by different
living arrangements such as multigenerational families, however
the young mothers currently being supported by their parents
have few prospects for further educational attainment and their
employment potential seems limited. Many unmarried mothers
cannot live with their mothers because their mothers can not
afford to house them. And many do not choose to remain in
their family of origin. Attention to family structure has important implications for welfare policy formulation as family structure appears to be a significant factor in determining the quality
of life among women, in particular their poverty status and that
of their children.
The Hawaii data show that single mothers fall into at least
two broad categories with differing welfare service needs. One
is the category of women who have been married but are now
divorced and are single heads of household. They have a high
level of labor force participation, are relatively well educated yet
are unable to bring their families out of poverty. Women in this
group may be "displaced homemakers", in need of supported
job training, preemployment training and/or possibly, additional education. Their greatest need appears to be sufficient
income from their paid employment and other sources to keep
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them and their families out of poverty. Guaranteed income proposals and universal family allowances seem to be relevant policy directions for this category of women. Access to affordable
child care, particularly after school care, is also an issue for these
women.
The second broad category is single women who are mothers
who are imbedded in multigenerational families. These women
usually have never married and became mothers in their teen
years before finishing high school. This group also participates
in the labor force, earns low wages commensurate with their
lack of education, but they and their children seem to be protected somewhat from economic hardship by their multigenerational living arrangement. However, evidence from this analysis
shows dearly that most teen mothers never finish their interrupted education. They are permanently at risk for falling into
poverty should the protection of the older generation no longer
be available. This group has been particularly neglected by policy makers, presumably because they are not now in poverty.
It is dear that these women have special needs for access to
continued education, job training and child care. This investment should pay for itself in enabling these women to reach
their potential and contribute fully to society.
Policy Implications
The Hawaii research has two further implications for consideration by policy makers. First, the results highlight the need
for research at the national level into the impact of family structure on poverty and welfare receipt so that effective and comprehensive welfare policies may be designed and implemented.
In particular, it would be most useful if family structure, as
these researchers have defined it, could be included as a variable
in the Census questionnaire so that information of this type is
more accessible to policy analysts. The research reported here
is the first of its kind in the welfare literature and opens the way
for exploration of a wide range of variables relevant to policy
formulation.
Second, the study of the obvious logical relationship between early motherhood and lack of formal education should be
replicated and updated to see if the association holds for the
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nation. A teenage mother who has left school will need intensive
assistance that may include several years of support until she
becomes "job ready". And she may need help believing that
more education is an opportunity that she should grasp. Many
theorists now suggest that young, minority women have low
self-esteem, and have lost faith in themselves and the system;
many do not have the motivation to try anymore since they have
seen and experienced so much failure.
A Role for Social Workers
Social workers have begun to call (again) for the introduction
of family allowances in place of piecemeal attempts at welfare
reform (see Kamerman and Kahn, 1987; Miller, 1987). Family
policies must be designed to assist single working mothers and
their children, whatever their living arrangements. Despite the
dramatic increase in labor force participation of women, they
remain at significant risk for poverty. They still earn the lowest
wages, are most frequently employed only on a part-time basis
and experience the most sporadic unemployment episodes. Policies that protect the working poor are needed with special attention to the mothers and children of our society. Examining
and understanding the family structures of poor mothers and
designing policies that truly help them get out of poverty should
be the focus of social work intervention. This group is too large
and their problems too severe to ignore. If the United States
indeed is to become a "kinder and gentler" nation, we must
address the problem of poor women raising the next generation
of children.
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Book Review

SOCIAL SECURITY AFTER FIFTY: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
Edward D. Berkowitz (Ed.). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1987. pp. 168.
In many ways, this compact little book is a celebration. It is
a celebration of the cornerstone of the American social welfare
system, the Social Security Act of 1935. It is a celebration of the
flexibility of an American political economic system that adjusts,
somewhat reluctantly, to the vagaries of a capitalist system.
Mainly, it is a celebration of the personality and work of three
people instrumental in the development, implementation, and
maintenance of an American institution; Wilbur Cohen, Robert
Myers, and Robert Ball.
Berkowitz's introduction provides intimate insights into these
three dynamic characters in American humanitarianism. More
interestingly, he illustrates how diverse they were in philosophy
and demeanor. Yet, he notes that it was precisely those differences that were vital to the structuring of an income maintenance system that has endured for fifty years. It has endured
despite constant political attempts to alter its intent. It has endured despite frequent administrative efforts to undermine its
scope.
Virtually every other article in this collection alludes to these
points from a specialized scholarly perspective. Neff offers an
historical overview of the first fifty years, focusing on the early
years of social security. Aaron and Thompson orient the reader
to an economist's thoughts on this American effort into collective
responsibility. Their opening statement is clever in this regard.
"Changes in the attitudes of American economists toward the
U.S. social security program resemble the reported attitudes of
English upper-class parents toward their maturing offspring.
When the social security system was in its infancy, economists
regarded it with great interest and affection. They ignored the
institution during its childhood. As social security reached maturity, economists reacted with a mixture of embarrassment and
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shock." This reviewer found the chapter by Derthick helpful in
understanding the political-economic decisions to federalize
all the categorical aid programs, but AFDC, under SSI.
Achenbaum's contribution is a comprehensive and provocative
piece on strategies for expanding the current social security system and creatively integrating it with other existing social welfare programs. In brief, if a person is interested in the social
security system, this book contains something for everybody.
That is both its strength and its weakness. The reader should
be selective. Read only those chapters relevant to one's specific
concerns, or some of the detail will become tedious.
Regardless of the admonition just presented, everyone should
join in the celebration by reading Cohen's article and Myers'
reply. It is a rare treat. Here are two "high priests" of social
security comparing notes. Wilbur Cohen's optimism is infectious. Myers' actuarial pragmatism provides balance. Together,
they give all of us potential cynics renewed hope.
Reviewed by James L. Wolk, Associate Professor Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri
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and relatively autonomous social space that duplicates the institutional
structure of the larger society and provides basic minimal resources for
social mobility, if onty within a truncated black class structure. And the
social ills that have long been associated with segregated poverty-violent

crime, drugs, housing deterioration, family disruption, commercial
blight, and educational failure-have reached qualitatively different proportions and have become articulated into a new configurations that
endows each with a more deadly impact than before."
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